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EGYPT

Rights Group Discusses Censorship Questions

92AF0827B Cairo *AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI* in Arabic
18 May 92 p 11

[Article by Khalid al-Sarjani: "Does the Religious Establishment Have Censorship Over Publishing: How Does That Influence Freedom of Thought, Creativity? No 'Religious Establishment' in Islam, But Civilian Institutions Connected to Religion"]

[Text] "Freedom of Thought, Belief, and Expression," was the title of the third intellectual seminar of the Egyptian Human Rights Organization. It was a two-day meeting, held in the headquarters of the Egyptian Association of Political Economics and Legislation in Cairo, in which discussion of these issues and their various ramifications took place, with participation from scholars affiliated with all shades of current thought in Egypt. This caused the discussions to become heated, and the upshot was that the seminar sessions ended with all agreeing to disagree, but without rancor or partisanship.

Today, we will review the documents and sessions of the seminar's first discussion, which dealt with two studies about "freedom of opinion and censorship."

Disagreement From the Beginning!

Journalist Fahmi Huwaydi was the first speaker of the seminar's first session. His subject was "Religious Institutions' Censorship of Publishing, and Its Influence on Freedom of Thought." Before beginning his talk, Huwaydi was anxious to clarify his disagreement with the secretary general, with regard to making accusations against individuals of religious groups. He then began to present his paper, which concentrated on two basic pivotal points. The first was to deny the existence of a religious establishment in Islam that obstructs freedom of opinion, and the second was to clarify his concept of the question of freedom of thought in the Islamic religion. Huwaydi stated that "censorship over publishing is an expression of a secular function and is not, by any standard, a requirement of religious obligation, nor the expression of fundamentalists. We are facing talk about legitimate policy and not Islamic law. Freedom of thought and dialogue are absolute in the Islamic concept. There is nothing in Islam called a 'religious establishment.' We must call attention here—according to Huwaydi's statement—to the fact that dialogue and debate are part of the religious communities [al-milal], sects, those who perform religious rites, and materialists, who make up the basic elements in the Koranic message, which some describe as perpetuating thought and counter-thought."

The sole objective restriction is within the limits of expression of belief, since apostasy and idolatry are not permitted, because belief represents 'the cornerstone of Muslim society.'

Huwaydi uses British society as an example. When British philosopher Bertrand Russell was asked for his opinion, as a man dedicated to democracy and the parliamentary system, as to what he would think about the House of Commons deciding that Britain should be Communist, his immediate response was that he would reject and oppose such a decision because, in that event, Britain would be denying its democratic foundations and the concept of the parliamentary system, and would be establishing a dictatorial system. This would mean that Britain would be abolishing the basis for its existence. Parliament's members had voted to protect that basis upon which the state, its constitution, and all its institutions are based.

Unchallenged Dialogue

One of the concerns is the need to clarify—as Huwaydi says—"that important distinction between the appeal to apostasy and idolatry, which is the object of restriction, and scientific dialogue, which can revolve around any issue, not only in the shari'ah but also in doctrine as well, including objection to the nature of God and His existence. While that appeal is not permissible from the point of view of faith, and not just Islamic faith, the latter dialogue is free of any restriction except the rules of honorable debate, the competence of the participants, its presumed decorum, and the venue for that occasion. However, there are conditions decreed for any serious and responsible dialogue, which result in another obligatory need to consider seriousness and objectivity. It is important that the boundaries be clear between dialogue and challenging the believers' articles of faith, and being disdainful of their sacred things. They are the same presumed boundaries as between criticism and vituperation, or between disagreement and condemnation.

In his paper, Fahmi Huwaydi makes a distinction between an establishment connected with religion, and another that has authority derived from religion. The first is a civilian institution, which is no different from any other institution, either in component parts or jurisdiction. However, that which makes it special is that it does its job in connection with religion. Accordingly, those who work in it are governmental employees, governed by the laws and powers of the state. By virtue of the scientific, functional specialty, the measures they adopt or positions of principle that they express are their point of departure, in terms of obligation or legality. Most of them are able to express an opinion. Perhaps they may take some action in their activity within the limits of evaluating an action or performance, either by criticism, approval, or rejection. In any event, they have no authority over belief or faith, or the essence of a person!

The institution that exercises authority derived from religion is one that exercises its powers by virtue of the fact that it is commissioned by God, with regard to whatever responsibility it espouses for Him. He is the empowerment, emanating from the concept of a specific belief, which the sacredness grants to an institution itself.

and empowers it to exercise the right to protect the belief and defend the conscience, out of a conviction that that is an expression of God's will. That concept gives the institution very broad powers, extending up to the limit of deciding "heresy," which would be considered a rejection of God's mercy in the Hereafter. Many negative consequences would ensue with regard to the individual in his earthly life, including no prayers said over him when he dies and allowing his wife to divorce him, in accordance with invalidating the marriage contract because of divestment and dispossession.

Civilian, Not Religious

Huwaydi concluded that the religious institution, in this latter concept, absolutely does not exist in Islam, inasmuch as there is nothing called a religious institution, or rather, there is no intermediary between man and God that could have the right to govern his conscience and intervene in his affairs. This permits us to determine that there is no religious establishment exercising censorship over publishing, but rather, it is a civilian institution exercising censorship over religious publishing.

Huwaydi turned to the second point, which is the concept of censorship and freedom of opinion in light of the Islamic religion, by saying that since censorship over publishing was tantamount to a secular organization connected to the religious culture, there was no way to evaluate that censorship except in light of what the culture reveals between the interests achieved and the chicaneries caused. It is the balance that decides many of the legitimate political requirements. If we decide that the merchandise of publishing are ideas, then we see no way to deal with this question, except on the same level, so that ideas may contend with ideas, and opinion can refute opinion, especially since this is the method undertaken by the Islamic message, for example, in the holy Koran.

Despite the fact that this is fundamental and is the ideal situation to which we ought to aspire, in the reality in which we live, it is not unlikely that there are attempts at cultural intrigue and destruction of consciousness. As Fahmi Huwaydi puts it: "There is no objection to an abundance of boards within the state's cultural agencies to examine books imported from abroad or published domestically, in the context of state efforts to pursue its responsibilities vis-a-vis social defense. In this regard, it should be stipulated that the task of that board has clear guidelines and limits, so that it continues 'to preclude what is unacceptable from being disseminated.'"

Huwaydi calls attention to the fact that, while the Islamic institution, with all the concentration and attention from intellectuals and the media, maintains its position with regard to freedom of publication, the position of the Christian religious organizations with regard to the same subject requires mention and noting.

The lawyer, Najad al-Bar'i, presented another paper for discussion, concerning religious institutions' censorship over freedom of publication.

Censorship Without Legal Basis

Al-Bar'i cited several points that make the religious institution's censorial stance against freedom of publication stand out, headed by the fact that it has no known legal basis for this because, with the promulgation of the permanent constitution for Egypt in 1971, previous censorship over the publication of books and printed materials was completely ended. In Article 48, it stipulates that freedom of the press, printing, publishing, and the media was guaranteed, and censorship over the press was prohibited, as was warning, suspending, or abolishing the press administratively. An exception is permitted if a state of emergency is declared or, in time of war, limited censorship may be imposed on the press, periodicals, and media, concerning matters connected with public safety or national security objectives. All of this is in accordance with the law.

Al-Bar'i added that this censorship not only conflicts with these clear, constitutional provisions, but it also denies the provisions of the Law of al-Azhar No. 13 for 1961, which abridged the text of Article 17 of the executive regulation for it, issued by directive of the president of the republic, [stating that one of] the duties of the Academy of Islamic Research is to pursue what is published about Islam and the Islamic legacy in research and studies, in order to derive benefit from them or to correct them. Moreover, this censorship also constitutes a violation of the Law of Publications No. 20 for 1936, which made the Cabinet sole authority to prohibit circulation in Egypt of publications that expose religions to matters that disturb the public peace. The Court of Cassation severely condemned the Academy of Islamic Research's request to impound any book whatsoever, regardless of subject matter.

Another point cited by al-Bar'i was that this censorship is used to serve political goals in many cases. Al-Bar'i analyses al-Azhar's report concerning the confiscation of a book about Islam in the 15th Century of the Muslim Calendar. In considering the reasons that the report gave for confiscating book, al-Bar'i brought out the fact that all reasons to confiscate were political. The third characteristic of this censorship is that it is exercised against publications that have no connection with religion and is done by persons who are not specialists in the fields they are censoring. "The object of the academy's jurisdiction is to discuss purely religious matters or, specifically, the Koran, the Prophetic Sunnah, or those studies that deal directly with Islam, in terms of its provisions or basic principles. For this purpose, those responsible for the academy were adequately prepared, but their preparation, and the diversity of studies they receive, do not qualify them to make judgements on creative works, either literature, poetry, or even films, since those creative branches clearly have special principles that only permit examination by those trained in those principles, who have attained an appreciation for culture by which they are able to weigh creative works."

The fourth and last point is that the censorship of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs takes the form of being subsequent to the publishing of the publication. This is disturbing to creative persons and publishers. Subsequent censorship is, perhaps, the most dangerous, in light of the lack of clear guidelines of just what is permitted or forbidden. It puts the writer, throughout his creative period, in a state of fear and increasing tension. Moreover, the threat of his prosecution continues, no matter how long his book has been on the market. This prevents his pursuing his creativity in complete freedom.

This last point raised heated discussion about the role of religious institutions in censorship over freedom of thought. A heated contest developed around whether ideas or opinion should be confiscated by any institution, or whether freedom should be absolute. This is a matter which, of course, was not resolved; discussion of it continued throughout the rest of the seminar.

Social Security Legislation Approved

92AF0939A Cairo *AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI* in Arabic
6 Jun 92 p 5

[Article by Fawqiyah al-Kuli: "New Social Security Legislation To Deal With Effects of Allowance Inclusion; Raising Minimum Monthly Contribution for Basic and Variable Plans to 1,000 Pounds; Permitting Investment of Son or Brother Full Year's Pension in Small Projects in Order To Eliminate Unemployment; Rules for Disbursing New Social Allowance to Qualified Pensioners as of 1 July"]

[Text] It has been decided to introduce new amendments to the social security laws in order to deal with the consequences stemming from the gradual addition of a special allowance to the basic benefit payment after having removed this allowance from the adjustable pension so as to achieve justice and equality for the insured. The amendments include the addition of five Egyptian pounds annually to the minimum basic pension until the year 1997 so that the minimum limit will rise from 35 to 65 pounds per month.

Dr. Amal 'Uthman, the minister of social insurance and social affairs, has stated that the new laws provide for the possibility of exceeding the maximum basic wage [pension] subscription so that this subscription will increase by as much as the allowance that is scheduled to be added to the wage [pension]. This will result in raising the maximum gradually from 250 pounds to 500 pounds monthly. This is in addition to the adjustable pension.

The maximum adjustable pension subscription has been increased to 6,000 pounds annually, i.e. an average of 500 pounds instead of 375 pounds monthly, as of 1 July 1992. This has been done in full agreement with the General Federation of Egyptian Workers and the Work Force Committee.

The minister added that the new amendments call for providing new benefits for pensioners, including raising

the minimum limit for funeral expenses and a marriage grant of 200 pounds for a daughter or a sister. For the first time, it has been decided to give a son or a brother, whose allowance has been suspended because he has reached the age of 21 or because he has reached the age 26 and has not yet completed his studies, a grant equaling a full year's allowance, plus various allowances, provided that the minimum is no less than 200 pounds, and to link this grant to the possibility of being invested in family-owned enterprises so as to wipe out the unemployment problem and to encourage young people to create small projects.

The amendments also provide for insurance against work-related injuries, the right of an injured worker to medical treatment and care if the injury results in a setback or complications after the end of the convalescent period. For some disabilities, it has been decided to extend the convalescent and disability reassessment period to four years after the proven date of the injury.

The legislation also provides for foregoing debts emanating from combined pensions as long as they are compatible with the new combination limits.

It has been decided to forego reclamation of funds inappropriately or unfairly disbursed now that the combination limit has been increased from 30 to 50 and eventually to 100 pounds, thus reducing the debt of the people concerned.

Yesterday, the minister issued the new regulations governing the disbursement of the new social allowance to pensioners and other qualified recipients beginning 1 July 1992. The regulations call for a 20 percent increase in all pensions that come into effect up to 30 June 1992 and that are guaranteed by all the social security laws, including comprehensive insurance and social security. Pensioners eligible for pensions before this date will benefit from this increase.

The minister asserted that this increase will be calculated on the basis of the two pensions, i.e. the basic and the adjustable, and of the increases added to them by 30 June 1992, thus making it possible for the maximum increase to amount to 98 pounds. The increase is also applicable to pensions that have exceeded the maximum and it will be added to the pensions previously raised to the minimum limit.

As for pensions commencing 1 July or thereafter, there will be—in addition to the increase amounting to 20 percent of the basic pension—an increase in the adjustable pension payable as of the above date amounting to 80 percent of the allocated special allowance because the effect of the increase will not appear in the pension in the initial years of disbursement.

As for the comprehensive insurance and social security pensions, the pension has been increased equally, taking

into account the pound fractions. Thus, the social security pension will rise from 13 pounds to 15 pounds and the comprehensive insurance pension will rise from 17 pounds to 21 pounds.

Consideration has also been given to granting the new increase to cases which have already reached the maximum [pension limit] by combining the allowance with the pension for expatriate businessmen and workers.

Ex-Minister: Remove Obstacles to Education

92AF0827A Cairo *AL-AHRAM* in Arabic
8 May 92 p 13

[Article by 'Ayidah Razq: "Liberate Education, Our Cultural Development: One Truth"]

[Text] Ten reasons for the trouble with reforming education were enumerated by Halim Jurays, former under-secretary of the Ministry of Education and a current member of the National Specialization Council, in the first section of his recently published book entitled, "Education Reform: A Call to Liberate Egyptian Education From Its Mistakes."

The reasons are:

1. Unclear goals that education must try to attain. The best evidence of this is that we have no clear answer to a single question: What are we learning?
2. Pursuing partial reform. Leaders want to achieve rapidly-implemented development, but it is well known that educational reform is a long process, and its results are only apparent after many years.
3. We do not benefit from experiences of past generations. Each minister comes to the ministry and begins his work to develop curricula, without a sound scientific appraisal of applied curricula, in light of actual implementation.
4. A lack of long-term independent, educational policy. We need a ministry policy, not a minister's policy. We must also test before generalizing, because errors in the field of education cannot be corrected over the near-term.
5. Accepting quantity without quality in diagnosing and treating our problems. We forget that education is a state of mind in the first place. When complaints increased about the poor level of Arabic language instruction, those responsible for education resorted to increasing the number of lessons. We have forgotten that the weakness is in performance. This same error was made in preparing elementary education teachers. The number of years to qualify them was increased to five. Despite that, the result dashed our hopes. On the contrary, it produced more problems, and most importantly, produced contempt for working in the elementary field.
6. Our recommendations for reform are structured with no regard for reality and resources. The result blocks our

efforts, because the real world rejects them. A fact that should not be overlooked is that we have gone overboard in producing theoretical, pedagogical ideas. We are flying right over where we ought to be. Today, we are in the direst need of a first developmental stage, requiring redoubled efforts in light of our presently available resources.

7. We adhere to slogans and principles, but deviate in applying them. We defend conditions and practices that have proved to be failures in terms of guiding education through obstacles. We do that, believing that it is our duty to adhere to the political line, while assuming that the leaders of educational development and reform will have abundant confidence and courage, and the ability to look into the future with intellectual actions, exposing any error or practice that has been proven unfeasible.

8. Applying statistical principle to draw us away from the reality of our problems. We do not understand that our accountability to future generations will be different, when they discover that we left them weighed down with backwardness and illiteracy, with education that is incapable of transforming the children of the next generation into productive citizens, believing in work and assuming responsibility.

9. We attribute all our failures in the field of education reform to a lack of resources, budget deficits, or deterioration of the level of instructors. We forget the disparities in our methods of thinking and the enormity of our aspirations. In many cases, we make plans for whatever should be reformed; yet, we hate to plan for modest reform, commensurate with our present situation and available resources. We don't remember that reform is possible in the worst conditions and with the least resources, provided that we take into consideration the possibility of having different levels of reform and follow-up planning over many years. We should note that the first reform plan or starting point should consider the importance of planning, as well as its difficulties, since it requires multiple efforts, constant follow-up, diligent supervision, and ideas that are in tune with reality.

10. We concentrate on goals instead of the reasons for our reforms.

We shall stop briefly at this last reason. Halim Jurays states: "We forget to inquire into the reasons when challenging many of our educational problems. Therefore, all our efforts come to nothing. We do that with regard to certain problems that have occupied the thinking of all senior leaders, ministers, teachers, guardians, and students over the past half century. Continuous efforts have been made to save education, to no avail. On the contrary, the situation worsens year after year. These four problems are:

- Private lessons;
- Alternative books;
- Cheating on examinations; and,
- Memorization and rote.

The most dangerous effects that these problems produce are that they nullify the basic function of the school. The home takes on this function through private lessons and alternative books that are far from the aspired goals. They also nullify free education and the principle of equal opportunity, which the Constitution provides. The problem of memorization and rote has frustrated the hope of attaining education's goals, for which we strive today.

In the second section entitled, "Toward a Future Vision of Modernizing Egyptian Education", Halim Jurays reviews the shape of society at the present time, and the types of defects with which it is beset:

1. Demographic disparity, i.e., population expansion that has not been accompanied by equal growth in economic revenue and social services, including educational services, especially in the second half of this century. This has been accompanied by human backwardness and the failure to equip youth with necessary knowledge, skills, and behaviorisms.

2. Defects in the structure of the labor force.

3. Deficiencies in productivity in economic and social fields.

4. Imbalance in consumption, i.e., rates of individual consumption of food, energy, and drinking water, have multiplied in recent years.

5. Disparity in values and conduct. Evidence for that appears in the deviations and strange kinds of behavior among Egyptians, which have not previously been seen.

The author then looks into future requirements, explaining the nature and pillars of the new cultural revolution, and the requirements of cultural change with regard to education.

In his book, the author calls our attention to certain fields to which we have not been giving our educational attention. They are:

1. Self-guidance and direction, which means guiding the students' to the kind of education that is compatible with their abilities and aptitudes, in order to guarantee the best for our human resources.

2. Behavioral instruction.

3. School activities, which disappeared with the school's courtyard, laboratory, and the system of two recesses.

Apart from these missing areas, in the author's view, there are two areas that need increased concern and attention:

1. Environmental education. He means by that, all educational activity should take the local environment as a starting point.

Neglect of environmental education has led to a gap between theory and practice, and to a lack of a comprehensive view of facts in people's thinking, as a result of separating some phenomena from others. This neglect has also led to the killing off of the Egyptian's innovativeness and creativity.

2. Population education. This means the concept and facts concerning population, and its connection with the life of the young and elderly within their home and community.

After that, the author discusses emergency and rescue agencies. He means by that those agencies whose efforts can be relied upon to achieve a rapid return on a level close to our educational reform cycles. One is the Agency of Technical Supervision and Guidance, which is still influenced by the old nomenclature. It deals with inspection, since it used to carry out surprise monitoring and tutelage. Most of its interest is aimed at having students memorize as much information as possible, which has no connection with their lives or environment. Another system is training in service.

Finally, the author reviews the revolution of American educational reform. This revolution was implemented as a result of the warning of danger announced by American opinion leaders and intellectuals in their famous report, ["A Nation in Danger,"] published in 1983, when they revealed that Japan had eclipsed America. They understood the fact that building the human structure on sound foundations is the only way to respond to their concerns.

Minister on Water Infrastructure Development

92AF0939B Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
13 Jun 92 p 5

[Article by 'Abd-al-Fattah Ibrahim: "Al-Kafrawi Asserts: Drinking Water in Greater Cairo Increased to 4.8 Million Cubic Meters; Efficiency of al-Suyuf, al-Ma'murah, Bab Sharqi, and al-Manshiyah al-Jadidah Plants Enhanced; 43 Sanitary Sewerage Plants, 18 of Them in Provincial Capitals and Cities, Replaced, Renewed, and Enlarged"]

[Text] Engineer Hasballah al-Kafrawi, the minister of reconstruction, new communities, housing, and utilities, has asserted that total drinking water production in the Greater Cairo will amount to 4.8 million cubic meters daily by the end of this June, an increase of 1.5 million cubic meters over the production in 1987, thanks to the following developments: the construction of giant plants in Musturud and al-Fustat; the development of the al-Ma'adi, North Hulwan, and Shubra al-Khaymah plants; the construction of two [water] elevators in Zahra' al-Ma'adi and 'Uwayqil; and the replacement or drilling of 50 wells in the authority's various plants. Water reservoirs and water mainlines with diameters ranging from 400-1,600 mm and with a total length of 77 km have also been built.

The minister added that the existing plants in al-Suyuf, al-Ma'murah, Bab Sharqi, and al-Manshiyah al-Jadidah have been renewed and enlarged and their efficiency improved; also, new lines and networks have been built to serve the new development areas in Alexandria Governorate, thus raising total production to 2.2 million cubic meters daily, an increase of 700,000 cubic meters daily over the 1987 production.

The minister said that work is underway to complete international contracts for drinking water projects in al-Buhayrah and Kafr al-Shaykh Governorates. This is in addition to the water plants built in al-Mahallah al-Kubra and Kafr Sulayman al-Bahri and the water plant expansions in Damanhur, Kafr al-Dawwar, Tanta, al-Qantarah Gharb, Bani Suwayf, and Asyut. Moreover, a 300-km dual line with diameters ranging from 250-550 mm has been built between Qina, Safajah, and al-Ghardaqah. Moreover, 250 compact units, each with a capacity of 2,000 cubic meters daily, have also been completed, thus raising the total provincial production to nearly 4.8 million cubic meters daily, an increase of 1.5 million cubic meters daily over the 1987 production. Thus, the average per capita daily consumption will amount to 210 liters, with an increase of 40 liters over 1987.

The minister added that work is underway at the Shubra al-Khaymah sanitary sewerage plants, which have a capacity of 600,000 cubic meters daily, and that these plants will be completed next year. Work is also underway at al-Birkah plant which has a capacity of 300,000 cubic meters daily and which will be completed next September; also at Abu-Rawwash plant which has a daily capacity of 400,000 cubic meters daily and which will be completed next October. Moreover, al-Jabal al-Asfar plant, which has a daily capacity of one million cubic meters, will be completed by the end of 1994.

He also noted that the main elevation plant in al-Amiriyah, as well as parts of the main tunnel which has diameter of five meters and a major spiral elevation plant, were put into operation last January.

The first stage of al-Birkah purification plant, with a capacity of 300,000 cubic meters daily; of the Hulwan plant, with a capacity of 350,000 cubic meters daily; and of the Zunayn plant, with a capacity of 330,000 cubic meters daily, has also been put into operation.

The minister also asserted that work is underway to develop and enlarge al-Sharqiyah and al-Gharbiyah purification plants in order to increase their capacity from 50,000 cubic meters daily to 800,000 cubic meters daily by the end of 1993. The area served by sanitary sewerage in Alexandria will increase to 70 percent. Sewer water will be treated before it is channeled into water drains or to Lake Maryut or is used for agricultural purposes, thus eliminating pollution in these areas.

The minister further added that work is underway to replace and renew 18 sanitary sewage disposal plants in provincial capitals and cities, to enlarge 25 plants, and to

complete the second phase of the sewers of the canal cities (Suez, Ismailia, and Port Said) which will be financed by a U.S. grant. Assignments have been given to supply mechanical and electrical equipment for 52 purification plants at a cost of 162 million pounds.

Engineer Mahmud 'Abd-al-Halim, the National Drinking Water and Sanitary Sewerage Authority chairman, has said that civil engineering jobs have been assigned to public sector companies and that assignments have been given to supply equipment and to implement civil engineering projects for 72 sewage treatment plants. A study has been conducted on al-Minufiyah Governorate water and sewerage projects which will be financed by the foreign [currency] component from a Swiss grant.

The authority chairman added that the total volume of the added absorption capacity amounts to 3.7 million cubic meters daily, plus a capacity of 3.3 millions which has existed since 1987, thus raising the national absorption capacity to 6.982 million cubic meters daily with the aim of achieving [economic] development, cultural renaissance, and protection of the environment.

IRAQ

Saddam Reportedly Treated for Nervous Breakdown

92AE0449A London SAWT AL-KUWAIT AL-DUWALI
in Arabic 13 Jun 92 p 5

[Combined Reports from Kuwait and Damascus:
"Reported Breakdown Precludes Public Appearances;
Saddam Faces Armed Insurrection in the South"]

[Text] Iraqi President Saddam Husayn last month suffered a psychological and nervous crisis that forced him to stay in bed for several days and to reduce his itinerary for the past four weeks. Military members of Saddam's personal guard who fled abroad told SAWT AL-KUWAIT that the Baghdad ruler suffered an acute psychological and nervous breakdown on 9 May while on an unannounced visit to the government-controlled Kurdish city of Kirkuk north of Baghdad. The military men said that Saddam was quickly transported by helicopter back to Baghdad where he underwent thorough examination and treatment by a medical team led by a Canadian specialist in psychological and nervous disorders. They said that the physician advised Saddam to stay in bed for at least a month and to receive no visitors except when absolutely necessary.

It is noted that the Iraqi president has not been seen on any public appearance outside his office during the past four weeks. Sources close to the ruling family said that Saddam Husayn had gone to Kirkuk last 19 May, the day Kurdish parliamentary elections were scheduled in the north, to monitor the Kurdish situation at close range since he expected competing Kurdish parties to engage in armed conflict, breaking-down the elections process.

One of the above sources said that the Baghdad ruler had planned to deliver a speech in Kirkuk in preparation for military attacks by Republican Guard and regular army forces on certain Kurdish positions in case the elections failed and civil war broke out among the Kurds. It is to be noted that Iraqi authorities had called upon the Kurds to boycott the elections and revolt against their leaders. The Baghdad ruler was accompanied on his secret visit to Kirkuk by Minister of Defense 'Ali Husayn al-Majid, Minister of the Interior Watban Ibrahim al-Tikriti, Public Security Director Sab'awi Ibrahim al-Tikriti, Military Chief of Staff Iyad Fitayh al-Rawi, and Special Security Director Kasi Saddam Husayn. The aforementioned sources further stated that he [Husayn] felt nervous and exhausted as preliminary reports indicated that peace and calm prevailed in Kurdish towns on election day and that no incidents occurred that would have marred the election process. Later that afternoon, he suffered a psychological and nervous breakdown manifested in a crooked lower jaw and weak speech. He was immediately transported back to Baghdad by military helicopter.

Various rumors circulated in the Iraqi capital that Saddam Husayn suffered a stroke or a shoulder wound. It was also rumored that he was taken to Jordan for treatment.

Turkish member of parliament Nuhad Mukhtib said while visiting Kuwait that anti-government Turkish Kurds are exploiting the vacuum of authority in northern Iraq and are using the region as a launching pad for operations within Turkish borders. He added in a statement to SAWT AL-KUWAIT that the Democratic Socialist Party, headed and represented in the Turkish parliament by Erdal Inonu seeks to substantially improve Kurdish living conditions and advocates giving them local language rights and facilitating their social progress.

In another development, Iraqi opposition newspaper AL-WAFAQ reported yesterday that an armed insurrection against the regime of Saddam Husayn broke out in the al-Ahwar southern regions. The London-based newspaper further reported that the regime, afraid of spreading hostilities, has embarked on a plan to force al-Ahwar residents to abandon their villages and homes. It also reported that two infantry divisions dispatched by the Baghdad government last week to quell what so-called disturbances, encountered nothing but a peaceful population, causing the officers and troops to defy their orders.

Ex-Ambassador Analyzes Opposition Activities

92AE0439B London *AL-HAYAH* in Arabic
9 Jun 92 p 13

[Article by Arshad Tawfiq, former Iraqi ambassador to Spain: "Iraqi Opposition Crisis: The Alternative...Its Prescriptions"]

[Text] For some months, innocent questions have been welling up over whether the Iraqi opposition can unify and pull itself together, but they have been unable to chart a course amidst the clamor of voices and chaos of myriad political groupings.

These questions have gone unanswered because they do not come from opposition organizations, but rather from Iraqis who have rejected the regime without entering the mosaic structures of Iraqi [political] groups. Despite their good intentions, they have been unable to do anything.

The questions have been extinguished and replaced by an appeal to convene a second opposition conference, with all of the formalities of location, timing, and participating faction quotas that this entails. According to opposition publicity, the issue of holding the conference has gained an importance equal to the downfall of the regime itself. Indeed, it has been exaggerated by some to the point that its very convening is deemed synonymous with disposing of the regime.

On the tortuous road to preparing for the conference, new alliances and various defections have come into prominence, in a struggle that concerns winning particular seats in an unknown hall which no one has as yet named.

No effort is required of any Iraqi watcher to ascertain the errors that have gone unchallenged. Those making the errors fail to acknowledge them, and hence they become crises in the full sense of the word.

Where does the crisis lie, and how does it manifest itself?

Any attempt to respond requires these important observations. With the exception of the Kurdish and Islamic movements, other Iraqi groupings have failed to offer clear political platforms and an economic, cultural, and intellectual outlook. Rather, they have satisfied themselves with general slogans that no opposition party disagrees with.

Indeed, those parties were unable, or did not want to make the effort, to offer the public an election platform and a detailed political program as political parties normally do when entering an electoral battle. Perhaps the speed with which these groupings arose was an important factor in their inability to crystallize or develop specific ideas to maturity.

Many believed the regime would fall overnight, and that they had to make themselves available prior to the presumed downfall. In their haste, they believed that proposing names was more important than putting forward ideas and programs.

The passage of more than a year since the ordeal, however, has turned these groupings into pallid names lacking clear ideologies, leading in turn to divisions and disagreements having no political character.

One of the results of movements lacking political content or a clear coloration is that loyalty within any group has to rely on fluctuating personal standards that are subject to change. Given this phenomenon, we can explain why figures are crossing from one movement to another with the speed they change shirts.

For the same reason, Iraqi opposition factions have had no political presence in international, Arab, or national events. Arab events have transpired without receiving any attention from the opposition. Not a single party has even bothered to issue a statement announcing its stance on an event, if some of these parties indeed have a position.

Confronted with national problems in Iraq, the opposition maintained its silence, as if afraid it might lose something by speaking out, not realizing that loss often accompanies silence. Silence is not golden in all cases.

For example, we have heard no specific ideas on the subject of autonomy or the Kurdish problem in general. No one has analyzed the economic blockade, or its causes and results. The Iraqi opposition has offered no clear opinion on future relations with neighboring states.

If the Iraqi opposition has chosen exile as the arena for its activity, it is because it has been unable to play this role inside the country for well-known reasons, the most important one being the regime's repression of any political, cultural, or intellectual activity that runs counter to it. Many of the factions, however, intentionally or not, themselves practice the same repressive methods that are followed inside the regime. They deny other parties political choice, they convert means to ends, and the party or the movement becomes the nation. This results in the creation of partisan struggles that most clearly resemble the struggles of parties competing in an election campaign, with the crucial difference that the Iraqi opposition will never be able to enter any elections, so long as the regime remains in Iraq.

This phenomenon may be due to the prevalent conviction during the Beirut conference that the downfall of the regime was at hand and to the frantic struggle for booty that stayed in place for another year. The opposition clung to the international position on the Iraqi regime, living a full year on statements, believing that the regime would be changed from abroad, and that "abroad" [quotations added] would cart these cripples all the way to the doorstep of the ruling palace. Out of this unrealistic conviction, some made publicity efforts to assert their personal presence by traveling from one capital to

another, so that those capable of carrying them to the seat of power would remember them. We have seen a long parade of these names, now grown tired of wandering and failing to acquire the title of alternative.

Many political observers have noted the absence of an alternative in Iraq. We will not understand this statement until we realize that the Iraqi opposition, in its present condition, has been so far unable to present itself as an alternative. The problem does not lie in the presence or absence of an alternative, but in the prescriptions for change required of such an alternative. By alternative, I mean a program that could be put into action by a group that inspires confidence.

As a unique example of dictatorial regimes, the Iraqi regime has created a social and moral state through a policy of repression, suppression, and forcing the individual into nonexpression of his opinions and convictions. Society is the victim of this state, which has become an acquired habit etched into the memory over many long years. This very same state, with all its ills, has been transmitted to the ranks of the opposition. Rather than preparing studies of this phenomenon and how to get beyond it, the Iraqi opposition has drowned in it.

The moral crisis is a phenomenon that must be confronted with courage and flagged at all points. An honor roll has to be prepared wherein opposition factions pledge to defend certain principles and openly state the issues that they are discussing or disagreeing about.

Some opposition factions claim they have roots on the inside. Apart from well-known exceptions, we find nothing in the activity and modus operandi of these factions that links them inside [Iraq]. They rely on their limited publicity and movement between one country and another. They do not even know the price of a chicken on the Iraqi market. They generally tend to discount the opposition within Iraq, as if considering them competitors and enemies, rather than supporters.

If it can actually be convened, the opposition conference must put a comprehensive political, economic, cultural, and social program onto its action agenda. Moreover, movements that are holding conferences from time to time must get their priorities in order and present themselves as a political program, not as a single individual or group of individuals. The admission that a crisis exists is surely the first step on the road to understanding and getting beyond it.

There has to be a clear conception and analysis of the Gulf War, its causes, circumstances, and results. Or more pointedly, we have to answer the major question, "What happened?"

Given such an analysis, each faction will be able to present its vision to others. The issue of Kuwait and its occupation is not the sole objection. I feel the time is ripe for a quiet and profound discussion along many axes. If we fail to do so, the 1959 phase in Iraq, with all of its

chaos, will have more profound content than this nebulous phase wherein the patriot and the agent, the fighter and the spy, are all mingled together.

Iraqi Atrocities Recounted in Trial in Iran

92AE0452A London SAWT AL-KUWAIT AL-DUWALI
in Arabic 13 Jun 92 p 9

[Article: "Victims of Human Rights Violations in Iraq Appeal to World Conscience; Trying Saddam Husayn Is International Responsibility and Humanitarian Necessity for Region; Credibility of New World Order Is Put to Test and Criterion Is Elimination of Remnants of Dictatorship; Regime Forces Used Children as Human Shields to Confront Uprising"]

[Text] Tehran—SAWT AL-KUWAIT—Within the context of exposing and revealing the crimes of Baghdad's tyrants—crimes unprecedented in ugliness and heinousness in modern history—and at the invitation of the Human Rights Documentation Center and the Alliance for Justice in Iraq, a special committee of legislators and jurists convened at Tehran University throughout the 23rd and 24th of last month to hear testimony from victims and people disabled as a consequence of physical and psychological torture and of terrorism in the jails of Baghdad's ruler and of his henchmen. The committee included Magistrate Muhammad al-Mufti and Attorney 'Aqil al-Shaykh Said. Circumstances beyond control prevented Dr. Shibli al-Mallat from participating. Ghanim Jawad from the Iraqi Human Rights Organization (headquartered in London currently) acted as secretary for the sessions, representing the Alliance for Justice in Iraq. He explained the idea of the sessions and the importance of contributing to the compilation of a documented dossier on the violation of basic human rights and liberties in Iraq. He also explained the importance of the two similar sessions that had been previously held in London and Paris to expose the Iraqi regime in preparation for bringing Saddam Husayn to an international court for the crimes he has committed against his people and the region's peoples, especially against Kuwait which continues to demand that the cream of its youth be released from the captivity of the dictator and a handful of his thugs. Jawad also shed light on the international efforts being made in this regard.

After taking the oath before the committee and in the presence of a crowd of media people and others from international organizations concerned with human rights, the witnesses recounted what they had seen with their own eyes. The following is their testimony:

Testimony of al-Hajj Abu-Shawan: He spoke of the violations committed against Kurds and focused his statement on the (Filite?) Kurds who belong to the Shi'ite sect. He mentioned the campaigns which the regime staged to evict the Filites from the country and which it managed to conceal [from the world]. He noted, for example, that 50 percent of those who were evicted to Iran in 1971 were Filites and that a similar eviction campaign was staged in

1981. He also spoke of detention of the young men of the evicted families in the regime's camps.

Al-Hajj Abu-Shawan also touched on the conditions in Iraqi jails, considering that he himself had been detained in 1981. We should keep in mind that his son was arrested in Kuwait and handed over to the Iraqi regime and that his fate is unknown.

Al-Hajj Karam, an 83-year old man from Baghdad, said that he was evicted after his sons and nephews, totaling 14 altogether, had been arrested. He also said that since their arrest on 16 October 1981, he has learned nothing about them to date (a list of their names with the attached supplements).

Abu-Haydar Shihab, an oil engineer in charge of oil production in Maysan oil field, spoke of the economic sabotage and crimes, especially in the oil and agricultural areas. He also spoke of the consequences to the environment of some of the regime's actions. Furthermore, he provided the names of some oil sector workers, especially engineers, who were executed by the regime (names attached). Some were also jailed. Engineer Shihab also presented a report on "Saddam's crimes in the oil, economic, and agricultural sectors", attaching to the report a small-size book.

Sister Z. Rida, (a 50-year old housewife), said that she was evicted with her husband and her three daughters in 1982, while her three sons were held back and taken to a detention camp. Nothing has been learned about them to date. The three sons were born in 1959, 1961 and 1963. She added that she had previously testified in Geneva some years ago, that she had been promised a positive effort but that nothing had come out of the promise, and that she is still awaiting the outcome of the UN efforts

Al-Hajj Muhammad al-'Amiri, a 41-year old employee of the Organization for the Defense of Free Expression, testified about the regime's violations of free expression. He said: "Many of the cases in which human rights were violated had a connection with the issue of restricted expression."

Al-Hajj al-'Amiri also spoke of the regime's attempts to restrict thinking and to confine it to the "Ba'thist" tendency. He discussed the regime's plan to Ba'th-size institutions and citizens. He gave examples of censorship on Islamic books, especially Shi'ite books. He noted the absence of pluralism and the prohibition against peaceful demonstration and all forms of criticism. He also emphasized that the uprising was an "explosion of repressed opinion" and a "spontaneous referendum" through which the citizens expressed their rejection of Saddam and of his regime.

Dr. Abu-Muhammad al-Baghdadi offered a medical testimony during which he presented three examples of people injured in the uprising. He brought to the meeting hall three injured persons whose treatment he had supervised. He had

personally examined them. He said that he and his colleagues have treated nearly 500 cases in nine months. The injured persons whom Dr. al-Baghdadi brought are:

1. Abu-Mu'ayyad al-Hilali, paralyzed right leg. He was hit during the shelling of al-Basrah.
2. Abu-'Ammar who lost his eyesight as a result of azimuth bombing.
3. Abu-Falah al-'Ali, damaged hand as a result of artillery shell.

The witness said that in his medical evaluation, the majority of those present currently in the House for the Wounded in Tehran are disabled by paralysis, by injuries to the brains and spinal cord, and by amputated extremities. He added that these people come from all parts of Iraq, especially from the south.

The witness added that some of the cases presented to him were cases resulting from torture.

The Marshlands

Brother Abu-Ahmad al-Wa'ili explained the situation in the marshlands area and the preludes to this situation, especially since 1985, the recurrent murders, the arrest campaigns, the confiscation of property, and the armed attacks on and displacement of peaceful citizens and the demolition of their homes. He also spoke of the plan to drain the marshlands, beginning by draining the area between Suq al-Shaykh District and Karmat 'Ali Subdistrict in 1982 and ending with the step he [presumably meaning Saddam] is trying ceaselessly to accomplish in order to drain Salin Marsh by cutting off its water sources and building a dirt barrier.

Brother al-Wa'ili also spoke of the worsening health conditions in the area and about the economic blockade that continues to be imposed on it (testimony attached).

The testimony of brother Abu-'Ali, who submitted a written statement because it was impossible for him to come to the site of the sessions, focused on the continuing blockade and military assault on the area. He underlined the type of tyrannical military measures used by offering a brief description of the military attacks that were staged from 19 April 1992 until 6 May 1992.

Al-Hajj Shukr Safar al-Bayyati offered a testimony which included a review of the Baghdad regime's violations of the Turkmen minority, demonstrating that this minority has been subjected to dual violations: Ethnic and sectarian, considering that Iraqi Turkmen are Shi'ites.

Hajj al-Bayyati spoke of the various violations and offered some figures on killings, arrests, executions, persecution of religious beliefs, and liquidation of religious scholars. He said that he has lists containing the names of executed, jailed, and missing Turkmen.

The witness pointed out the campaign to Arabize the Turkmen areas, to evict their inhabitants, and to

demolish their villages. He also noted the cruelty with which the regime confronted the uprising in the Turkmen areas and the regime's use of children as human shields to protect its tanks. Finally, the witness presented Umm Hasan, a Turkmen sister victimized by the regime.

Sister Umm Hasan al-Bayyati said that she was arrested and tortured, that the regime killed her brother, and that her husband was a prisoner. She spoke of what she had seen at jail, saying that she saw a naked woman being tortured and the bodies of a number of naked women dumped on the ground.

Because it was difficult for the witness to express herself in Arabic, the committee appointed brother Abu-Layth to translate for her.

Lieutenant Colonel Abu-'Ala' al-Husayni: The testimony of this witness focused on the regime's human rights violations in the military sector. He first pointed out how the regime tried to steer the military establishment away from its fundamental task of defending the country and to make its ultimate concern defending Saddam. He also talked of the extremely harsh and unjustifiable military measures employed to confront certain cases with immediate execution or execution outside the district. He also dealt with persecution of the relatives of arrested or executed military men and spoke of the dangerous tasks assigned to the psychological intelligence directorate.

Dr. Abu-Haydar's testimony: In his capacity as a physician and a prisoner simultaneously, Dr. Abu-Haydar spoke of the terrible health conditions in jails. After asserting that the charge made against him was refusal to join the government party and sympathy for religious movements, he pointed out the phases through which he had gone until he was sentenced. He also pointed out what he had seen in the detention camps to which he had been moved. He noted that diseases, especially pulmonary tuberculosis and skin diseases, are devouring prisoners. This is in addition to the various consequences of torture with which prisoners are afflicted and to cases of paralysis and of insanity.

Testimony of Attorney Abu-Khannab al-Najafi: This man, who was among the audience attending the sessions, asked to appear before the committee to present his testimony. The committee agreed and let him take the oath. He spoke of what he had seen in the days of the uprising and the violations which the ruling regime committed in the most venerable city of al-Najaf. He said that during the uprising, he had the opportunity to familiarize himself with a number of the regime's documents and that the content of three of those documents called for killing all prisoners returned from Iran within a maximum period of three years.

The attorney from al-Najaf then talked about the regime's persecution of Iraqi refugees in their camps in Saudi Arabia, especially in Rafha' Camp, asserting that numerous attempts to poison food and water have been foiled.

The testimony of Dr. Husayn al-Shahristani (specialized in nuclear engineering) was the lengthiest and contained numerous interesting points. Even though it focused on government violations of learning and of the rights of religious scholars and of the cultural circles, especially university and educational circles, al-Shahristani's testimony was as varied as what the man had seen and as diverse as his experiences. The committee asked him about the circumstances involving his incarceration and about what he had met and seen during the 10 years he had spent as a prisoner or under interrogation. During his testimony, Dr. al-Shahristani mentioned a number of university professors who had been either detained or imprisoned with him, saying some of them have disappeared, others have been executed, and some are still waiting. Dr. al-Shahristani spoke of astounding cases of torture and arrest, including cases of arrest and imprisonment because of "dreams" seen by "defendants" in their sleep!

In a related development, the ex-adviser to the Nuclear Energy Commission which is headed by Saddam himself spoke of certain aspects of the conditions of preparation for the regime's nuclear program and of the aggressive objectives set for the program and told how he had refused to work in the said program.

His Eminence Sayyid Bahr al-'Ulum, one of those who saw the uprising in the most venerable al-Najaf, offered a quick review of some of what he had seen of the regime's violations of the city's sanctity, of its educational centers, and of the Shi'ite religious scholars, especially of His Eminence Imam Sayyid al-Khu'i. Sayyid Bahr al-'Ulum had compiled a complete file on the issue. But his poor health prevented him, regrettably, from presenting the details of the important sights he had seen. He said that he will submit all the information to the Human Rights Documentation Center in Iraq.

Hajjah Umm Lama offered her testimony on the Baghdad regime's violations of women's and children's rights and presented a number of documented cases of such violations which involved women and children directly at times and indirectly, i.e. because of relatives accused of opposing the regime, at other times.

Amazing violations committed in this regard include poisoning with thalium, arrest, torture, and arbitrary execution.

She also noted the regime's war against and persecution of families of persons accused of sabotage, of fleeing military service, or of other charges by cutting off their pensions or social aid allocations, by separating couples, or by taking hostages, and so forth. Hajjah Umm Lama submitted a file on the issue to the committee.

Hajjah Miryam Ibrahim: This lady testified about her missing children, saying that she has four sons (a physician, an engineer, a teacher, and a business school graduate) and one daughter (a student), that they were arrested more than 10 years ago, and that nothing has been learned about them since. She said that she herself was arrested with her daughter-in-law and grandson and that some of her children

were tortured in front of her or in front of their other brothers. Hajjah Miryam also told of the important things she had seen during her detention.

Mrs. Umm 'Abir al-Ansari: This lady testified on how she, her husband and their child were arrested in 1986. She said that her husband, a teacher, was tortured in front of her and that they were then separated. She was put in a separate cell at the General Intelligence where she gave birth to a baby girl who remained without clothing or [medical] care. She was sentenced to a 15-year prison term but was released in two years and given her husband's death certificate. She then described the jail cells and the bad food and treatment there.

Testimony of Mrs. Umm Jamal: This lady said that she has three sons, one a university student and the other two preparatory school students, and that they have been detained since she was deported to Iran. She spoke of the deportation tragedy. She also said that a number of relatives were detained with her sons.

The session secretary presented his explanatory notes after nearly every testimony. In addition to the files and documents submitted by the witnesses, the Documentation Center has compiled a brief documentary file on each issue raised in the above statements.

In a related development, written testimony was received during the sessions, such as the testimony by 'A.D. al-Shahristani, Sayyid Muhammad 'A. al-Nasiri, and Sister Umm Nawal who submitted the names of her sons and her nephews who have been in detention for various periods and about whom she has learned nothing. Letters expressing appreciation for this legal activity and proposing that similar activities be organized in Iran and in other countries were also received. Upon conclusion of the testimony, the committee and its secretariat drew attention to the importance of the project and urged the audience and others to present whatever testimony they have to the Human Rights Documentation Center in Iraq so that it can organize it and present it to the parties concerned. 'Aqil al-Shaykh Sa'id then read the text of the statement of the committee which examined the witnesses' statements in light of the legal human rights provisions, especially since Iraq is a signatory to numerous treaties in this regard. The committee made a number of conclusions and proposed two recommendations. The conclusions are that it has been proven that the regime is engaged in regular and extraordinary violations of these rights and that the testimony that the committee has gotten is enough to refer Baghdad's regime to the international judiciary, even to convict this regime.

The two recommendations are summed up in the need to continue compiling and documenting testimony to be presented to the international parties concerned and the need to follow up on the plan for bringing Saddam Husayn and his regime to trial.

Committee Statement

The committee has studied the information presented by the witnesses and the files submitted by them in confirmation of their testimony and it has reviewed the provisions of the relevant international and national laws and made the following conclusions:

First, violation of human rights and of man's basic liberties has become a constant and regular course in the policy of the regime existing in Iraq. Thus, such violation has covered all areas of social life.

Second, the regime's scorn for rights and liberties and the discriminatory steps taken by this regime have reached the extent of committing acts of annihilation from which the Kurds have suffered in the north and Shi'ites in all parts of the country, especially in the south. The policy of factional persecution has included the Turkomen, Kurdish, Filite, and Assyrian minorities, and others.

Third, the current events in the marshlands are tantamount to mass annihilation acts perpetrated by the regime's oppressive agencies against the marshland inhabitants and those who have sought asylum with them. This area is experiencing a worsening hardship because of lack of food and medicine.

Fourth, the popular movement which rejects the regime and which expressed itself in wake of the defeat of the regime forces by the alliance forces was tantamount to a general referendum which proved the opposition of the people, with their various political, ethnic, religious, and denominational affiliations, to the policy of expansion, aggression and of belittling rights and liberties and the problems, crises, and wasting of lives, capabilities, and property to which this policy has led.

Within this context, the committee has become certain that the regime has employed brutal methods to suppress the uprising, including the use of banned weapons, such as napalm and poison gas. It has also practiced all forms of brutal mass murders and of compulsory eviction which are incompatible with the principle of necessity and proportionality in dealing with civilian unrest.

Fifth, the plan to Ba'thize Iraq's society and institutions has essentially negated freedom of expression and belief; but it has not limited itself to just denying the freedom of expression and publication. This plan has even undermined the simplest rights and liberties connected with the observation of religious rites and (led to the disappearance) of some administrative procedures.

Sixth, women and children, to whom international laws, and especially the international treaties concerned, devote special attention have suffered from constant violations. They have also suffered from the consequences of the violations committed against their families.

Seventh, the regime's legal character has led to the Revolution Command Council's domination of all powers. Popular participation in managing the country's affairs is nonexistent, thus leading to individual rule and to singular political viewpoint at the leadership level.

Eighth, the regime's aggression against Iran and Kuwait and the violations it committed during these two aggressions have proven that this regime is an element of

instability in the region. Consequently, it is a source of danger to rights and liberties. Therefore, the committee recommends the following:

Regarding violation documentation: The committee recommends that the secretariat continue its work by compiling and documenting the regime's violations of human rights in Iraq and by making all the efforts possible to compile complete files on all forms of violations and to present them to the parties concerned.

Internationally: The committee recommends that any of the abovementioned files be submitted to the international parties concerned when they are completed and that the plan for convening an international court to try Saddam and his regime be pursued with these parties.

Finally, the committee is convinced that the evidence it has obtained on the Iraqi regime's violations of human rights and basic liberties in Iraq is enough to refer this regime to an international court, and even enough to convict it.

The Committee for Hearing Evidence Connected With the Iraqi Regime's Violations of Human Rights

KUWAIT

Minister Lauds Positive Role of Mosques

92AE0446B London SAWT AL-KUWAYT
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 11 Jun 92 P 3

[Article by 'Adnan al-Lawhani of the Islamic Press Agency: "After the Occupation Forces Stole a Big Part of It...al-Ma'ushurji: 'The jurisprudence encyclopedia shall be completed soon...The experience of the occupation confirms the role of the mosques'"']

[Text] Kuwait—Muhammad Saqr al-Ma'ushurji, minister of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs announced that Volume Nos. 24, 25, and 26 of the jurisprudence encyclopedia published by the Ministry for the service of jurisprudence shall be printed shortly and shall be offered on the market following its completion in the very near future. In a statement to "SAWT AL-KUWAYT" the Minister said that the jurisprudence encyclopedia is one of the cultural projects in which Kuwait prides itself and through which it renders a great service to the ruling of the Islamic Shari'a, as well as to all the religious rulings in general. The Ministry in the last few years has made great strides in this respect, publishing twenty-three volumes to date. The Minister of Awqaf indicated that during the aggression against Kuwait many parts of this encyclopedia had been lost when the forces of the vile occupation confiscated many of the belongings of the Ministry of Awqaf, such as books and copies of the Quran and other cultural and intellectual works. He also added that the Ministry is currently reprinting some of the volumes that had been lost. Regarding the services rendered by the Ministry to the mosques, Minister al-Ma'ushurji said, "Mosques have a

great and clear role in Kuwait, because, thanks to God, we are a Muslim nation abiding by the rules of our religion and very keen to perform the duties and rituals of our religion on all levels, such as prayers, zakat, fasting and hajj as well as all the principles and morals that Islam requires." He added that everybody in Kuwait knows the role that mosques played during the occupation and their good effect in uniting the people and urging them towards cooperation and solidarity as well as calming them and keeping them in contact and urging them to hold to the legitimacy and system of their country. In addition, mosques were springboards for supplying the people with food, materials and medicine. Everyone, whether inside or outside Kuwait, knew of or witnessed the good deeds that the mosques had a great role in developing and spreading. In conclusion, the Minister of Awqaf said, "From this spring point, we are very eager that the mosques shall continue playing their important role and, on our part, that we stress this role and emphasize the role of the mosques in guiding society."

In another matter, the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs approved the appointment of four missionaries to Latin America and also approved the strengthening of the programs of the Islamic Mission Center there which include translating and printing the Qur'an, establishing a number of Islamic camps in several countries on the continent, and financing some construction projects in the Islamic centers and society. Mr. Ahmad al-Sayfi, Director of the Islamic Mission Center for Latin America has met with Dr. Ali Bin Fahd al-Zami to discuss matters of the Islamic mission and the aspects of cooperation between the Ministry and the center.

Islamic Banks Assist Reconstruction of Kuwait

92AE0434A London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
22 May 92 p 49

[Unattributed interview with Shaykh Salih 'Abdallah Kamil, chairman of Dallah al-Barakah Group, no place or date: "Chairman of Dallah al-Barakah Group, Shaykh Salih 'Abdallah Kamil, to AL-HAWADITH: 'Kuwait Reconstruction Portfolio Living Example of Islamic Bank Efficacy'"]

[Text] In 1982, the march of the Dallah al-Barakah Group began in Jeddah via the al-Barakah Investment and Development Corporation. Today, the group has 260 companies in 33 countries, and its activities cover all financial, industrial, agricultural, and mining fields. The Dallah al-Barakah Group has been unique in a leading experiment, namely, the Kuwait Reconstruction Portfolio.

AL-HAWADITH met with the chairman of the Dallah al-Barakah Group, Shaykh Salih 'Abdallah Kamil, and conducted the following interview.

[AL-HAWADITH] Islamic economics contains a comprehensive economic theory, beginning with succession to property, and continuing through the rules governing

production, and the distribution and handling of wealth. How has the al-Barakah Group succeeded in applying this truth?

[Kamil] Building and developing the Earth is a fundamental Islamic principle. It is a developmental obligation imposed upon us by Islam. God, Most High, said, "It is He who hath made the Earth tractable for you; therefore, walk in its highlands, and eat of His sustenance, for resurrection is unto Him." He also said, "Who made the Earth a cradle for you, and drew roads in it for you, so that you might find your way."

Economic theory in Islam is characterized by its comprehensive and integrated nature. It does not take a narrow view related [solely] to the supply and demand of productive resources, but also to how they may be best employed and exploited.

Evidence of this comprehensiveness is Islam's treatment of various economic aspects of production, distribution, and handling of wealth, the payment of alms, and treatment of the problem of scarcity.

Activity of the Dallah al-Barakah Group has been characterized by gradualism, diversity, and expansion. From maintenance activity, the group launched into contracting, Islamic banks, commercial companies, and then investment companies, including offering issues and funds. This latter development involves the investor's proper selection of the investment vehicle that achieves his personal objectives and those of society.

[AL-HAWADITH] Have the Islamic banks been successful in the development process in Islamic countries?

[Kamil] The Islamic banks have made great efforts in the development process in Islamic countries. We would mention the following ones as examples:

- Collecting savings from various classes, especially from small savers;
- Participating in the imp't of strategic materials and those needed for development;
- Participation in establishing factories and companies and building infrastructure projects.

One of the objectives the group believes in is service to the Islamic economy. It has worked to translate these objectives into a practical reality. It has established a number of Islamic banks served by numerous commercial companies in myriad Islamic capitals and countries, where they are the banks' limbs for developing commercial exchange and encouraging Islamic exports.

In the context of establishing commercial companies, it established the al-Samahah Commercial Companies Group, which is owned and operated by the Tourism Holding Corporation [as published]. Some of these companies are specialized in specific commodities, such as coffee and fertilizers, while others work in the import and export area generally. These companies seek to assist Islamic countries to export their surplus production of

various commodities, and to work to eliminate middlemen by providing support services for commercial activity in transportation, warehousing, insurance, and marketing.

In order to develop the economies of Islamic countries, the group has strived to participate in the Export Support Fund proposed by Islamic banks to develop Islamic commerce, the first phase of which will include the four Islamic states of Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, and Pakistan, with a capital of \$500 million. Its most important objectives are the following:

- Supplying Islamic exports and imports;
- Ensuring investments are based in Islamic law, and applying commercial exchanges on the same basis;
- Ensuring the supply of commodities to Islamic countries at least cost and by eliminating middlemen.

The periodic reports of these establishments confirm that they are proceeding according to plan and achieving a new success every day on the march toward their objectives. This is due to the goodness and providence of God, and to the great response they are receiving from Muslims, who are always seeking reassurance that their money is being invested in accordance with the principles of Islamic law.

[AL-HAWADITH] What are the benefits given by the investment funds of the al-Tawfiq and al-Amin companies?

[Kamil] The al-Tawfiq Investment Fund Company and the al-Amin Securities Company enable the individual investor to own shares in the form of negotiable stocks and to participate with a small amount of capital in large operations which they would be unable to participate in, were they not distributed in the form of shares. Both also open the way for Islamic banks to fund financial institutions having an Islamic legal commitment by investing excess liquidity with them through buying shares of participation that realize a profit for them during the time they are owned, and which can be liquidated when cash liquidity is required. Investments in both companies enjoy many benefits. These include

- Legitimacy of investment: All investments are made in accordance with the provisions of Islamic law and represent actual assets that truly exist;
- Surety and liquidity: The banks and companies of al-Barakah Islamic Group and its cooperating institutions are committed to ensure the repurchase of shares at the price declared at the time of sale. Hence, they provide the cash liquidity required upon demand;
- Tax exemption: The investments and their returns are not subject to any taxes (because each company is registered as tax-exempt in Bahrain);
- Profitability: Good profitability levels varying according to the area and term of investment selected (short, medium, long), however the investor wishes;
- Banking facilities: Investors in al-Tawfiq and al-Amin shares enjoy the ability to have such shares accepted

by a large number of the group's banks as collateral for various banking facilities, such as the issuance of letters of guarantee, opening letters of credit, and so forth.

[AL-HAWADITH] The al-Barakah Group has moved to establish some investment portfolios for the reconstruction of Kuwait and Lebanon. We would like to know the bases on which these portfolios have been established and the possibility that this could be repeated for specific purposes in other Islamic countries.

[Kamil] The establishment of investment portfolios relies on various objectives that differ according to purpose. There are portfolios that have diversified investment objectives and others that have specialized investment objectives, such as real estate, stocks, and the like. There are portfolios with humanitarian objectives, also. The bases for organizing these portfolios differ according to their goals.

Here we will address the Kuwait reconstruction portfolio, a leading experiment unique to the al-Barakah Group, as a living example of the efficacy of Islamic banks and their ability to establish this type of portfolio.

When the idea arose, the Kuwait reconstruction portfolio was authorized for a specific goal. Other objectives began to emerge after the idea was studied in more detail. We deduce from this that the beginning of any portfolio must be based on the presence of an actual need. To be more specific, the need for participation in reconstructing a Gulf Islamic country is a duty dictated to us by our venerable religion. Perhaps the establishment of a portfolio for collecting funds, and then investing them in financial ventures in the same country, is the most ideal method of supporting this idea.

[AL-HAWADITH] Through your experience in the Islamic economy, how do you see the shift to Islamic banks in light of a world economic system based on interest?

[Kamil] We, in fact, do not deny that there is a world system based on interest, and that this system has its bases, history, and rules of operation.

The Islamic banks have succeeded in attracting many sectors within Islamic societies to participate in their activities by using the ways and means of Islamic transaction. Nonetheless, the matter requires that the Islamic banks reinforce their cooperation, enter new sectors of activity, lay sound plans for their monetary requirements, and strive to establish an Islamic capital market. We have begun the steps by establishing the al-Tawfiq Investment Fund Company, the al-Amin Securities Company, and certain special, general, and joint funds. Once the Islamic banks have succeeded in securing an Islamic capital market—and we are confident they will—very soon, God willing, they will have great weight. In this case, by putting their shoulders together, they will be able to reduce their costs and increase their returns.

Report Warns of Future Economic Uncertainty92AE04634 London *AL-HAYAH* in Arabic

Jun 92 p 10

[Text] Kuwait—A report by the Kuwaiti economic weekly *AL-SHAL* warned of the country's financial future. It said, "We will pay the price of this constant drain several times over politically and socially." The report pointed to the government's failure to deal with the problem of the oil deposits, "and it is possible that the situation could turn into a disaster."

The text of the report follows:

The Oil Sector

Kuwait's oil production still hovers around a million barrels a day, which is the goal of the production policy up to the middle of the year. It seems that recent statements by officials that Kuwait has lowered its projections for production up to the end of the year to 1.4 million barrels a day, instead of the 1.5 million barrels a day that it had been in previous projections. We hope that the source of that change is the awareness by oil policy makers of the effect of the state's unwise oil policy on the state of the deposits. Kuwait is still refining about 290,000 barrels a day, 170,000 at the al-Ahmadi refinery, and 120,000 at the Port 'Abdallah refinery. The number of collection centers in operation is still seven, and some of them have been furnished with additional equipment to separate out larger quantities of water. Efforts to draw [oil] from the lakes, set to reach 100,000 barrels a day, are still faltering. It seems that the oil drawn from them has been offered for sale to more than one source, but it was refused because neither it nor its derivatives could be used, perhaps because it had lain around for a long time, and had lost on account of that of some of its properties.

The world around us is expressing its increasing anxiety over the state of the oil deposits. Some technicians in the Kuwait Oil Company had told senior officials about those possibilities right after the liberation. Recently many newspapers, such as *AL-MID* and *THE INDEPENDENT*, and other oil periodicals, have published detailed articles, some of which set losses at 20 percent of the reserves because of the lack of a sound production policy.

Despite the oil minister's response to the BBC, and despite the response of the Kuwait Oil Company to an article in one of the local newspapers, things do not seem to be reassuring. In the two responses one can read a piece of information that we have also studied closely. The gist of this piece of information is that any true knowledge of the state of the deposits is so far unavailable, that the production policy was set without this information and that part of British Petroleum's task will be to study the state of the deposits, something for which the Kuwait Oil company lacks some expertise. Even though we wish to believe what officials in the oil sector say, the issue is too serious to have let all this time

pass before commenting upon it in an undetailed or convincing manner. Since last October, we have been asking and warning about these risks, and the production policy should have come at the same time as a detailed statement on monitoring the state of the deposits. However, there is still plenty of time, though it requires a lot of courage, but it is possible that the situation could turn into a disaster if we do not face it honestly.

Public Treasury

Last week the National Assembly decided to distribute compensation to Kuwaiti families of around 5,000 Kuwaiti dinars. Cabinet members in the assembly and 14 members voted against the resolution, but it seems that it passed with a majority of 44 votes. If old statistics are true which state that there are around 112,000 Kuwaiti families, then the monetary amount of the compensation will be around 560 million Kuwaiti dinars, or around \$1.9 billion.

The argument of those who defend the decision can be summarized in that the constitution has established and decreed compensation, and Kuwaitis deserve it, and that compensation covers important people, specifically the deal struck to pass the program of "hardcore indebtedness", and there is no reason for us not to pass compensation for the little people. Meanwhile, the government's argument, as reported by one of the local papers, can be summarized in that the government has paid, or given up, about 3.9 billion Kuwaiti dinars (about \$13 billion) in government allowances, the forfeiture of real estate loans, housing authority loans, consumer and social loans, and retroactive payment of salaries to the public and private sectors. In addition, salaries have increased; substitution of retirement pensions has been abolished; even fees for communications and electricity have been abolished, as have customs duties.

If we add to that the deficit of 5.6 billion Kuwaiti dinars in the program for hardcore indebtedness, the interest that the government paid on deposits during the invasion, what it paid to support the exchange rate of the dinar, and the difference of interest rates on it compared to other Gulf states, the amount of the compensation will exceed 10 billion Kuwaiti dinars. Clearly, some other members of the parliament and the majority of the members of the finance committee in the National Assembly are worried about the country's financial situation.

Perhaps the philosophy that has prevailed since the beginning, which used public money to buy political approval, led to the state which we are in. It will not end, rather it will go on to real estate and commercial compensation, and much more. One thing that has not been taken into consideration is that the amount of rewards and compensation, besides their negative social and economic effects, will affect the possibilities for obtaining the necessities of life in the near future, a future that will be experienced by the great majority of

those living today. Perhaps reason will prevail and this constant drain will stop, which besides harming us politically, will cause most of us to pay several times over for it financially and socially.

Construction Efforts and Government Establishments

Although a year and a quarter have passed since the liberation of Kuwait, it still seems that economic performance is faltering. Notwithstanding the activity that was created by the bottlenecks in supply as a result of post-occupation circumstances, the expansionist expenditures of the government, and the magnitude of basic necessities for the population, [economic performance] has begun gradually to fade. Even though that can be partially explained by the weakness of bank credit plans, and the weakness of the administrative agencies, the prevailing psychological state, waiting for compensation, and the 45 percent drop in the population, to a great extent it is due to an absence of economic vision. Reconstruction expenditures do not create a true demand for local goods and services, and the government's population policy is not known, and most of the time businessmen follow ineffective government measures. Expansionist government financial policies spread feelings of apprehension and doubt about the future, in particular, about the government's oil policy, among others.

The government has an administrative style that is not suitable for meeting the circumstances of reconstruction. It is clear that government establishments are not playing the role required of them, because they "either do not know" how, or they cannot. Therefore voluntary and non-voluntary committees, agencies, and councils have multiplied to bring up idea upon idea, which are not actually implemented, because most of the bodies do not have authority, but are only advisory agencies. There is the National Council, and the supreme council for planning, housing, education, and oil, and committees of hardcore indebtedness and economic stimulation, and meetings and committees for public affairs, and all of them pour into one place. These agencies have conflicting ideas among themselves and with the concerned government offices, and all of them come to nothing. Usually only those ideas with influential backing are implemented. They are finally accepted because of political expediency, regardless of their incompatibility with the technical realities and with what is required to safeguard the future.

Therefore we believe that there exists an administrative problem that is to blame for the breakdown of economic activity, and for its financial and psychological consequences. We also believe that our economic course and what might happen to it could bring about a real threat to the future of the country and its stability. Priorities must include filling the administrative gaps and establishing required public goals to serve as a guide for all our efforts.

Zeal for Democracy Seen in C of C Vote

92AE0435A London *AL-HAWADITH* in Arabic
5 Jun 92 p 30

[Text] It could be the first time in the long history of Kuwait that elections of the board of directors of the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry have been held with this much commotion and heat.

It could be the first time that such elections have been held outside of the Chamber's traditional building in the area of the old markets.

It could be the first time that elections of the Chamber of Commerce have been held under the oversight of the courts and the public prosecutor's office, with strict security protection.

These three manifestations left a strong impression on observers that these elections were different from others.

Competition was very fierce and hot. The number of people coming to the candidates tents (headquarters) and to the voting booths was unexpected.

Starting at 0700 AM last Monday, 25 May, the Kayfan region, where the Kuwait Athletic Club is, where the voting took place in its huge hall, was so densely crowded with people casting their ballots that some observers became confused and began to think it was the scene, not of commercial elections, but of the parliamentary elections, which are 4 months away.

The election campaign began more than 2 months ago, and its ferocity intensified so much in the final week before voting that it attracted attention. An unfortunate incident occurred, which was repudiated by all sections of Kuwaiti society at all levels as being alien to Kuwaiti society, known for its great generosity and respect and its abhorrence of violence and hostility. However, the incidence contained in a way that affirmed the nature of this noble people, naturally disposed to tolerance and love.

The election battle was between two long slates of economists and merchants, large and small, who have had an important role in building a modern Kuwait.

The first was the slate of the economic family led by 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hamad al-Saqr, chairman of the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry for more than 33 years. The second was the slate of the "al-Dayrah people," led by the well-known businessman Khalid Yusuf al-Marzuq.

The outcome of these unique elections was that the "economic family" won 23 members, and the 24th was Khalid al-Marzuq, who penetrated the slate of the economic family, without any one of his 23 companions on the "al-Dayrah people" slate. Results were delayed for more than 24 hours, and the reason for that delay, as sources close to the sorting process said, was that the box held a large number of votes. This greatly helped the slate of the economic family to decide things in its interest; also helping it to win in this way, was the fact

that a large segment of the al-Dayrah's slate were not sufficiently familiar with the elections game. But this does not mean that the economic family's victory was unusual, for the foundation that it has built in commercial circles over a period of more than 30 years cannot be taken lightly.

As for the win by Khalid al-Marzuq with not a few votes (4,182), the first factor was his personal stock, as one of the most prominent businessmen on the Arab and Kuwaiti scene.

The number of those merchants who paid their dues to the Chamber was more than 16,800 persons, out of an original members, while the number of voters was close to 11,000.

Observers confirmed that the Chamber of Commerce and Trade elections were not, as some of the media reiterated, a competition between the government and the opposition; thus they were not a battle between a winner and a loser, rather they were democratic behaviour that is not alien to the Kuwaiti people.

Paper Appeals for Aid to Torture Victim

92AE0446A London SAWT AL-KUWAYT
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 11 Jun 92 p 2

[Article by Madi al-Khamis: "What Compensation for Someone Subjected to Torture?"]

[Text] I saw him suffering from his pain. I saw his tears rolling down his cheeks. I approached him as he was sitting next to his wife in the headquarters of the National Committee for the POW's and the MIA's in the Sheikh Sabah al-Salem Hospital. I asked him, "What is your story?" He said, "The vile Iraqis found a weapon in my house during the occupation. They took me to a detention camp where they tortured me until I lost one eye. They burned other parts of my body. They gave me electric shocks and extinguished cigarette butts on my body. After a while they threw me in the street. During the rest of the occupation period my wife tried to nurse me using very primitive means. Then came the liberation, and the legitimacy was restored and we rejoiced in the complete victory that Allah had given us. We hoped that the government would compensate us after all we had been through that included pain and the theft of all our belongings. But the unexpected happened. After more than a year and a half since the liberation I am still suffering from severe pains all over my body, in addition to a fractured jaw and broken teeth, loss of my right eye, and severe burns and bullets in my leg. In spite of all of that the Ministry of Health has not graciously agreed to send me abroad to be treated, in spite of the fact that the medical reports affirm that I need a speedy treatment and that I am suffering numerous ailments. I am very astonished at this situation... Believe me I don't need any compensation and I am ready to sacrifice everything for my country. All I need is medical treatment and, by God, if I had the money, I would not have hesitated even for one second. But I do not have the money. All I hope is

that the government would make us feel that it is concerned about us and this situation. I got tired of corresponding to no avail with the National Committee of the POW's Affairs and the Ministry of Health. Every day they say good will come and may God punish the people responsible that made me just a body with no use. By God, it would have been better that I had died; as now I cannot move and I cannot drive my car. Still, I have great faith in God."

Our friend ended his story but I cannot forget how he looked. Wounds all over his body, his right eye does not move, his jaw and his teeth are broken, and yet they would not treat him. We do not know the reason. Had the man been a victim of an ordinary car accident, he would have found treatment and the government would have paid for it, but how about the person who has been tortured for the sake of his country. May God help you my friend. If the government is not able to treat him or send him abroad for treatment, then this is an open invitation for the kind at heart to reach out and help him. What you would give would be well spent on this patriotic man who was tortured because of his country. This man and his story are very well known to the enthusiastic young man Jasim Matar, the chairman of the Media Committee at the National Committee of the Affairs of the POW's and MIA's, who promised to take interest in this case. We trust in God and we have great hopes in the kind-hearted Shaykh Salim al-Sabah, deputy prime minister, minister of foreign affairs and chairman of the National Committee of the Affairs of the POW's and the MIA's, to personally intervene to give medical treatment to a Kuwaiti citizen who was tortured and suffered and had all the doors shut in his face and, on top of that, had his hopes crushed when the Ministry of Health told him that there is no treatment for his right eye and transferred him to the psychological hospital for treatment. As I have known from well-informed people in the National Committee of the POW's and MIA's, the case of this man and many like him should be reconsidered and are worthy of concern. These people deserve our attention and it is money well spent to treat them and they should not be transferred to the psychological hospital. May God keep you all in good health.

New Officers Named To Head Workers' Union

92AE0446C London SAWT AL-KUWAYT
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 11 Jun 92 p 3

[Article by 'Abdullah al-Shimri: "The Executive Council of the General Union of Kuwaiti Workers: 'Abdallah al-Bakir is President and Nasir al-'Utaybi Is his Vice President"]

[Text] Kuwait—The new Executive Council of the General Union of Kuwaiti Workers elected, by acclamation, 'Abdallah al-Bakir president for a two-year term, along with the rest of the union's new administration, in a special meeting held yesterday after two weeks of deliberations. The new administration is as follows: "Abdallah al-Bakir, president of the General Union of Kuwaiti

Workers in its current session 92/94; Nasir Hazza' al-Utaybi, vice president; Muslih Sabil al-Azmi, secretary-general; Ahmad 'Awad al-Muhmal, assistant secretary-general; Jum'a Rashid, treasurer; 'Ayed al-Thaydi, secretary for foreign relations; and Bandar al-Khayran, secretary for internal affairs. Two other members, Badr al-Faylikawi and Sa'ud Nahar, were elected by acclamation to the posts of director of the Labor Cultural Institute and editor of al-'Amil magazine respectively. The representatives of the general assembly of the General Union of Kuwaiti Workers elected the fifteen member executive council on the 26th of last month which includes five members representing the oil union namely: Sa'd Sayf al-Hajri, Muslih Sabil al-Azmi, Sa'ud Nahar 'Abdullah, Bandar al-Khayran and 'Abdullah al-Bakr. It also included 10 members representing the trade unions of the government sector who are: 'Ayad al-Thaydi, Jum'a Rashid, Nasir Hazza, Ahmad 'Awad al-Muhmal, Badr al-Faylikawi, Badr 'Awad al-Azmi, Murshid Falih al-Wasmi, Muhammad 'Abdullah al-Hujaylan, 'Ali 'Abdulrahman al-Kandari and Muhammad 'Umayr al-Ajmi. Sources in the union attributed the phenomenon of allowing the oil sector to hold the union presidency for many sessions to the experiences of government representative in the trade union field which led them to forfeit their majority right which guarantees one of them the presidency in favor of the public good.

Election of Women to Parliament Opposed

92AE04544 London SAWT AL-KUWAYT
AL-DU'WALI in Arabic 13 Jun 92

[Article by Faris al-Salman: "National Council Secretary Announces His Platform: 'I Oppose the Admission of Women to Parliament, and the Most Important Issues are Security and Population Composition'"]

[Text] Kuwait—Mr. Talal al-Ayyar, Secretary of the National Council, announced his platform for the upcoming elections of the Parliament. He indicated that the program includes symposia and cultural lectures hinting that it is imperative for candidates to inform their constituents of the broad lines they intend to follow. In his speech to reporters, al-Ayyar stressed that he opposes election of women to the Parliament. He illustrated by saying that the social circumstances do not allow women to shoulder such a huge responsibility. He added that the elections of the public welfare societies, in which women are allowed to participate, are completely different from the parliamentary elections. He immediately amended his statement by saying, "If there is an intention to give women the right to participate, I think that it should be limited to election suffrage. This view does not take anything away from the Kuwaiti woman who has proven herself in all fields." Regarding the issue of security, al-Ayyar stressed that the two issues of security and the population composition are among the most important issues facing Kuwait. He said, "We have made great strides in dealing with these two issues, however, we have to keep in mind that they are related

to other economic and social issues, which means that we will have to solve all these issues together." Answering a question about those who are without nationality, al-Ayyar said that some of them do not deserve the (Kuwaiti) nationality because they hid their passports and claimed that they did not belong to this category. On the other hand, some of them have records of long service to Kuwait; some of them joined the military, and those people deserve the (Kuwaiti) nationality. Regarding the difficult issue of debts, al-Ayyar stressed that its solution was in the public interest. In this respect, he said that measures taken to resolve the debt problem have had positive effects on revitalizing the banking movement in Kuwait. As far as compensating those who suffered from the unjust Iraqi invasion, he added that he supports the proposal of [giving each family head] 5,000 Kuwaiti dinars, saying that he was one of sponsors of that proposal. The proposal affects 112,000 families who would receive damages totalling 560,000 million Kuwaiti dinars. Regarding the Iraqi weapons still inside Kuwait, al-Ayyar made reference to the emergency draft law dealing with special procedures for confiscating the prohibited weapons, ammunition and explosives. He added that the draft bill has been urgently submitted to the National Council to finalize its passage. He added that the topic is very sensitive, but that it is imperative to root out the presence of so many of weapons. In conclusion, al-Ayyar took note of the efforts exerted by the Minister of the Interior to establish peace in the country.

Homes To Be Searched for Weapons

92AE0446D London SAWT AL-KUWAYT
AL-DU'WALI in Arabic 11 Jun 92 p 3

[Article by Nasir Yusif: "Parliament Discusses Confiscation of Weapons After 'Id"]

[Text] Kuwait—'Abdulkarim al-Jahidi, chairman of the parliamentary Committee for Security and Defense, said in a private interview with SAWT AL-KUWAYT that the Committee for Security and Defense and the Legislative Committee shall hold joint meetings after the blessed 'Id al-Adha to discuss the government bill to consider promulgating a law that would allow the police forces to search areas and houses for unlicensed weapons. Al-Jahidi added that the issue of the widespread weapons has become a security hazard for both the government and the Parliament such that it cannot be ignored. He added that the two committees decided that the joint meetings shall be attended by the Minister of the Interior Sheikh Ahmad al-Hamud and the Minister of Justice Ghazi 'Ubayd al-Samar in order to reach a joint opinion by the government and the Parliament on how to implement the project. Al-Jahidi said that the widespread presence of the weapons and their use in weddings, especially by irresponsible people, may have had repercussions on the stability of the Kuwaiti society.

LEBANON

Election Climate, Concerns Reviewed

Community Leaders Receive Followers

92450285A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
28 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Walid Shuqayr: "Holidays in Lebanon Full of Politics, Crowds at Leaders' Homes Prepare for Elections"]

[Text] The past three weeks' religious holidays in Lebanon teemed with politics, despite their being a chance for the Lebanese to escape from the misery of the economic and social situation they are experiencing—the limited prospect for solutions and the unlimited prospect for higher dollar exchange rates and a declining Lebanese pound.

Although the majority that some call silent went to seek amusement in public places, long-awaited joy in family get-togethers, or solace in warm spring weather walks, the information media, television, and even political drawing-room conversations thrust into part of their activity the crowds of people who visited politicians and high officials in a number of localities to exchange holiday greetings with them.

The politics that filled these holidays was of the colorful traditional Lebanese kind that has begun to revive and that this year is acquiring a dimension related to a specific event, the elections.

On 'Id al-Fitr, television carried scenes of crowds of well-wishers who went to the Tripoli home of Prime Minister 'Umar Karami and lined up for a turn to shake hands with the scion of Tripoli, who was forced to move to the outside courtyard of the house, sit in the sun surrounded by staff and notables, and shake each person's hand.

On the second day of the holiday, a similar scene was repeated when Speaker of Parliament Husayn al-Husayni, went to his home in Ba'labakk. Not until the next day was he able to leave his reception room and return to Beirut. In the south, the head of the Amal movement, Minister of State Nabih Barri, sat in his spacious villa in the town of Musaylih, surrounded by the movement's officials in the south, who came with village delegations. He talked, exchanged holiday greetings, and answered the questions of the southerners, whose main anxiety about the fate of the south mixed with their anxiety about the deteriorating economic situation.

The occasion also testified to people's eagerness to "do their duty" toward other figures and several ministers, including Agriculture Minister Muhsin Dallul in his home town of Kwayz.

On Catholic Easter, the Hawsh al-Umara' area was crowded with people encircling the home of President Ilyas al-Harawi, who spent three days receiving holiday well-wishers. Many made their way to the president with difficulty; some could enter Hawsh al-Umara' only on foot.

On Eastern Easter, the deputy prime minister and minister of defense, Engineer Michel al-Murr (Orthodox), instructed the ministry's information bureau to broadcast a statement saying, among other things, that he had gone to his home town of Blaqhrin to receive citizens' holiday greetings. His mansion there overflowed with people last Sunday. Television carried the scenes.

Although the media carry accounts of holiday crowds at the homes of top officials, this did not prevent large crowds from going to the homes of many other popular leaders. Naturally, the media did not carry the scenes or devote space to every politician in the country. They focused priority on top officials and carried information about their talks with their visitors.

Although some commented on these reports of crowds of well-wishers by saying that there are leaders who every weekend receive such crowds of people consulting them and seeking solutions to their problems on their authority, one can attribute this year's interest in the crowds of people greeting top officials to the following question: If the ranks of the people harbor strong resentment against the pillars of government because of the economic situation, what motivates people to "carry out this duty" toward leaders in whom their confidence is shaky?

The elections, first, last, and always—so goes the answer—are a basic reason, in addition to other reasons. Talk about these elections, which the Lebanese yearn for after a lapse of 20 years, so fills the world and so occupies popular, family, and evening gatherings that it forms one of the elements that spontaneously divert people from the worries of their daily life. A Lebanese does not change his pattern of political activity: sectarian identity, regional identity, and then family identity. The sectarian distribution of parliamentary seats predetermines the head of the slate or who forms it, especially if he is in a government position, for in Lebanon the government plays a more normal position than government people play in other countries in the election process, forming slates, and favoring one person's influence over another's. Each village has its election "key," as does each family, and these people, wherever they are, follow a "we're-here" strategy just before the elections, where alignment is based on promises of services to voters. Doubtlessly, it was this strategy that produced the crowds. Indeed, some of the "keys" and crowds must have come to make the point that they expect the leaders in turn to do their duty. Some leaders began implementing their visit schedules to console, congratulate, or even attend athletic events on the basis of the election account lists.

Some think there are other reasons for the crowds that appeared in greater or lesser numbers over the holidays at the homes of important people.

Some say that the crowds at the home of the "effendi" in Tripoli derive from an implicit Islamic feeling among Tripolitans that refuses to hold Prime Minister Karami responsible for the economic crisis and lack of confidence in the government, though he has problems that have negatively affected his northern position.

Some say the crowds that visited al-Husayni came to support popularly the role of the speaker of parliament, which is being subjected to criticism as a Shi'i position in the government and in the makeup of the strife-torn troika.

As for al-Harawi, the list of additional reasons is long. The conscience of Christians in Lebanon's city of Catholicism, where the president went to seek their support, was stirred by a hidden feeling of solidarity with the Christian president, whose position is suffering a loss in the name of al-Ta'if, powers, and the conflict of the troika, while he has already granted many concessions and cooperated more than others with the Muslims and Syria. There were also some who said that he "tried to change the government that people do not trust, but was unsuccessful, so how can we hold him alone responsible for the economic situation? How can we believe the reports circulating about deals with his family, when we can find out who is buying and selling potatoes in al-Biq'a and he is not one of them!"

In all these highly politicized holiday exchanges of greetings, the assessments or analyses of some people did not find the crowds "arranged." Although they were partly so due to a certain pervasive political or family system or because senior government employees customarily must go to the home of high officials on such occasions, most of the crowds came spontaneously for the aforementioned political reasons, mainly the elections. Furthermore, the services these high officials can perform, each in his district, make the holiday an opportunity to show esteem and ask for further services.

So the holidays in Lebanon were mainly political. Aside from the crowds, they were an opportunity for excursions or inferences. Easter was a chance for the Progressive Socialist Party chairman, Minister of State Walid Junblatt, to visit al-Harawi to discuss the problem of the forced emigrants, after he had been visited by Syria's Vice President 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam and the chief of staff of the Syrian army, Lieutenant General Hikmat al-Shihabi, for a private meeting on pending matters. When former President Sulayman Franjiyah, surrounded by his son Robert and his grandson, Minister of State Sulayman Tuni, received well-wishers, it was a sign that there was no dispute about leadership in the Zgharta household.

The overall "Orthodox revival" in Lebanon in view of the Christian situation in the country is one explanation for the crowds at the home of al-Murr and perhaps at the

homes of other leading figures of that church. More than 10,000 persons attended the Good Friday liturgy accompanied by the voice of the singer Fairouz deep in al-Kurah, filling the courtyards and halls of the historic church of Dayr al-Balamand.

Christian Leaders and Elections

924502854 London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 28 Apr 92
p 2

[Article: "Christian Leaders Consider Elections Remote. But Some Act As If They Were Taking Place Tomorrow"]

[Text] Informed sources have indicated that Foreign Minister Faris Buwayz visited (former) President Sulayman Franjiyah in Zgharta two days ago on his own personal initiative and that he had not been commissioned to carry any message to him from President Ilyas al-Harawi.

Buwayz briefed Franjiyah on the negotiations with Israel and the appointments the cabinet is discussing to fill empty positions in Lebanese diplomatic missions, particularly in Washington, Madrid, and Rome, in addition to regional and international developments.

The visit also was marked by an election-related character in terms of reviewing domestic conditions, what is being said generally about elections that may take place early this summer, and (former) President Franjiyah's position toward them. On his way back from Zgharta, Buwayz, it was noted, stopped in Jubayl, where he made visits of a social nature.

The informed sources mentioned that the foreign minister was eager to ascertain the points of view of leaders on the coming settlements of accounts. He had met with Speaker Husayn al-Husayni and Patriarch Nasrallah Sufayr before heading north.

Despite this move, Christian leaders, especially the Maronites, agree in saying that there will be no parliamentary elections this summer and not even a "dignified return" for those who were forced to emigrate. Some of them, however, act as if elections were going to take place tomorrow, either by closely monitoring ongoing developments in this area, by their contacts, particularly with election "keys" and popular bases, or by holding meetings with probable candidates or those who hope to enter the parliamentary club.

These sources say that public movement among Maronite leaders is virtually nonexistent, except for the "conciliatory role" that the Maronite League has begun to play. In addition, independent personalities are working to form a Bkirki-led political axis advocating the holding of elections, though only after the following conditions are met: a dignified, safe return for those who were forced to emigrate; providing an atmosphere of confidence for Lebanese citizens to exercise their rights, freely and without repression, threat, or fraud; and granting

Lebanese who left Lebanon under compulsion the legal right to participate in the elections.

The sources add that some are talking about an "upper ceiling" of conditions that should be announced and adhered to in order to obtain a minimum—for example, demanding that the elections be held only after complete sovereignty is achieved by means of the Lebanese army and after its deployment is assured over all Lebanese territory without exception.

Bkirki's Position

The sources are reticent about discussing the role the Maronite League has played to date in bringing the church's leaders to agree on common demands. They do, however, speak about the position of Bkirki—particularly that Patriarch Sufayr was candid in his Easter letter when he expressed the fears that worry Maronites, especially when he spoke openly about a possible loss of identity.

On the practical level, the sources raise the following points:

- The foremost concern of each dignitary and political party or organization leader is to discuss questions of election districts—whether they will be at the *muhafazah* (governate) level, in accordance with a new election law, or at the *qada'* (district) level, in accordance with the old law now in force.
- How will the alliances be? Who will be in charge of leading the ticket in each election district? Who are the persons qualified to participate in them?
- Could a Maronite alliance be established like the 1968 triple alliance? This time it would include the doyen of the National Bloc Party, Parliamentary Deputy Raymond Iddah [Edde]; General Michel 'Awn; and the head of the National Liberal Party, Engineer Duri Sham'un. Or will each leader enter the contest separately to show his strength and the size of the following he represents on the scene?
- Will the government participate in this election contest, if it occurs, by forming slates, especially in areas where there is preponderant Christian weight, to guarantee that the largest possible number of Christian deputies loyal to it reach the coming parliament? Or will the government remain neutral, leaving the game to take its course—win who may, and lose who may—with the state having no role or influence in favoring one slate or one candidate over another?

The sources think that concern about the settling of accounts by election has begun to take precedence among Christian leaders, especially Maronites, over any other settling of accounts. Coming days may bring many surprises and clarify many positions and alliances.

LIBYA

Report on Conditions Extant Under Sanctions

92AF09424 London AL-WASAT in Arabic
15 Jun 92 pp 25-28

[Article by Rida al-A'raj: "Special Report on Daily Life in Country Living Under Blockade: Were It Not for Saddam Husayn's Mistake of Invading Kuwait, West Wouldn't Dare Punish Libya"]

[Text] Tripoli—Libya—When the bus stopped next to the small Turner aircraft that was preparing for its regular flight No. 446 from Carthage Airport to the town of Jorba in southernmost Tunisia, an opulent Libyan turned to his companion and whispered in his ear audibly: "What times! Are these aircraft all we are left with?"

The phrase "what times" is reiterated wherever you turn in Libya. As long as it sums up Libya's condition under the blockade, it makes no difference whether it is uttered in condemnation or in astonishment. The citizen cannot but blurt it out whenever he is faced with the feverish market and falling currency value and whenever he finds it difficult to travel to the nearest neighboring Arab countries. The time when travel was easy and when prices were stable has gone for a period whose duration and features are difficult to determine accurately. The time of concern and of fear of an unknown future has arrived—a time that exposes everything in the country to chaos and turbulence.

The features of this suddenly-arrived time are evident in the citizen's rush to hoard basic foodstuffs without realizing that he will contribute to their disappearance and, consequently, increased prices. Numerous other commodities have almost disappeared or are the object of speculation, such as medical drugs and vehicle spareparts. But one businessman believes that the reason isn't just the blockade but also the economic policy that has permitted importation without government intervention. Consequently, numerous antibiotics have disappeared from the market and goods and equipment from sources known to imitate whatever is Japanese have entered the market and are sold at high prices.

As a consequence of this policy, the businessman said, a wide door has been opened for the black market and a Libyan dinar has become equal to a U.S. dollar in value whereas one dinar used to equal more than three dollars. If the blockade lasts long and if the imports policy remains unchanged, the dinar will be exposed to a real catastrophe.

But the picture isn't totally gloomy. State-managed cooperatives secure the citizens' needs of basic commodities, clothing, and furniture, at times, at nearly nominal prices. For example, a sack of sugar which may cost more

than 30 dinars in the market is provided by the cooperatives to citizens at six dinars. The same applies to other subsidized commodities, including rice, flour, tea, coffee, and oil.

One may ask: How will Libya secure its needs of these commodities if it is decided to impose a total blockade? A brother official in the control agency supervising the people's bureaus (cabinet ministries) said: "Our store of these commodities is enough to meet our needs for 10 years to come." He paused and then added: "I have disclosed one of our strategic secrets to you."

It has become familiar to hear Libyans making comparisons between the gulf crisis and their country's crisis with the three western countries of the United States, France, and Britain. As long as the preludes are the same, even though the issues are different in nature, then why shouldn't the results be the same? Every day the crisis enters a deadend, the possibility of a military strike dominates the thinking, especially since the 1986 precedent is still fresh in the memory.

Parallel to this daily thinking, unprecedented rumors are spread about bridges established recently between Tripoli and Baghdad. There is also talk about transporting to Libya some pieces of Iraqi weaponry that have been hidden in Sudan and about the readiness displayed by the Iraqi Government to provide the military and oil expertise Libya will need if Arab and foreign experts are compelled to leave it. However, some rumors are incredible, such as the rumor speaking of a secret visit made by Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi to Baghdad. Even though the sources circulating this rumor are western sources, it is certain, according to the information available to us, that Iraq tries to exploit the crisis between Libya and the West to break out of its isolation. Iraq has succeeded, if we may use the phrase, to appear to be in the Libyans' eyes the sole Arab country that has refused to adhere to the sanctions against their country. In Tripoli, there is currently extensive activity by specialized Iraqi delegations discussing the possibility of establishing joint projects between the two countries. Because Iraq is unable currently to absorb the thousands of experts it has, Libya seems to be the appropriate place to absorb them. Perhaps Libya is also seeking this end because of its need for these experts in this difficult phase through which it is going.

However, this hasn't stopped Musa Zallum, an ex-Libyan diplomat, from saying: "If it weren't for Saddam Husayn's mistake of invading Kuwait, the West wouldn't dare punish Libya." He added: "Now we realize how grave was that mistake."

Muhammad al-Ghul, general director of Voice of the Arab Homeland Radio and of the monthly periodical that goes by the same name has also underlined the damage caused by the gulf crisis to the Arab ranks, saying: "It has become difficult for the Arab countries to take a united stand vis-a-vis the Western allegations."

Youth Are Regime's Eyes

The truth is that Libyans view the unity-oriented slogans raised in every part of their country with great doubt. The presence of nearly two million Arabs in Libya has not alleviated their bitter feeling toward the Arab countries' adherence to the sanctions. If it is difficult to observe the reactions to the countries that have implemented the air travel ban, then the citizen doesn't conceal his anger at these countries whenever he has the opportunity to express his opinion. When Colonel al-Qadhdhafi proposed a merger with Sudan, Libyans were aware that this is impossible to accomplish. Still, they view it as something with which to spite the Egyptian position.

There is, it seems, an endeavor to re-mold the Libyan-Arab relations on the basis of the position toward the crisis with the West. Even though in his call to squeeze spending, al-Qadhdhafi has made no open reference to likely sanctions against countries that have adhered to resolution 748, Libyans at the various levels interpret this call as being tantamount to punishing these countries. The education, health, and service sectors that are run by Egyptians primarily will be subjected to cuts. Consequently, their budgets, which amount to hundreds of millions of dollars annually, will also be cut.

In view of the possibility that the confrontation with the West will last a long time, perhaps Libya realizes now the need to reexamine its economic policy and to regulate its market which is now wide open to foreign labor from everywhere. It is noticed that there is economic activity and expansion in numerous production and service areas. But the results of this activity have been reflected in the imports volume. Libya relies greatly now, even more than in the past few years, on importing numerous basic and ready-made commodities, spareparts, machinery, and operational equipment. It now seems that there will be a deficit in next year's budget which has been presented to the basic people's congresses to pass. This means that the foreign exchange resources, which come from oil basically, have been exhausted.

This economic activity has been rapid and disorganized. Steps have already been taken to streamline it. The question that Libyans ask is: How successful can these steps be? This is because the Libyan experiment is highly unique and peculiar. Libyans like to characterize their society as a society of solidarity. To date, the expenditures list continues to contain the section for treatment at society's expense, i.e. what the state pays out of its budget for this purpose. There are also expenditures for the people's bureaus. Ultimately, these are political expenses, if we may use the phrase, whose goal is to gain more support for the regime. I recall now the statement of Mohamed Mosadeq, a Tunisian managing an industrial company operating in Libya, and his emphasis on the harmony existing between Libyan youth and the regime. He continued to point out the privileges that the youth enjoy, the least of which are modern cars. If a visitor cannot explain the phenomenon of smashed cars

roving Tripoli's street, he can get to know the reason fully after a while. Young men are always behind numerous traffic accidents. The youth are the regime's eyes and arms. If you feel their presence, it is because they are actually present everywhere. In first class hotels where delegations and journalists of all colors and nationalities stay, many youth turn into escorts. Once when we went to visit a model school, there were five of these young men and four of us journalists!

My Libyan interlocutor wasn't surprised while reading my questions alertly. He answered decisively: "And how do you think the regime has managed to survive all these years?"

Brother 'Abd-al-Hamid 'Ammar, the congresses secretary at the People's General Congress, has explained some aspects of the Libyan political experiment, saying: "There is in Libya a new political system that differs from all other systems in the world. In Libya, there is no president, no ruler, no cabinet, and no deputies. All these instruments have been merged in the people. In Libya, authority is the people's authority. Those who think that al-Qadhdhafi is Libya's president are mistaken. He is the revolution commander but he cannot make a decision individually."

On his part, al-Qadhdhafi lets no occasion pass without a reminder of his role as the revolution leader only. He was able to ignite the masses' enthusiasm when he entrusted them with the task of responding to the West's demands for extradition of the two Libyan citizens accused of blowing up a U.S. airliner over Lockerby. Before the masses launched the meetings of their congresses, which are comprised of 237 congresses for men and a similar number for women and of nearly 1,047 sub-congresses emanating from them, the prompt answer they gave was not to extradite. The Libyan radio, television, and press have spent all their time presenting proofs that it is impossible to hand over the accused to the West. Maylud 'Arafah, a Libyan legal adviser, explained the matter to me as follows:

"The Libyan penal code, like any other law that regulates relations among the members of the same society, is a purely territorial law, i.e. its jurisdiction doesn't extend beyond Libya's borders, except in certain cases, as when a Libyan citizen counterfeits Libyan currency abroad, attacks the country's flag and sovereignty, joins a hostile country, or enrolls in its army. The Libyan penal code also applies to any Libyan who commits a felony or a misdemeanor in a country other than Libya but isn't tried there. This law ensures that such a citizen is brought to trial on the basis of the principle that stipulates the perpetrator of any crime shall be punished. In this case, the police and judiciary agencies of the country where the crime is committed must present decisive proof for indictment of the perpetrator of the felony or misdemeanor in their country. Therefore, one cannot accept the principle that the persons suspected in the Lockerby case must be extradited because of the inadequacy and weakness of the Libyan judiciary who have an

experience of more than 40 years with the penal code which is a true copy of the Italian penal code. The Europeans are better aware of the hidden secrets of this law."

Concluding, 'Arafah said: "This is what I will say at the people's congress also."

It is evident that all participants in these congresses have taken the same position. The overwhelming majority among them are members of the revolutionary committees that have become the regime's sole party, without an official announcement. This is because the phenomenon of absence from these congresses has become noticeable, and al-Qadhdhafi has pointed it out repeatedly. Even though markets are closed every evening when these congresses are in session, merchants and vendors rarely go to them. I have seen some shopkeepers locking themselves in their shops. A taxi driver has assured me that he hasn't attended one of these congresses for years because he isn't thinking of traveling outside Libya. One of the penalties levied on those who absent themselves from these congresses is to deny them a passport.

Storm Hasn't Arrived Yet

The revolutionary committees have AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR, their organ that is published every Monday. It is the Libyan paper most vehement in dealing with the Lockerby issue and criticizing the West at a time when all slogans hostile to the West and to the United States in particular have disappeared. Big boards continue to be seen in squares and on sidewalks but they carry nothing. They have been painted green, at times without much care to conceal the slogans they had carried. The majority of the other papers are weeklies that are extremely local in character, considering that they are ordinarily published by the municipal information committees, excluding the daily AL-FAJR AL-JADID, which is published by AL-JAMAHIRIYAH NEWS AGENCY where the emphasis is always put on solidarity with Libya in its current crisis.

Both television channels are content to transmit the reverberations of and interactions with the crisis and to present the Libyan position on this crisis in a calm manner that differs from the customary style of the Libyan media. Rather, the United States is present with its movies. In two movie theaters, two U.S. films were playing. 'Imran Raghib al-Madanini, director of the Seen Television Programs Directorate, sees nothing surprising in the matter. In explanation, he says: "There is no hostility between the Libyan and U.S. peoples. Our relations are always with the peoples."

The "four-year war" series is the only program that constitutes material for propaganda confrontation with the United States, considering that the series deals with the confrontation between the United States and Libya in 1905 when the Libyan navy captured the USS Philadelphia, a U.S. ship that was considered at the time the backbone of the U.S. fleet.

But information in Libya isn't just the image or the word. A series of meetings and conferences have been held in Tripoli to express international solidarity with Libya. Hardly a day passes without the manifestation of an aspect of this solidarity. Even though it is difficult to evaluate practically what has been accomplished with these meetings and conferences, it is certain that Libya hasn't been cut off from the rest of the world, despite the blockade.

Even though effects of the blockade have been reflected on the health and service sectors, the pace of ordinary life hasn't changed. The oil sector, the biggest and most important sector, is under the charge of three German companies that have long-term contracts and of the Libyan Petroleum Company. Wintershall Company has maintained its daily production rate of 36,000 tons. Arabs and Libyans working in this company are considering the creation of an independent company if this German company is forced to leave under the pressure of future circumstances in order to ensure continued oil production, even if for domestic consumption only.

Siemens, a German company, is the only company that has shut down because it became impossible for it to carry on with its work as a result of the air embargo. Inversely, it is noticed that there has been a deluge of businessmen arriving to conclude deals with guaranteed profit. Anthony Cairo, a Portuguese, talked to me about the importance of the Libyan market and its promising potentials and about the Libyans' fulfillment of their financial obligations. Even though Cairo manages his company from London, he sees no reason why some Western companies should sever their dealings with Libya.

In fact, none of the foreign experts working in Libya have expressed the wish to leave the country. They live an easy life and they enjoy numerous facilities, as well as the right to use satellite dishes to pick up television stations. When I asked Jurgen, a German engineer, when he was going to leave Libya, he answered with a resounding laugh: "Even if I am compelled to leave here, I will return as a tourist guide. I will bring tourists to Libya's desert. There are many crazy Germans who chase whatever is rare and strange."

In Tripoli's silent night, except for the waves of the Mediterranean, the sight of soldiers was new to the eyes of the Libyan citizen. He had been previously used to seeing boy and girl students going to their schools in military uniform. But soldiers were in their barracks.

Nobody knows exactly what soldiers do in Tripoli's streets, and perhaps in the streets of the other Libyan cities, and nobody can ask this question. But caution is necessary, as military tradition says. All of Libya is in a cautious and watchful state and all possibilities are open. There is no doubt that a crisis with the dimensions of Libya's crisis with the West dictates protecting the government institutions and departments, and primarily the citizen who is the easy target of any aggression.

Since the eruption of the crisis, citizens, especially students, have been mobilized and given military training, even though all citizens are given military training annually. The new confrontation emanating from the bombing of a U.S. airliner in 1988 and a French airliner over the Niger in 1989 is nothing but one of the series of long confrontations with enemies and the foes. 'Abdal-Hamid al-Amami, secretary general of the Higher Institutes and Advanced Centers and member of the Jamahiriya Student Federation General Secretariat, said: "The mobilization has existed since the early days of the revolution and the process of militarizing students started in 1970 because there is a dire need for students to protect the pan-Arab bastion from the Zionists and imperialists."

Al-Amami added: "Libya is now paying the price of its pan-Arabist positions." However, he has lauded positions of the Arab student associations and federations toward his country. He also hopes that the dialogue advocated by the Jamahiriya Student Federation with U.S. students will be realized. But this is tied to how the crisis develops.

Al-Amami also asserted that not a single one of the 15,000 Arab or foreign students enrolled in Libyan universities has left the country, and neither have any professors. Visiting professors from Europe and the United States have not stopped arriving. This is confirmed by 'Abdallah 'Ali, head of the High School Education at the General Secretariat for Education.

The reality disperses all doubts. The ten Libyan universities are approaching the end of the academic year, the streets are crowded with pedestrians, and the markets are alive with the clamor of vendors from everywhere.

One can hardly believe that the storm that has passed across all of the world's boundaries hasn't reached Libya yet!

MOROCCO

Illegal Immigration to Spain Discussed

92AF0929A London *AL-MAJALLAH*
in Arabic 26 May 92 pp 36-40

[Article: "Moroccans' Illegal Migration to Spain; Men Buy Passports, Women Pay Money for Husbands"]

[Text] Hello, Andalusia! We have missed you, ever since Granada was lost, the last stronghold of the Beni al-Ahmar kings. You never received visitors from the south with generosity and grace. You only brought sadness to the victims of the boats, or "coffins of death," who tried to come to your land, searching for new horizons of life. It is not wrong to cry for them. We have been crying since Abu 'Abdallah al-Saghir cried in his mother's arms in your beautiful paradise.

In the steps of Tariq Ibn Ziyad, the steamer "al-Boughaz" left Tangier harbor, headed for the Spanish

city of Algeciras. Perhaps, the most important thing that one notices these days is the lack of passengers, as the ship comes in sight of the city on the strait separating the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. There are foreigners who can be counted on the fingers of two hands. A border guard blamed the difficulty of obtaining a visa to enter Spain as the reason for so few Moroccans traveling there.

Before the visa system was imposed, ferry boats were filled with passengers from all walks of life, seeking recreation on the Spanish sun coasts, along with adventurers who did not know what was in store for them. Merchants would visit Spain on shuttle trips to buy Spanish goods for sale in Morocco. Now, matters have changed, and most of the migration has become secretive, with no need for passports or entry visas. However, this way is fraught with danger and perils.

Jamaleddine [Mashbal], a social attache and former supervisor of the Moroccan Consulate General in Madrid, said that migration to Spain began in the late 1950's, because of two factors that occurred in Spain. The first was the commerce that was created by the building of American military bases in Spain, and the flow of hard currency that that produced. The second factor lay in the intensive migration of Spanish manual labor primarily to Western Europe and America, so that the number of Spanish immigrants by the early eighties totaled 4 million. Consequently, Spain was the number one European country in terms of migration. This, in turn, produced a flow of hard currency to Spain, which shared in creating huge development projects.

Mashbal added that these two factors created a dynamic intercourse, causing Spain—in the late 1950's and early 1960's—to require manual labor to complete the development projects. However, instead of requesting Moroccan migrant labor officially, within the framework of a bilateral agreement between the two countries, Franco Spain opened its doors to secret or illegal migration, at which it winked and called "illegal but tolerated" labor.

Mashbal thinks that this caused a kind of speculation in manual labor. At a time when Spain was exporting national manual labor in order to obtain hard currency, it was compensating for that labor with cheap Moroccan labor that had no legal status. This enabled the Franco government to enrich itself from this situation, whenever it wished. The situation remained like that, until the number of Moroccan workers living in Spain in the mid-Seventies reached 80,000, of whom 95 percent were residing illegally, without social security, working for less than minimum wage.

After Morocco organized the free zone in 1975, and annexed the Sahara, the Spanish authorities expelled thousands of Moroccan immigrants. They were arrested and crammed into jails before they were expelled to Morocco. The number of Moroccan immigrants dropped from 80,000 to 30,000 persons. As a result of that, in

1976, the Moroccan Government appointed a social attache in the Moroccan Embassy in Madrid to conduct a study of the conditions of the Moroccan community in Spain, in order to give it assistance and try to stop the expulsion campaigns. Then, unexpectedly in 1979, Spain agreed to the International Charter for Human Rights, considered to be an encouraging factor and helpful in stopping the expulsion campaigns.

On the first official visit to Morocco by Spanish monarch Juan Carlos in 1979, the occasion was considered appropriate for the Moroccan Government to place settlement of the status of Moroccan immigrants on the agenda for Moroccan-Spanish discussions. Reference was made to that issue in the joint communique issued at the conclusion of this visit. As a result, the Spanish Government began a study of technical and legal means that could lead to a settlement of the immigrants' status, so that those carrying work and resident permits would no longer be the exception, inasmuch as there were no more than 3,000 persons in that category. However, the means and techniques that the Spanish authorities designed for this settlement were filled with many loopholes, and were not completely successful, although the status of many immigrants were settled by the beginning of the eighties. Mashbal recalled that, at that time, while there was a political will for settlement on the level of the Spanish Government, its instructions in this regard were met with underhanded rejection and considerable procrastination on the level of local and provincial administrations and agencies.

In addition, a large number of Moroccan immigrants, whose legal status should have been settled, did not possess passports, since they had left Morocco illegally. In light of this, the consuls were dealing with a strange situation. On the one hand, they wanted to issue passports to these immigrants, if they could prove they had obtained work in Spain. However, on the other hand, they were wary of this with some justification, since issuing passports might encourage more illegal migration and, consequently, turn the consulate into a factor encouraging illegal migration, instead of working to settle the status of illegal resident migrants.

In this regard, Abdellah al-Qaderi, the Moroccan consul in Malaga, told AL-MAJALLAH that 300 immigrants living in Almeria (40 kilometers north of Malaga) came to the Consulate last February seeking new passports, claiming they had lost theirs. "It became clear to us later that these persons were selling their passports to gangs composed of Algerians and Spaniards, who used these passports for various purposes." Al-Qaderi explained that the sale price of a passport could reach 60,000 Spanish pesetas (about \$600). For the most part, this money would be spent to obtain a permit to reside in Spain.

It is worth pointing out that the Moroccan Consulate in Malaga has an area of jurisdiction that includes 14 Spanish provinces, including Gibraltar. Abdelqader Musleh, the Moroccan vice consul and supervisor of

settling immigrant status in the Malaga district, says: "The biggest problem is in our consular district, because it is located near the border area." He explained that the number of Moroccan immigrants living in Malaga totals 3,000, whereas Moroccans living in Spanish areas within the Malaga consular district total 20,000 persons. He pointed out that the Moroccan Consulate keeps statistics to ascertain the true number of Moroccan immigrants.

The Moroccan Consul explained the process of settling the Moroccans' status. He said that it began in February 1990, and has continued for one and a half years. During this period, the Consulate has received between 300 and 400 files a day requesting settlement. Later, a Spanish ministerial decision was issued, to the effect that all foreigners residing in Spain legally, who had entered Spain before 15 May 1991, had the right to submit an application to settle their status. It is worth noting that the Spanish authorities—before that—had made it a condition that a foreigner had to reside for five years in Spain without a break before his status could be settled. They then imposed a condition on foreigners that, even if they had entered Spain before 15 May 1991, they must submit a work certificate. That was a big problem.

Despite the end of the period set by the Spanish authorities to receive applications for settlement of immigrant status, the illegal migration still increased. The migration was done on small wooden boats, which carry only 10 persons, and are not equipped with rescue devices or radios. Many of these boats sank, because they were overloaded. The majority of illegal migration voyages were at night or during periods of heavy fog, in order to avoid Spanish naval observation posts. Many times these boats anchored off the coast of Almeria, whose name is associated in Moroccan minds with incidents of migrant boat sinkings, boats which the Moroccan press called the "coffins of death."

However, what do those who went to Spain on these boats say, as well as those who entered legally before the visa system was imposed?

Mohammed, 28 years old, born in Al Hoceima, says that he went to Spain in 1988 on a fishing boat. He visited Morocco in 1989, 1990, and 1991 by the same means. He added that he submitted an application to the Spanish authorities to obtain a residency permit through a lawyer. He paid the latter 50,000 Spanish pesetas (about \$500) as a fee but, so far, he has not obtained the permit.

Seid, also 28, from Tangier, who works as a sailor, says that, despite the problems that those coming to Spain face, and the fact that they are refused permission to enter that country, he was not affected because of his European appearance. He explained that he was able to obtain a residency permit, with the help of some Spanish friends and his employer, who gave him a work contract.

Ahmed, 25, from Tetouan, was fortunate, because he obtained a residency permit within a year, having obtained a work contract.

Qasem, 28, from Tangier, told us that his father worked in Algeciras, but his father was content for them to be registered at the Moroccan Consulate, without registering with the Spanish authorities. He added that his family has returned to Morocco, while he returned to Spain to study chemistry in one of the universities. However, an incident occurred, in which he had no part, but which landed him in jail. After his release, he returned to Morocco where, after three years, he obtained a new passport, enabling him to go back to Spain. Qasem said that he has been unable to pursue his studies and is still looking for a job.

Bilal, 28, from Tetouan, has a different story. He came to Spain after obtaining a work contract. He submitted an application for a residency permit last July, and is still waiting.

The other Moroccan youths, whom we met in Algeciras and Malaga, refused to give their names or have their pictures taken. They migrated by means of small boats, which cost each of them between 7,000 and 10,000 Moroccan dirhams (approximately \$800 to \$1,100). They told us that the initial points of the illegal sea voyages from Morocco are the area of [Malabata and Oud al-Yan], which are suburbs of Tangier, the areas of [Ouadi al-Ramal, al-Daliyah, al-Moudif, and Martil] in the Tetouan area, the Jebha area in Chechaouene Province, and the Beni Nessim area in al-Nador Province, as well as the coastline of Al Hoceima Province.

It is worth pointing out that most migrants are from the northern Moroccan area, migrating when it was impossible for them to find work. "Mafias" emerged in northern cities to smuggle human beings, by which they make a quick profit. In addition, many of those who want to migrate illegally fall victim to swindlers and trickery; their money is stolen and they do not make their voyage. There are other migrants who divide among themselves the cost of hiring a boat and crew. One of the stories about obtaining a residency permit in Spain was called the "Huelva case" by the Spanish press. It concerns a group of Moroccan seamen, who work on Spanish fishing boats in Moroccan waters under a fishing contract with EEC nations. The Spanish authorities refused them residency permits in the city of Huelva, where they anchor their boats. They spend four or five months at a time at sea.

The Moroccan consul in Malaga stated that he explained to Spanish officials that it was unreasonable for sailors to spend months at sea, see the wharf, but not be permitted to land. He added that the justification given by the Spanish Labor Ministry's representative was his fear that those sailors would obtain a residency permit and, then, run away to work somewhere else. The consul suggested that the sailors be given a seaman's residency card, which is different from the ordinary residency permit, so that they could be prevented from running away to work in other fields. In this way, the issue was later resolved.

The process of settling immigrant status in Spain resulted in settling the status of 40,000 Moroccans in 1991. It also resulted in the emergence of a new trade based on forging documents required by the settlement process. There also emerging gangs who bring young girls into Spain on the pretext of employment as servants. However, the girls soon discover that they have fallen into corrupt Mafia hands.

Leila, aged 29, from Casablanca, said that she used to work in a textile factory, but she was influenced by certain persons and began to think about migrating to Spain. They promised her a happy situation and a respectable salary. However, ultimately, she was thwarted by a bitter fate, and her situation deteriorated.

Leila is only one example of hundreds of young women who were deceived and found themselves unable to find a respectable job, or obtain a residency permit in Spain legally. Therefore, they can only look for a husband at any cost, so that they may legally stay and avoid the fear of being expelled by the Spanish police. The "cost" for a Moroccan woman to marry a Spanish husband, in order to obtain a residency permit legally, ranges from 100,000 to 300,000 pesetas.

Abdelqader Musleh, the Moroccan vice consul in Malaga, stated that the case of a marriage like this leads to two situations today. They come to the Consulate either to have certain documents authenticated, or to have them prepared. He pointed out that the Spanish police have recently conducted a campaign against Spaniards who marry in exchange for money.

On the other hand, Mohammed [Bendjil], a Moroccan who has lived in Spain for 13 years and has Spanish nationality, says that there are some Moroccan women who published ads in newspapers and magazines seeking marriage in exchange for 500,000 pesetas.

Hanan [al-Boujedayni], 15, a student in the data field, told us that, by frequenting a restaurant and coffee house in the Ben al-Medina suburb of Malaga, she met many Moroccan girls who have married bohemian-type Spaniards.

Fetiha, 30, from Casablanca, said that she had not visited Morocco for five years, and that all she could do was marry a Spaniard to obtain a residency permit, so that she could visit Morocco. She added that, in order not to remain the hostage of a mixed marriage of convenience, she had a child by him to protect her from the "profits of fate."

Another Fetiha, aged 29, from Marrakech, who works as a waitress in an Italian restaurant, told us that she had not yet obtained residency permit documents, but that she was reluctant to marry a Spaniard, particularly since her cousin's experience was still on her mind. The latter, despite the enormous cost of marriage, continued to suffer from her Spanish husband's thievery. He was always asking her for money and, if she refused, he would threaten her with divorce.

In this regard, Jamaleddine Mashbal, after studying the problems of immigrants, believes that marriage in order to get a residency permit is a phenomenon that emerged, for the first time, in America, and has spread through Moroccan immigrant circles in Germany. It emerged prominently in Spain in the 1960's.

In general, one can say that the sea has never been a deterrent to migration between Morocco and Spain, even when means of navigation were primitive. Today, with modern technology, observers believe that imposing a visa system will not be a deterrent either. According to the same observers, it is a big mistake to define present day relations between Morocco and Spain in terms of the Islamic conquest, since migration was a centuries-old custom before that. The original Spanish inhabitants, who were called Iberians and who trace their heritage to Moroccan Berber tribes, crossed the strait of "Boughaz" and settled in Spain. Since that time, the migration has not ceased...and will not stop.

Trade, Economic Agreement Signed With China

LD107162392 Rabat MAP in English
1250 GMT 1 Jul 92

[Arab Maghreb Union "Pool" item]

[Text] Rabat, Jul 1st (MAP/POOL/UMA)—Finance Minister Mohamed Berrada and Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations Wang Wendong signed here Tuesday an accord on economic and technical cooperation between Morocco and China.

Under the agreement, China extends the kingdom an interest free loan of 5.5 million USd.

The two officials also signed documents for a Chinese donation of equipment worth 505,000 USd. They covered aspects of bilateral economic cooperation and probed ways to have it further enhanced. The two sides agreed to launch cooperation projects in the field of infrastructure in Morocco.

Constitutional Amendments Conform to Opposition Proposals

LD107141992 Rabat MAP in English
1224 GMT 10 Jul 92

[Text] Rabat, Jul. 10 (MAP)—"His Majesty King Hassan II has completed two months ago working out the constitution amendments he deems necessary and they will be submitted to the people's approval once the electoral lists are definitely set", said Ahmed Reda Guedira, the King's advisor.

Answering a letter dated June 19 by leaders of five opposition parties sent to the sovereign, Guedira said several of the amendments made by King Hassan II conform to the opposition proposals made in the letter.

The five parties are the Istiqlal Party, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, the Party for Progress and Socialism

and the organisation for a democratic and popular action. The sovereign's advisor said the proposals concern election organisations and proposals to amend the constitution.

Istiqlal Party Elects New Secretary General

LD0707164992 Rabat MAP in English
1237 GMT 7 Jul 92

[Text] Casablanca, Jul 7 (MAP)—The National Congress of the Shura and Istiqlal Party wound up works Sunday in Casablanca adopting recommendations on several aspects of political, economic and social life in the kingdom.

Participants also elected Mohamed Maach as secretary general of the party, 17 members to the Political Bureau, 113 to the Central Committee and 294 to their National Council.

The party said it was upholding constitutional monarchy and national territorial integrity. It stressed the call by the Moroccan sovereign urging the young to play an active part in political life and contribute to national development.

The party deplored division in the Arab world and voiced unconditional support to the Palestinian people in its historic struggle.

Human Rights Body Notes Positive, 'Worrying' Elements

LD2506141592 Paris Radio France International
in French 0630 23 Jun 92

[Text] The Moroccan Human Rights Organization issued a report on people presently detained in the country. It numbers 532 people jailed following incidents of a political nature, and 102 detained for the views they hold.

Maitre Ben Ali, the organization's vice president, explains that although there are positive elements in the present situation, there are others which are more worrying.

[Begin Ben Ali recording] We noted that positive measures were taken, in particular in the freeing of a certain number of political prisoners in 1989, and then the adoption in 1991 of some amendments which set more precise rules concerning holding custody. As for the situation in practice, we can say that in recent times we have received fewer complaints concerning torture and arbitrary detention.

Nevertheless a great deal remains to be done. First on the legal level, we consider that there are laws negating the normal exercise of individual and public freedoms. Then, on the practical level, we need to set up guarantees, and on this point we noted in several trials that the conditions of these trials were not fair. [end recording]

Democratic Bloc: Memorandum to King Hassan II

LD0807180592 Rabat MAP in English
1354 GMT 8 Jul 92

[Text] Rabat, July 8 (MAP)—The Democratic Bloc formed of five opposition parties addressed last June 19 a memorandum to King Hassan II where these parties drew the broadline of the constitutional reforms as they viewed them.

In the memorandum, whose full text was ran this Wednesday by these parties' papers, the Istiqlal Party, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, the Party for Progress and Socialism, the National Union of Popular Forces and the Organization for a Democratic and Popular Action point out that the 'delicate' circumstances Morocco is going through require 'cohesion on the part of the whole nation' to be able to take up the challenge of edifying 'a unified, strong and prosperous' Morocco.

To reach the goal, the Democratic Bloc proposes political and constitutional reforms in order to base the democratic system on firm foundations. The bloc calls in this regard for constitutional reforms guaranteeing the consecration of the authority and responsibility of institutions, the sovereignty of law and the modernization of the state's apparatus. The reforms, the bloc claims, should protect human rights, fundamental individual and collective freedom, as well as civic, political, economic, social and cultural rights to create 'an efficient frame' meeting the people's legitimate aspirations to prosperity and progress.

The bloc also requests that relations between powers be based 'on a positive separation' and that the parliament be endowed with the necessary prerogatives to conduct control operations, set up investigation commissions and question the government...that must stem from the parliamentary majority.

As to the judiciary power, the block proposes 'an effective independence of justice with regard to the executive and legislative branches' and calls for a comprehensive reform of the judiciary system.

The bloc members request that all the members of the parliament be elected at universal suffrage for a five year term, that local democracy be consolidated through further decentralization and that public monies be submitted to strict control.

For the bloc, sound and healthy democratic institutions will prompt the people to wage the battle of economic, social and cultural edification and construct the future on new firm bases.

King's Adviser Replies to Democratic Bloc Memorandum

LD0907222292 Rabat RTM Television Network in Arabic 2030 GMT 9 Jul 92

[Text] Here now follows the full text of the message sent by Mr. Ahmed Reda Guedia, his majesty's adviser, to the leaders of the following parties: The Istiqlal, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces [USFP], the Party of Progress and Socialism [PPS] and the Movement of the Democratic and Popular Action, in response to the memorandum they sent to his majesty pertaining to the proposed amendments of the constitution.

Peace and God's mercy be upon you. His majesty, may God make him victorious, studied the message that you sent him on 17 Thi al-Hijjah 1412 AH, corresponding to 19 June 1992, and entrusted me, may God protect him, to inform you that he noted that, on one hand, the message included considerations of a general nature and opinions regarding the holding of elections that you had already expressed during previous occasions, and on the other hand, the message addresses, in detail, all the amendments that you propose to apply to the constitution.

Regarding this very matter, I have the honor to emphasize to you that his majesty, may God assist him, two months ago finished drafting the amendments, whose correct view was deemed necessary to apply to the constitution; and will submit them to the Moroccan people to express their opinion on them as soon as the new general voting registers are compiled and definitely countered [After 31 July]. Then you will realize that the mentioned amendments are congruent in a number of aspects with the proposals you had expressed in your mentioned message.

Yours gratefully.

Daily Praises Procedure Adopted for Coming Elections

LD0907185692 Rabat MAP in English 1248 GMT 9 Jul 92

[Text] Rabat, Jul 9 (MAP)—The procedure adopted for coming elections is an innovation and a major gain for the democratic struggle, says the daily AL BAYANE of the Party for Progress and Socialism (PPS).

Dealing with concertation on coming ballots, the PPS daily praised the fact that parties were provided with documents on the warding of communes and constituencies. The daily sees this as an improvement recalling how in the past only privileged parties were informed of the warding before candidacies were submitted. Now, the daily says, one knows beforehand and can even come up with observations before adoption of the project.

SAUDI ARABIA

Finance Minister Calls For Savings, Investment

92AE0408A Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 6 May 92 p 25

[Article by AL-RIYAD correspondent]

[Text] His Excellency Muhammad Aba-al-Khayl, minister of finance and national economy, has confirmed that it is necessary for national savings to grow at an appropriate rate to absorb population growth, while maintaining a high standard of living, in order for the national economy to achieve a suitable long-term economic growth rate.

In the opening session of a conference on "The Present and The Future on the Horizon of Investment and Financing in the Kingdom," which began its activities yesterday morning at King Sa'ud University, Aba-al-Khayl said:

"It pleases me to speak to you today on savings and investment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on the developments in these two sectors of economic activity, and how they can encourage economic growth in the Kingdom in the coming years. I will speak, first of all, on the degree of sufficiency of the savings rate in the Kingdom. Then I will touch on the rate of investments and incentives, as the aim is to discuss long-term economic trends. I will ignore 1990-91, in view of its having been affected by a large number of short-term events linked to the Gulf crisis.

"Gross national savings in the Kingdom are estimated as a part of national income account figures. The Kingdom has achieved high savings rates, especially in the early '80s, when the absorptive capacity of the domestic economy was far less than it is now. This pushed the savings rate then to more than 40 percent of gross domestic product at times when the scope of basic facilities and our national economy stabilized at the limits of growth more in accordance with long-term trends, and the savings rate tended to be more in line with those of other countries: about 15-20 percent in recent years. Gross estimated national savings in 1989, for example, were about 50 billion [Saudi] riyals."

His Excellency said in clarifying this point, that what he meant by gross national savings was "the value of gross basic domestic product after deducting the end-consumer expenditure of the national and public sectors, and also deducting net current transfers to the rest of the countries of the world, whether in the form of workers' remittances, ownership income, or other current transfers.

"The level of gross national savings in the Kingdom is the principal source of funds required of most long-term investment outlays, or capital-creating expenditure

"Therefore, it is necessary to allow the national economy to achieve a suitable rate of long-term economic growth, to allow national savings to grow at a suitable rate, and to absorb population growth with the preservation of a high standard of living. It is clear that the existence of the required level of savings is vital in providing a renewable source for new capital investments."

He added, "In this regard, it is remarkable that the end-consumer expenditure of the national sector has risen from about 20-25 percent of gross domestic product at the end of the '70s to between 45-50 percent of it in recent years, while the government sector's end-consumer expenditures rose from about 20-25 percent of gross domestic product to about 35-40 percent during the same time period."

"Although the rate of national savings is no longer noticeably low by global standards, it is now less than it has been in the past."

"But when we study gross national savings, we must mention that the past saw a large and sudden decrease in oil imports, and a resultant economic deflation. For the government to continue operations on a budget thus reduced and also to ease the economic deflation, it began, at that time, to spend government savings, which are a major part of gross national savings, in order that the building of infrastructure might continue at the same speed with which it began."

"For this reason, we must not use an annual budget deficit as a negative measure of national savings, as the government offered to use its foreign accounts for domestic expenditure in order to maintain a reasonable level of growth without facing the risks usually faced by countries in those circumstances."

"Instead of offering the 'average' deficit in the budget as a measure of gross national savings, we refer to an approximate estimate of private savings. This allows us to see that while government savings fell off, fluctuating between 15-20 percent of gross domestic product in the late '70s for the reasons I mentioned, private savings rose from about 15 percent of gross domestic product at the end of the '70s, to a little more than 20 percent in the period from 1986-88, before stabilizing at around 18 percent of gross domestic product in 1989."

"This analysis shows that the government gave priority to the growth of national savings over public government savings. This analysis also suggests that the national sector succeeded in activating the rate of savings by a small margin, even during the period of deflation. The rate of private sector saving, however, recently went back to a level lower, to a certain extent, as economic growth has now resumed its course."

"If we return to this condition, and to figures of the account of national income, we find that the expenditures of gross capital creation, 'including expenditures for fixed capital creation and stock changes,' equalled about 77 billion ryals at the end of the '70s, then rose to

about 130 billion ryals in 1983, dipping to about 53 billion during the deflation period. But it revived after that to a little under 70 billion ryals in 1989."

"If we distinguish between private investment expenditure and government investment, we can see that government investment in appliances, equipment, and plants decreased from 20 percent of gross domestic product in 1978 to no more than 8.5 percent in 1989, but there was no noticeable change in the rate of gross government investment in facilities and equipment, as the decrease was due almost entirely to the contraction of the rate of construction expenditure."

"The falling-off of government construction activity in the Kingdom is the natural result to the fact that most of the Kingdom's infrastructure is complete."

"As regards national sector investment outlays, whether in the form of building new housing or what is called fixed commercial investment, gross expenditure on housing construction reached about 3 percent of gross domestic product in the late '70s, decreasing somewhat, in 1989, to 4.2 [as published]."

"Gross fixed commercial investment rose from about 6-8 percent of gross domestic product in the late '70s to between 10-12 percent during the period of deflation, and fluctuated between 8-9 percent in 1988-89."

"This apparently suggests that expenditure on fixed capital investment was too late in 1989, despite some scattered statistical indicators that suggested the investment picture was now somewhat brighter."

The Minister of Finance and National Economy confirmed that it was up to the national sector to maintain or increase private investment rates so that it might be possible to maintain real economic growth at the higher rates desired, as the government had invested much in order to give the national sector the chance to lead economic growth

"What is worth mentioning here is that gross national savings decreased from about 30 percent of gross domestic product in the late '70s, to about 16 percent in 1989, to about 21 percent of the gross domestic product the same year, which indicates that the volume of total national savings was not subject to the creation of gross capital in the Kingdom. It was always possible to make use of foreign assets to insure the necessary investment."

"What has special meaning in this regard are the foreign financial assets possessed by the national sector. We can estimate, using modern statistics from the principal statistical sources in the world, that the Saudi national sector had, in October 1990, about \$30 billion of financial claims on member banks on the rolls of the Bank for International Settlements. That does not mean they are net financial assets, there are also claims from the same banks on these account holders, but the mention of them means activating the national sector's foreign financial assets, in addition to the return to the national sector

itself of other assets, outside of foreign banks, in the form of shares, real estate, and direct investments in the ownership of various projects, plus current returns of these funds."

His Excellency said, "Finally, after reviewing some remarks about national savings and investment, I would like to conclude this review with a few remarks about the national sector's domestic investment incentives.

"The government has provided for the same goal I mentioned above: building an economic base on national sector activity and all possible investment incentives. The government has not ceased, in all the years past, to move in this direction. If we wish to review the list of incentives, we find a long list, beginning with project study, and continuing even through the production and startup phases, including soft loans and government purchases. Of course, an environment such as this is an ideal environment, otherwise only available in free trade zones.

"Government agencies concerned with this business undertake to offer all assistance to private investment, and to cooperate, beginning in the study phase and continuing on through the startup phase, to help businesses deal with the government with regard to purchases of national products and the foreign contacts necessary to encourage foreign participation leading to know-how transfer and the opening of export markets. When the field is still wide open for the national sector to make real investment, and when the elements of financial, human, and organizational capabilities are available, as is now clearly the case, what is needed is the greatest expansion possible in this field. What might be encouraged at this point are:

"A. An increase in feasibility studies on investment projects by government agencies, chambers of commerce, and large stock companies; then, possibly, the creation of a follow-up mechanism to hold general meetings in which these studies can be recommended for discussion, with clarification of the conditions necessary for implementing them. These could be considered major occasions for using the media to expand the scope of information about these projects.

"B. An expansion in funding opportunities, using the occasions I have mentioned, or direct research by government agencies, banks, chambers of commerce, concerned businessmen; or through an understanding between these sides on arrangements leading to a diminution in funding risks, [to both] financiers and beneficiaries, quickly and effectively.

"C. Encouraging large companies to expand their production operations, with the aim of founding companies with new products integrated or connected to their products, whether they do it alone or in concert with other financiers. The importance of this point is that existing companies have the expertise, facilities, and financial resources that enable them, more than others,

to found new companies and attract investment from individuals or other companies.

"The points I mentioned above, about prompting national investments, do not represent the whole picture, but I bring them up as examples of what may be described as an organized, comprehensive campaign, in which private and public agencies, and perhaps specialized individuals, will participate, aiming for a rapid expansion in national sector investments.

"Given current world and national conditions—the rising competition among states at the global level for production and trade, the trend toward facilitating and simplifying global commercial exchange, as well as regional commercial exchange—there is little spare time for those who want to increase their productive capacity and ensure their competitive position.

"To aggravate the situation even more, the demand for capital funds in all parts of the world has increased in such a way as to have caused a loss in available long-term investment funds. The competition for available financial resources is likely to lead to the investment of Saudi financial assets in various [other] regions of the world, instead of at home, making it more difficult to find money for domestic investment when the opportune time comes.

"Thus we must all—government agencies, research centers, and national commercial sector organizations—work together in an effective and organized way to create new domestic investment opportunities, and to encourage the direction of national funds into them. They are more remunerative and secure than other [investment opportunities], anyway."

Dr. Ibrahim al-Misha'il, Provost and Acting Director of King Sa'ud University, gave a speech in which he discussed the efforts of the Saudi Economic Society, and confirmed the importance of this meeting and its theme, "The Present and the Future on the Horizon of Investment and Funding in Saudi Arabia," saying that it linked the present reality of investment and funding with a bright future.

Society President Dr. Nasir al-Qa'ud also gave a speech in which he expressed his thanks to His Excellency the Minister of Finance and National Economy for overseeing this meeting, and Dr. Khalid al-'Anqari, Minister of Higher Education, and referred, in his speech, to the genesis and goals of the Society.

Dr. al-Qa'ud confirmed that the distinctive, intense, and brilliant national economic indicators, given the data of the Gulf crisis, exceeded expectations, and were a sign of the standing of this economy and its surpassing power to grow and adapt in the most difficult circumstances.

The sessions of this two-day meeting will deal with a number of topics, among them:

- Industrial Investment: Incentives and Impediments

- The Concept of Setting Up a Free Trade Zone in the Kingdom
- A Dynamic Model for Investment Demand
- Stock Companies and the Stock Market in the Islamic Economy
- The Development of Investment and Supply in the Saudi Industrial Economy in the Last Twenty Years and the Experience of the Dallat-al-Baraka Group
- The Role of the Group and the Islamic Bank for Development in Funding Exports
- The Impediments and Incentives of Investment and Funding in Saudi Arabia
- Choosing the Best Instrument of Competing Economic Policy to Direct the Course of Economic Activity
- Chances for Improving Returns on Investment and Funding Decisions in Agricultural Projects in the Kingdom.

Private Ownership of Businesses Increasing

92AE0445B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
16 Jun 92 p 11

[Text] Riyadh—Economic studies indicate that Riyadh will soon enter the age of the private sector as individuals move increasingly toward private business ownership. In 1990, 73,237 of the 288,924 companies in Saudi Arabia were owned by individuals. As of the end of 1990, 2,458 new companies had been established in Riyadh.

Private companies in Saudi Arabia represent a third of all companies operating in Saudi Arabia. The capital

invested in them is 41 percent of the Saudi total. Seventy percent of these companies are limited liability companies. Riyadh has 47 stock companies in which the lion's share of capital is invested (24.7 billion Saudi riyals).

During 1990 alone, 187 new companies were formed in Riyadh, which is more than half of the 367 companies established in Saudi Arabia in 1990. The capital of the new companies in Riyadh totals 1.5 billion riyals. About half of this sum is owned by four public stock companies established in Riyadh in 1990. Preliminary results from a land use survey undertaken by the Higher Authority for the Development of Riyadh indicate that about 52,000 organizations are operating in Riyadh. They occupy 10.5 million square meters of land. The majority of them are retail clothing stores. Automobile related businesses take up the largest area of land occupied by businesses.

In a related development, the Saudi Planning Ministry is planning to increase the Saudi private sector's share of GDP during the next five years by 4.7 percent to 166 billion riyals or 41 percent in 1994-95.

Growth in the number of private-sector companies and in the capital invested in them has kept pace with expectations regarding the private sector. The number of private companies in Saudi Arabia increased in 1990 by 367 companies or 30 percent compared to the number of new companies formed in 1989. Among these companies are 241 limited liability companies and six stock companies. Their capital totals 2.5 billion riyals. In 1990, 7107 [private] companies with capital of 86.8 billion riyals [were established in Saudi Arabia].

Riyadh's Share of Public Companies in Saudi Arabia in 1990

Type of Company	Total Number of Saudi Companies	Riyadh	%	Total Saudi Capital (Billions of Riyals)	Riyadh	%
Limited Partnership	878	180	23	1596	648	41
Joint Liability Partnership	2138	528	25	2987	980	33
Limited Liability	4096	1710	42	33,508	9514	28
Stock Companies	85	40	47	48745	24705	51
Total	7107	2458	35	86837	35846	41

Manpower Needs Projected to 1995

92AE0445A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
16 Jun 92 p 10

[Text] Riyadh—Studies just completed by competent agencies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia project an annual 1.2-percent expansion of the labor force. These studies expect Saudi [indigenous] manpower to increase by 433,900 by late 1995. Of this figure, 220,400 Saudis will replace foreign workers and 213,500 Saudis are expected to be employed in new jobs.

Saudi Arabia's civilian labor force of 5.77 million is expected to grow by 0.7 percent yearly to 5.98 million by the end of 1995. [During the same period.] private-sector

manpower is expected to grow by 204,800 workers to account for 96 percent of total manpower growth, while public-sector manpower is expected to grow by only about 8,700 at a yearly average rate of 3 percent; the ratio of manpower in the productive sectors to total manpower is expected to increase from 35 percent to 36 percent; the percentage of manpower in the services sector and the public sector is expected to be somewhat less than in the productive sectors; manpower in manufacturing industries will rise by about 85,600 at a yearly average rate of 3.2 percent; manpower in the agricultural sector is expected to increase to 27,400 (i.e. 10 percent of total manpower in Saudi Arabia), reflecting continued productivity growth due to the accelerated expansion of

modern, mechanized, agricultural activities and the phasing out of traditional agriculture; manpower in the building and construction sector is expected to increase by a marginal 0.3 percent; manpower in the commercial sector is expected to increase by 23,900 workers; manpower in the financial services sector is expected to grow by 2.5 percent yearly or 13,200 workers.

According to the studies, professional and technical manpower is expected to increase by about 68,600. By the end of 1995, the civilian labor force will include about 800,000 professionals and technicians having advanced qualifications. They will constitute 13.3 percent of the total labor force in Saudi Arabia.

These studies also predict that the number of Saudi females in the labor force will grow, exceeding the number of males in the labor force. The 574,800 Saudis expected to enter the labor market by the end of 1995 can be broken down according to educational level as follows:

- 12 percent (68,600) will have completed university education, of which females will constitute 44 percent or 30,300.
- 1.3 percent (7,400) will have completed a post-secondary technical education program.
- 25.8 percent (148,500) will have finished secondary school, or will not have finished post-secondary education.
- 10.5 percent (60,500) will have completed middle school, or will not have completed secondary school.
- 22.1 percent (27,000) will have completed elementary school, or will not have completed middle school.
- 15.7 percent (90,400) will be below the elementary level.
- 12.6 percent (72,400) will have finished short-term technical training programs.

The studies show that the fact that Saudi workers command higher wages relative to [similarly qualified] foreign workers will limit the expansion of the employment of Saudis, especially unskilled workers, in the private sector. The studies advocate several measures to reduce this wage disparity, so that the private sector will give preference to Saudi manpower. The studies maintain that the employment of Saudi citizens might be adversely affected if the matter is left to market forces alone, because employers will continue to hire easily obtainable, trained, cheap, foreign manpower. The studies therefore recommend the following measures:

- The implementation of selection measures to guarantee the employment of new Saudi entrants to the labor market in all economic sectors, while maintaining the competitive advantage mentioned above.
- Measures to improve quality and disposition to work of Saudi manpower, and efforts to make the Saudi labor force aware of the wages which it can expect.

SUDAN

Fathi 'Ali on Coup Aims, Nimayri, NIF

92AF09184 London *AL-WASAT* in Arabic
25-31 May 92 pp 32-35

[Interview with Field Marshal Fathi Ahmad 'Ali, former commander of the Sudanese army, by Tariq Hasan in Cairo, date not given]

[Text] Field Marshal Fathi Ahmad 'Ali, former commander in chief of the Sudanese Army, revealed in an exclusive interview with *AL-WASAT* that elements under his command are currently engaged in clandestine operations in the Sudan aimed at toppling the regime of Marshal 'Umar al-Bashir.

He emphasized that it is the National Islamic Front [NIF] led by Dr. Hasan al-Turabi that controls the current Sudanese government, and that it is former President Ja'far al-Nimayri who has made it possible for the NIF to infiltrate all state institutions. Field Marshal Fathi Ahmad 'Ali called for the arrest and public trial of current Sudanese President 'Umar al-Bashir and former President Ja'far al-Nimayri. He also pointed out that the current regime in Khartoum is about to be toppled.

Field Marshal Fathi Ahmad 'Ali had been commander in chief of the Sudanese army until 30 Jun '89 when Marshal 'Umar al-Bashir's group assumed power. He considers himself, along with a group of former senior officers and military commanders, to be the "legitimate command of the Sudanese armed forces." It is to be noted that an alliance exists between Field Marshal 'Ali and Col. John Garang's "Popular Movement for the Liberation of the Sudan" which is engaging al-Bashir's government forces in the south of the Sudan.

Following is the text of *AL-WASAT*'s interview with Field Marshal 'Ali at his Alexandria residence.

[AL-WASAT] You say that you are the "legitimate command" of the Sudanese army even though this army, under the government of Marshal 'Umar al-Bashir's, is waging and winning a war in the south of the Sudan. Don't you consider this a contradiction?

[Fathi 'Ali] I don't consider it a contradiction because the army has been forced into this war and is now fighting by virtue of its courage and in order to defend itself. If we go back a little we would find that the war issue has been resolved by al-Mirghani's initiative of 16 Nov 89 and was accepted by the democratic government that was then in authority. As to the victories achieved so far, we, being military, appreciate the efforts of the Sudanese soldier in that respect and do not attribute those victories either to the present regime or to the Popular Defense Forces. Sudanese army accomplishments in any field are the fruits of cumulative efforts by former commanders, including us, and are in line with known traditions and legacies.

The current regime can not [possibly] build a professional fighting army in a [mere] three years and can not therefore be given credit for any current victories. The credit goes [only] to the Sudanese army and to its officers and troops. I represent the legitimate command of the Sudanese army but I believe that the pretext for current fighting is very flimsy. The army itself does not believe in it but fights because, having been pushed into the hell of this war, it is not in its tradition to lose or withdraw or surrender. This fact is recognized and acknowledged by Popular Movement fighters.

[AL-WASAT] This what you say. The opposition charter therefore calls for only a single war against the current government in Khartoum?

[Fathi 'Ali] Yes, the charter calls for only one war directed against the government. There is also coordination in this regard with the Popular Movement in order to bring down the regime. We are also in agreement on this with the rest of the opposition coalition.

[AL-WASAT] Don't you think that the mere act of victory further commits the army to the political administration that is leading to triumph?

[Fathi 'Ali] The current field command of this battle is professional and has no relationship to the political organization of the ruling NIF. I therefore see nothing unusual about any of this.

[AL-WASAT] You said that the army was pushed into this war. Why then did it not refuse or rebel?

[Fathi 'Ali] The army can not rebel under battle conditions because it usually goes into action automatically when fighting occurs. It can not rebel, especially while in the south, and it would never intentionally weaken or accept defeat. This is out of the question even when it knows that the pretext for the war is feeble. This is the character of the Sudanese soldier.

[AL-WASAT] How then can you be sure that the army supports you at this time?

[Fathi 'Ali] Proof of that is in successive armed attempts to topple this regime since 30 Jun 89. Only six or seven such attempts have been made public but there were very many others and those implicated have already been liquidated and executed. Furthermore, our clandestine operations continue despite those liquidations but I can not go into that. We are assured through constant contacts that we enjoy full support. It is no exaggeration to say that there is pervasive belief that the legitimate command of the armed forces offers the only salvation from that regime.

[AL-WASAT] Does this mean that you orchestrated all attempts at toppling the current regime in Khartoum?

[Fathi 'Ali] We don't claim that we were behind all of the attempts but any one who has raised a weapon against the current regime most definitely believes in the fundamental issue of liberating the Sudanese people from a

despotic regime. Any movement in that direction is in the mainstream of the legitimate command.

[AL-WASAT] But none of those attempts was anything more than a military coup?

[Fathi 'Ali] They should not be viewed only in that context because we do not believe in military coups and are opposed to them. The Sudan has suffered an insurrection, in the form of a military coup, against the constitution and the legitimate authority. It is common knowledge that it [the coup] was received with popular demonstrations and protests. This is well known ..[?] within the country despite the regime's control and censorship of the media. A very large popular movement in the Sudanese street currently exists alongside military movements. The military action we seek would precede or follow a populist uprising. This will happen sooner or later. Salvation will soon be ours.

[AL-WASAT] What makes you so sure that salvation is around the corner?

[Fathi 'Ali] There are indications. It is a fact that oppression will eventually come to an end. This has been the fate of all dictatorships. The history of the Sudanese people make this a virtual certainty. Moreover, that all political and military forces are working to topple this regime.

[AL-WASAT] This sort of talk is vague in the extreme and we heard it often over the past three years?

[Fathi 'Ali] What is new is the stifling external isolation and the economic situation that has seriously deteriorated. The state is now about to collapse. I do not believe that those are casual indicators. They are reason enough for any people, or group, to explode. I would say that this is about to happen..very soon.

[AL-WASAT] Don't you believe that the Sudanese citizen has been caught between the current government and its opponents who were once in power and viewed with certain disapproval?

[Fathi 'Ali] Maybe that was the case during the first year, or even the second year, of the current regime's life because there was a lot of discussion about an alternative. Let me say very truthfully and openly that the old traditional hands tainted with corruption or who contributed to the deterioration of political, social, and economic conditions will have no place among us during the transitional period to follow the fall of the current regime. There will be no place for old political maneuvers that were previously common in the Sudan. This has been emphasized by all opposition charters at the last London meeting. This is now a fact.

[AL-WASAT] By what means would you guarantee this?

[Fathi 'Ali] The charter of the National Democratic Coalition itself. It has defined stipulations and objectives for a five-year interim government. Also the constitution, which is clear and has resolved several, if not

all, issues of contention. The armed forces will also play a role of authority and will guarantee that the transition period conforms to the charter.

Nimayri and the Islamic Front

[AL-WASAT] When you were the army's commander in chief you submitted a memo on 20 Feb 89 to then-prime minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. The door was open for you to assume power then but [you didn't]. Now, as you stand in the opposition, you call for toppling the current regime and for taking control. Why did you not do so to begin with?

[Fathi 'Ali] The armed forces memo had to do with correcting the course of democracy. It apprised the legitimate authority of the dangers that threatened Sudanese national security at the time and offered constructive preemptive suggestions. Its objective was never to seize power. We oppose the current regime not because we aspire to rule but because we seek a pluralistic democracy. Indeed, authority could have been ours but we have respect for the constitution and for the people's will.

[AL-WASAT] But you will share in authority if you succeed in toppling the current government?

[Fathi 'Ali] Yes, same as other elements in the National Democratic Coalition.

[AL-WASAT] You deride the current government for its domestic isolation. Don't you think that it was successful in winning over certain segments of Sudanese society that now support its continued rule?

[Fathi 'Ali] Yes, it has spread and expanded but by appointing its cadres to various sites in order to dominate them. This can not be construed as acceptance by the various popular segments. The only supporters of the current regime are NIF cadres, led by Dr. Hasan al-Turabi, and other loyalists, zealots, and seekers of materialistic gain, trade, etc [opportunist]. Furthermore, the regime has sought to create a national council (parliament) by appointment rather than through elections. Most of Council members are drawn from the NIF, the ranks of the "May regime", and others who disjoined their parties.

[AL-WASAT] Dr. al-Turabi said in a recent statement that the Military Council is temporary and that elections of various levels will be held in the Sudan this year and the next two years. How do you view this?

[Fathi 'Ali] I don't want to anticipate events. We have to wait and see how the Sudanese citizens react to such elections.

[AL-WASAT] Don't you think that those elections may impose a new reality on the opposition movement?

[Fathi 'Ali] I don't think so. Many elections were held during the Nimayri era but they did not impose any realities on Sudanese citizens who overthrew Nimayri

and his institutions in a popular uprising. I believe that the same fate awaits the NIF regime and its alleged elections.

[AL-WASAT] Even if the war in the south comes to a halt?

[Fathi 'Ali] Yes.

[AL-WASAT] While you throw doubt on the legitimacy of the present government, former President Ja'far Nimayri wonders from where you derive your legitimacy!

[Fathi 'Ali] This is not surprising, coming from Nimayri. He is an officer with the rank of a colonel who assumed power with others in a military coup. He does not know what legitimacy is. He should ask himself who appointed him commander in chief of the Sudanese armed forces? Nimayri has abused the Sudanese people's values, freedoms, and dignity for 16 years. He tainted Islam, for the sake of perpetuating his rule, with laws he promulgated in Sep 83 and attributed to Shari'a. He got so caught up in his religious craze that he appointed himself the "Imam of Muslims." It is he who made it possible for the NIF, led by al-Turabi, to infiltrate all state institutions. His only grace, if any, was the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement that halted the war in the south. It was not long, though, before he violated the agreement and the war was resumed on a larger and more violent scale. Strangely enough, he was out of the government when he issued a decree rescinding the September laws, claiming that he was misled by NIF leaders and that they [the laws] were flawed and not rooted in Islam. Nimayri and 'Umar al-Bashir are exactly alike and it is the will of the Sudanese people that both be arrested and publicly tried under the laws that were in effect during the second and third democratic eras. Nimayri speaks in the name of the military establishment and sometimes in the name of the opposition. I say that he is entitled to dream like everybody else and nobody can deprive him of his dream.

[AL-WASAT] Does this mean that you insist on your demand that Egyptian authorities hand Nimayri over?

[Fathi 'Ali] This is pre-mature and I don't like to go into it now. We will do so when the time comes.

[AL-WASAT] You said that al-Nimayri is dreaming. Don't you think that the other opponents of the current regime are also living in a dream?

[Fathi 'Ali] Yes, we are living a dream but there is no comparison between our legitimate dream and the dreams of the deposed.

[AL-WASAT] Incidentally, the Sudanese government says that you too are wanted by law and order?

[Fathi 'Ali] They may say what they want as long as they are in authority. If we concede that their action was a rebellion and a coup against the legitimate government, then we are on the side of legitimacy and we have the support of all segments of the Sudanese people.

Leaking Military Secrets to Garang

[AL-WASAT] There are rumors of a possible alliance between Nimayri, Garang, and al-Mirghani. How would you comment?

[Fathi 'Ali] I don't believe a word of it.

[AL-WASAT] There are also rumors of possible rapprochement between the government and opposition parties as a result of recent meetings between al-Turabi and opposition representatives.

[Fathi 'Ali] Such meetings may have taken place. There is no harm done when one individual meets with another. However, I don't believe that there is any rapprochement at all, or even negotiations towards that end. We in the National Alliance have resolved that there would be no agreement or negotiations with the current regime in the Sudan and that it must be toppled. Such reports are leaked and exaggerated by the NIF in order to fragment the opposition. We are aware of that and know that those attempts are fruitless.

[AL-WASAT] What, then, is the purpose of those meetings?

[Fathi 'Ali] The meetings may have dealt with other issues but not rapprochement, at least as far as the opposition is concerned. The NIF, because it is in trouble, indeed seeks reconciliation and is hoping to interest some of the opposition.

[AL-WASAT] Were you contacted?

[Fathi 'Ali] There were indirect contacts to which we were totally unresponsive.

[AL-WASAT] What was the offer made to you?

[Fathi 'Ali] A general pardon which had already been announced twice and we therefore don't give it any weight because it is ridiculous. Who is pardoning whom? This is totally unacceptable to us, even in the future.

[AL-WASAT] The current regime has introduced radical changes in the Sudan and any succeeding regime would have to face a different reality. Are existing opposition plans ready for that?

[Fathi 'Ali] The future government of the Sudan will undoubtedly face some difficulties, which is natural. Let me remind you that the Nimayri regime lasted 16 years and the democratic government that succeeded it was able to reverse the course and was well on the way to gradually erase the remnants of the old system when the coup took place. The problem after the change will be in instilling the foundations of true democracy.

[AL-WASAT] The government is accusing you, as members of the opposition, of setting the international community against it.

[Fathi 'Ali] Not true. It is the regime's own foreign and domestic policies that have caught the attention of all

countries. In fact, the government is doing the opposition's work with enviable efficiency!

[AL-WASAT] The government accuses you of passing on Sudanese army military information to John Garang's Popular Movement. Any truth to that?

[Fathi 'Ali] Those are false allegations with no basis in fact. It must be understood that citizens of the southern Sudan constitute a majority in the armed forces, especially among the troops and other ranks. Three members of the so-called National Salvation Council are natives of various provinces in the south. The Popular Movement, through its own devices, has always kept informed of troop movements to their minutest detail. That was a cheap shot by the NIF. Neither the commander in chief nor any member of the legitimate command carried any secrets with them out of the Sudan. We are above that.

[AL-WASAT] Don't you think that an alliance between you and the Popular Movement presupposes that information is coordinated between you?

[Fathi 'Ali] The information coordinated has to do with NIF efforts to undermine the armed forces, its conspiracies against the Sudan as a country and against the people as a nation, and its domestic and foreign policies that would separate the south of the Sudan, undermine the peace process, and terrorize neighboring countries.

[AL-WASAT] In view of your military ties to the Sudanese army, do you have any qualms about allying with the Popular Front?

[Fathi 'Ali] I have no qualms, especially that our fundamental objective is to achieve peace which is even more difficult than war itself. I say with all sincerity that the problem between the south and the north in the Sudan is a crisis of confidence and of understanding. We presently seek to bring divergent viewpoints closer together in order to facilitate the political process necessary for a dialogue between north and south and to secure the country's national unity as a supreme objective. This belief has been the position of the legitimate government that was elected to authority.

[AL-WASAT] Do you believe, in light of current victories by the Sudanese army, that the Popular Movement will maintain its alliance with the opposition or will it seek a unilateral agreement with the government in order to settle the war problem?

[Fathi 'Ali] I believe that it, as frequently reiterated by its leader, will remain committed to the opposition charter. However, this raises the point of whether the democratic alliance itself, and all its components, should prove its commitment to its own charter in order to assure the Popular Movement that the opposition remains united.

[AL-WASAT] Does this mean that all parties to the opposition will now fight the war on the side of the Popular Movement?

[Fathi 'Ali] Not necessarily. I believe that the obligations of the other parties lie in the north, east, and west of the Sudan. There are political scenarios that could strengthen the opposition.

[AL-WASAT] The opposition plan calls for the creation of a constituent interim martial authority, and of an interim National Council, to be followed by general elections. This is what the Sudanese government is now doing, so why do you take issue with that?

[Fathi 'Ali] The difference is that the opposition's plan came first. Government claims are gleaned from the opposition. The regime has been floundering since the beginning. It initially established a Military Council and held debating conferences. Then it created Popular Committees and opted for the provisions of the Green Book and the Libyan system of government. Later, it applied Shari'a and is now adopting the opposition's program because, in point of fact, it has no plan for governance. Another important point is that we call for a national constitutional conference of all Sudanese elements for the purpose of selecting a course of action to resolve their chronic problems and devise a new system acceptable to all. This differs from a dictatorial government that imposes itself on the people.

[AL-WASAT] Why did you opt for the Gulf war period to come out as an organization opposed to the government?

[Fathi 'Ali] The international community was at the time calling for constitutional legitimacy and the institution of justice and rightfulness. The timing was very favorable to our call for the return of the legitimate authority that was violated in the Sudan. We had a people-elected democratic government but the NIF turned against it by force of arms.

Hamdi Defends Lifting Gasoline Subsidy

92AF0923A Khartoum *AL-INQADH AL-WATANI*
in Arabic 19 May 92 p 1

[Article by Salim 'Uthman]

[Text] Minister of Finance and Economic Planning 'Adb al-Rahim Hamdi said that large amounts, estimated at billions of Sudanese pounds, have been allocated in the 1992-93 state budget for road construction. He said the figures will show the amount of increase in the production sector expenditure in the general budget.

In a statement he made at the Transitional National Assembly yesterday in justifying the reasons for lifting gasoline subsidy, he said the decision was not new, and that it has been endorsed at the highest levels of the state as part of a three-part program to salvage the national economy. It has also been endorsed by the labor unions, the regular armed forces, the youths, the students, and the women's association. He said: We import all the gasoline with our hard currency. The step taken has

nothing to do with taxes. Rather, this a fair readjustment of prices as recommended by the three-part program.

He said our annual energy consumption is approximately 1.6 million tons, and it is expected to increase to three to five million tons annually by the end of the 10-year plan. He said providing this large volume of energy costs the government a tremendous amount of money, and failure to secure energy in the quantities required would hinder production. He added: This year we exported cattle worth more than \$30 million, and we are seeking to export \$700 million worth of cattle beginning next year. He said the government spends billions on the public sector institutes at a time when their yield does not exceed one percent [as published]. He again invited investors to buy the loss-making institutes. He added that the state spends \$1.5 million on student scholarships, and that the price of making peace in the war that has been imposed on us is extremely high, which makes it impossible for the government to provide a large subsidy for energy imports. He added that the cost of lifting the gasoline subsidy will be borne by the production sector through the Farmers Bank and the Animal Wealth Bank.

The minister of finance said the subsidy has been lifted in order to realize the peace option, which is the state's number one priority; to eliminate the financial losses; and to provide great resources for the agriculture. He said the rate of inflation has increased from 94 percent in February to 112 percent in March because of increasing deficit. Speaking about the damage to the agricultural sector in the northern provinces, Hamdi said the decision to lift the gasoline subsidy has revealed the inefficient agricultural system there where small pumps are being used in small holdings. He stressed the need to combine these into large holdings in order to reduce their production costs.

He said that 125 million pounds have been paid to cooperatives in the northern provinces. Concluding, he said no commodities can bear the cost of lifting the gasoline subsidy, and urged the Assembly to play its role in the campaign to oblige investors, merchants, and others to stick to the real prices and to streamline consumption.

Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Abu-al-Qasim Ibrahim Muhammad, the Assembly leading member [ra'id], said the processes the government is talking about are non-existent, combining the agricultural holdings in the north is impossible at present, and controlling commodity prices is impossible. He wondered where are the controlling bodies that are going to control the prices.

Dr. Sharif al-Tuhami suggested that the price of gasoline be fixed at 75 pounds per gallon which, he believes, is the cost price. He said preparations [to farm] 1000 feddans with mechanical means used to cost 25,000 pounds. After lifting the subsidy this went up to 200,000 pounds.

He called for managing the economy in all its aspects, and said that the timing of lifting the subsidy was unsuitable.

Al-Shafi' Ahmad Muhammad called on all the parties concerned to study the subject and to submit their suggestions for practical steps to be taken. He said lifting the gasoline subsidy has hit the agriculture and transport sectors very hard. He criticized the government departments for not being up to the decision, and for failing to submit procedural and executive measures, pointing out that a reversal of declared policies would open many loopholes.

Maj. Gen. (Ret.) 'Abd-al-Wahhab 'Abd-al-Rauf stressed the need to deal with the problem of mechanical irrigation in the north. He strongly criticized the nonavailability of vital medicines in the market at a time when all kinds of luxury goods, especially luxury cars, are available.

Dr. Ahmad Ibrahim al-Turabi called for providing the necessary funding for the success of the agricultural season. Haniyah 'Ubayd expressed her fear that gasoline sold with coupons might find its way to the black market.

Muhammad al-Amin Khalifah, the Assembly speaker, referred the minister's statement to the economic committee in order to submit its recommendations to the Assembly. He said the committee is permitted to seek assistance of whomever it wishes from outside the Assembly.

Restrictions on Currency Exchange Lifted

92AF0918B London *AL-HAYAH* in Arabic 7 Jun 92 p 9

[Report from Khartoum by 'Umar Muhammad al-Hasan and Salah 'Abd-al-Rahim: "Finance Minister Lifts Foreign Exchange Controls"]

[Text] Minister of Finance 'Abd-al-Rahim Hamdi announced that all foreign exchange controls have been lifted and that arrivals and departures at ports and airports are no longer required to declare the funds they carry.

The Sudanese minister of finance told a press conference yesterday that "that step was part of Sudanese government policies to liberalize the economy and support the Sudanese pound," and that there will no longer be any restrictions on the amounts of Sudanese currency that departing passengers can carry with them. Departures were restricted in the past to a maximum of 20 Sudanese pounds.

Fiscal authorities also announced yesterday that the Free Markets Administration is now mandated to accept the Sudanese currency for fiscal transactions. The minister said that the Administration will accept foreign currencies only from diplomats and from arrivals and departures at Khartoum Airport.

Government Submits 1992-93 Budget to TNA

Follows Economic Reform

92AF0922A Khartoum *AL-SUDAN AL-HADITH*
in Arabic 24 May 92 p 1

[Article by Muhammad Hasan Zaki: "Finance Minister Praises Steadfastness of Sudanese People; Carry Burdens of Economic Reform Policy"]

[Text] 'Abd-al-Rahim Hamdi, the minister of finance and economic planning, submitted the draft of the general budget, the development budget, and the foreign monetary budget, as well as the accompanying draft legislation for the new fiscal year 1992-93, to the Transitional National Assembly [TNA] on 23 May 1992. In his detailed speech, his excellency announced that this budget was aimed at stimulating and invigorating the economy and making a transition to the stage of a decade of comprehensive, national strategy, building the new, great Sudanese state. He gave a comprehensive review, with a detailed analysis of the new general budget, comparing it with the first two budgets of the program of the national salvation revolution.

At the beginning of his speech, the finance minister announced that this year's gross national product [GNP] had increased by 11.3 percent, which was one of the highest rates in the world today, either in the developing or advanced nations. This confirms the total success of the policies of stimulating production by means of freeing prices. This succeeded because of the patience of the Sudanese people, and their bearing the burdens of reform and structural surgery, at a time when international institutions have distanced themselves from the reform process, which has increased our people's reliance on themselves and their stubborn insistence on achieving their goal.

He stated that the estimates of general personal income totaled 73,711,500 billion Sudanese pounds, an increase of 41,011,633 billion pounds, while total general expenditures for 1992-93, including the development and trade budgets, is estimated at 156,438,848 billion pounds, an increase of 113.4 billion pounds over this year's budget. "The huge disparity between expenditures and income comes from our decision to continue deficit financing of national growth projects. Therefore, the general budget will include the 50.7 billion pound development budget. This includes financing agriculture by 18.7 billion pounds, in addition to the drought relief program, which raises agricultural credits to 22 billion pounds. This also includes financing transportation projects worth 14 billion pounds, and projects of oil and mineral extraction, as well as providing financing to small farmers, worth 5 billion pounds. We expect that a very large part of this amount will be disbursed to the various states, especially those portions of southern states where peace has been established."

The finance minister stressed that the reason for total success of the policies to stimulate production by freeing

prices is the fact of "our conscious choice of deficit financing policies for agricultural production in particular. We had no alternative to this choice. The resulting budget deficit will lead to increased prices." He said that the general budget for 1992-93 shows a total deficit of 82 billion pounds. It will be reduced to 34 billion pounds through financing from easements and loans, which will be granted to the state from certain traditional sources, as well as from some new ones. This is a reflection of foreign policy efforts. Financing from loans, and financing projects, totals 25.955 billion pounds. In addition, part of the local compensation for Libyan crude oil—continual—totals 11.8 billion pounds. A token amount for new government bonds for 1992-93 has been earmarked at 48 billion pounds, reducing the deficit from 82 to 34 billion pounds, which is the final number, and is approximately 5.2 percent of the GNP for next year. This is less than the deficit for 1991-92, which is expected to total 6.9 percent. This is a reasonable and acceptable percentage economically, and had very strong justification. The finance minister said that the deficit, in fact, will constitute an economic danger, "unless we strongly control it and not permit it to increase. There must be continued attempts to increase revenues during the new fiscal year, through improving tax and customs collection."

The finance minister said that, with regard to his review of the foreign monetary budget estimates, "we expect exports within the range of \$431 million, compared with imports within the range of \$2.168 billion. The gap is very large, but includes unseen payments to cover an appreciable part of the foreign monetary budget."

He added that unforeseen collections will amount to 508.6 million pounds and private remittances 350 million pounds. Official remittances, which are loans and easements, will be 141.1 million pounds; development drawings for projects ratified by international institutions, 219 million pounds; and commodity drawings, 453 million pounds. Total revenue will be \$1.612 billion.

The minister stated that services and first imports would be \$2.168 billion; unforeseen payments, 119.4 million pounds; cost of financing, 37 million; and other payments, 82.4 million. Critical loan installments will be 100 million. Therefore, the foreign monetary budget deficit will be \$775 million.

He said that, in this situation, we must [adopt] extreme caution regarding the size of exports.

Adjusts Wages, Taxes

92AF0922B Khartoum AL-SUDAN AL-HADITH
in Arabic 24 May 92 p 1

[Article by Khadijah al-Bahi: "20 Billion Pounds Estimated from Taxes"]

[Text] 'Abd-al-Rahim Hamdi, the minister of finance and economic planning, announced in a statement made to the TNA [Transitional National Assembly] on 23 May

1992, the details of the draft general budget for fiscal year 1992-93. Hamdi described next year's budget as designed to stimulate and invigorate the national economy. He called it a people budget.

The finance minister enumerated the people part of the budget. It increases the minimum wage from 1,600 Sudanese pounds to 2,000 pounds a month for each worker in the state, of which 1,000 pounds is a basic salary, 500 pounds is a transportation allowance for residents of the capital, and 300 pounds for workers in the states. The new minimum wage is effective beginning 1 July 1992.

The finance minister said that it has been decided to exempt the high cost of living allowance from taxation, double the mileage allowance to 500 and 700 pounds monthly, raise the pension minimum from 1,200 to 1,400 pounds, and increase the monthly bonus from 10 to 30 pounds and from 25 to a maximum of 120 pounds.

He stated that the minimum tax exemption would be adjusted to 4,000 pounds per month, in order to be 2,500 pounds or more, so that the full exemption will reach the eighth level (a) and below.

The minister explained that adjusting the wage and salary structure would cost a total of 5.77 billion pounds in the new budget.

He announced that it has been decided to raise the social insurance fund budget from 2.9 billion pounds to 4.9 billion pounds, as a specific subsidy for needy families and small producers.

The finance minister stated that the budget had earmarked 19.585 billion pounds for the item of salaries, insurance, social security, and direct subsidies for the central and state governments and the social insurance fund, compared with 7.399 billion pounds last year.

Hamdi said that the budget was aimed at raising tax collection to 3 percent of the national income, estimated at 20 billion pounds during the new fiscal year. He added that it was decided to increase defense tax credits from 7 to 20 billion pounds, as a subsidy for the armed forces and their dazzling victory, and to open development horizons in southern Sudan.

Economic Development Funded

92AF0922C Khartoum AL-SUDAN AL-HADITH
in Arabic 24 May 92 p 1

[Article: "50.7 Billion for Development, Increase of 525 Percent"]

[Text] In his speech before the TNA [Transitional National Assembly], the minister of finance and economic planning announced that development budget estimates for fiscal year 1992-93 totaled 50.7 billion pounds, compared with 8.1 billion pounds this year, an increase of 42.6 billion pounds or 525 percent. Local currency estimates rise from 3.1 billion pounds to 24.8

billion pounds. This is a direct contribution to the budget. Local compensation from foreign currency will be 25.9 billion pounds, divided among the various sectors as follows:

- Agriculture, increased from 2.6 billion pounds this year to 11.6 billion pounds, in addition to 5 billion pounds to finance small farmers. This means that it will increase to 16 billion pounds, or 32 percent of total development expenditures.
- Transportation and communications, from 1.2 billion pounds to 14.4 billion pounds, or 28 percent of the total development budget;
- Energy and mining, from 1.3 billion pounds to 5.4 billion pounds, or 10.7 percent;
- Water, from .5 billion pounds to 4.3 billion pounds, 8.5 percent;
- Social development, from 1 billion pounds to 8.3 billion pounds, 16.4 percent;
- Government industrial, from .4 billion pounds to 1.5 billion pounds, or 2.9 percent;
- State development, from 200 million to 2.4 billion pounds, 4.7 percent; and
- Reserves and reconstruction, from 900 million to 3.7 billion pounds, or 3.5 percent.

Import, Export Duties Factored

92AF0922D Khartoum *AL-SUDAN AL-HADITH*
in Arabic 24 May 92 p 1

Article: "Minister of Finance Proposes Changes in Customs and Income Tax to Protect Local Production"]

[Text] Before the TNA [Transitional National Assembly] on 23 May, the minister of finance and economic planning, 'Abd-al-Rahim Hamdi, submitted proposed customs and income tax adjustments, most of which are aimed at reducing rates. The most important change is lowering the defense tax to 20 percent instead of 40 percent, as applied to certain commodities, provided that basic commodities are exempt, such as medicines, lentils, rice, all foodstuffs, wheat, flour, and milk, and all agricultural and industrial production income [madkhalat].

The finance minister stated that the changes are proposed to impose a higher percentage import tax on flour and dried milk, in order to protect local production and encourage citizens to enter these fields, i.e., the production of wheat and milk. He stressed that this will not increase customs on commodities. He said: "If we now take 30 percent from customs, and the specific rate for the group of commodities, for example, we will lower that rate to 3 percent. We will take every effect of the customs dollar. Our most important goal is that customs not continue to be a headache with regard to changes. We want to change the customs rates themselves and, later, we will withdraw the total effect."

He said that exempting agricultural income from defense taxation, as an additional state subsidy for this sector, will amount to 16 percent of total taxes collected. The adjustments also propose exempting all industrial sector

raw materials from the defense tax, because the same goods would be subjected a second time when produced, like incomes to sales tax and to production fees. In addition, this would lower import fees on incomes to only 15 percent.

The minister referred to the fact that the result of these proposals would be to increase the customs share of revenue to 24 billion pounds next year. However, as a precaution, 21.3 billion pounds was authorized in this year's budget.

The finance minister also submitted to the TNA proposed adjustments to the Income Tax Law of 1986, by applying a full exemption on deductions for rent, which is paid by a person who owns one house and rents it to another person as a source of income, and then rents another house for his own residence.

Another change is aimed at permitting the undersecretary of the Tax Bureau to collect taxes in the same year in which the income was earned, so that a specific person would pay installments during the same year. Settlement would be at the end of the year. This would guarantee an excellent cash flow for the budget and would settle one of the seasonal problems.

The proposals make big changes in the import tax rates and impose higher percentages on presently forbidden goods, such as ready made clothes, milk, and canned goods. They will be applied at an appropriate time after a complete study.

The changes include raising the import tax on tea and milk to 5 percent, instead of the equivalent rate of the defense tax to 10 percent. The effect will not increase the selling price to the consumer of 130 instead of 120 pounds per roll [453 gms] at the present time. The tax return will be increased by 100 percent.

The proposed customs for buses and trucks will be 5 percent, and parlor cars 50 percent. This will lead to lowering the effect considerably.

Increased Expatriate Revenues Reported

92AE0923B Khartoum *AL-SUDAN AL-HADITH*
in Arabic 22 May 92 p 1

[Article by Amani al-Saffah] ces fees and taxes received from expatriates during the period July 91 to April 92 have shown a remarkable increase, exceeding the projected 150 million Sudanese pounds. Tax revenues totalled 222,406,675 pounds, and revenues from services fees totalled 27,328,633 pounds.

An official source at the Expatriate Tax Office told *AL-SUDAN AL-HADITH* that the upsurge is due to the economic policies adopted recently, to an increase in the dollar rate of exchange, to the increase in the number of

expatriates abroad, and to payments by returnees from Kuwait and Iraq of their dues in local currency.

He said the highest collections came from our embassies in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

It is worth noting that expatriates in the Libyan Jamahiriyyah and Iraq always find difficulty in paying the service fees. The expatriates say they are not aware of this fee and that our embassies there gave them no notification in this regard. It is noted that fee services are collected in foreign currency on category basis.

New Sudanese Dinar To Replace Pound

92AF0923C Khartoum AL-INQADH AL-WATANI
in Arabic 22 May 92 p 1

[Text] The General Secretariat of the cabinet issued a decision amending Article 23 of the Sudanese National Bank, providing for adoption of the dinar as Sudan's official currency instead of the pound.

The decision provides for dividing the dinar into 10 units, each of which is equal to one pound, and the Sudanese pounds into 100 units each of which is equal to one piaster. The dinar's basic color is light blue and desert yellow, with violet being the color of the edge decoration and the figure defining the value of the denomination.

The dinar's front depicts the picture of the Republican Palace with some decorations and the figure defining the value of the denomination, and the other side is framed with decorations and shows the value of the denomination in English. The note contains a hidden watermark, which is a picture of a minaret and the dome of the Two Niles Mosque.

TUNISIA

Effort To Convince Europeans of Nahdaouis Goals

92AF0983A Paris LE MONDE in French
28-29 Jun 92 p 4

[Article by Michel Deure, correspondent in Tunis: "The Government Criticizes Tolerance of An Nahda 'Terrorists' by Several Countries"]

[Text] Tunis—The Islamist threat to Tunisia exists outside—not inside—its borders. The Government of Tunisia is convinced of this, and while maintaining its reserve, it is barely able to hide its irritation, noting that nothing has come of some 20 warrants issued through Interpol [International Criminal Police Organization] for the arrest of the leaders of Tunisia's Islamist movement, An Nahda, who are accused of plotting to overthrow the government through violence.

In quarters close to the government, blame is cast on several European countries, Sudan and—more cautiously—Iran. "Europe wages a ruthless battle against terrorists when Europe is directly concerned," it is

noted, "but when the terrorists come from the southern shore of the Mediterranean and pose a threat to the security and stability of the Maghreb, Europe merely invokes human rights and existing regulations." The instances cited to illustrate that remark are troubling, if they are true.

It is said that in late January or early February, Tunisia gave the French police the names and photographs of some 10 An Nahda leaders who had a direct hand in "the plot" and who were preparing to leave Algeria for France. Now, it is said, most of them are in Paris where they have joined two of their friends (granted political refugee status in 1987) in an intense propaganda campaign in the more restless suburbs of the capital and among Tunisian circles. Their leaflets, audio cassettes, and video recordings are cited as proof that they have but one goal: "to fell the Tunisian Government through violence." The question asked in Tunis is: How is it that these fugitives and erstwhile proteges of the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] have entered France and been allowed to conduct their activities in the open, while Tunisians who apply for a visa to travel to France for studies, business, or health care face bureaucratic obstacles?

The same unhappiness is expressed with regard to Great Britain where An Nahda's "Emir," Mr. Rached Ghannouchi, and several associates appear to have taken up residence. From London, they spread their propaganda calling for a revolt. Other organizers of the An Nahda network are said to be harbored in Germany, Spain, and Belgium. It is believed that Tunisia's diplomatic appeals to these countries to put an end to their activities have gone unheeded thus far.

'The Islamic Threat'

The behavior of officials in Khartoum is equally disturbing—if not more so—to the Tunisians who affirm that North African Islamist groups have been or are being transferred to military bases in Sudan from Afghan training camps located in Pakistan. For two years, Mr. Ghannouchi managed to travel freely thanks to a Sudanese diplomatic passport. Tunis protested and Khartoum assured them that his passport had not been renewed. In actuality, it is said, Ghannouchi was given another Sudanese passport under a different identity.

There is a semblance of satisfaction here with the steady stream of assurances coming out of Tehran despite the fact that it had frequently welcomed An Nahda's leaders with open arms. But skepticism remains, given Iran's negative reaction to the cancellation of the second round of voting in Algeria's legislative elections. And what about unpredictable Libya? Colonel al-Qadhafi's recent remarks to North African legislators threatening to "join forces with the devil and the Islamists if [my] brothers do not stand by me" (in the Lockerbie affair) have made Tunis more vigilant and so has the anti-Arab press campaign now unfolding in Libya. Algeria, however, a source of great worry until the beginning of the year, has stated reassuringly "that it now understands the

Islamic threat." An Nahda's leaders were not expelled from Libya whose privileged guests they had been for such a long time, but they preferred to leave. Only the "most staunch of activists" remained behind and a half-dozen of them were recently arrested as members of FIS armed groups.

The Tunisians say that in view of the evidence to be brought forward in the An Nahda "conspiracy" trial, their European friends" should be convinced that they are harboring "criminals" and not "mere political opponents." The case is to open next month and will be tried by a military tribunal because some 50 officers and noncommissioned officers are implicated, along with some 150 civilians. Also to be tried this summer by military tribunal are some one hundred people (including a few military men who are more or less sympathetic to An Nahda), charged with mounting attacks in late 1991 against political figures and government buildings.

Over the past 12 months, numerous Islamists have been tried in the civilian courts of the capital and the provinces on charges of distributing leaflets, disorderly conduct in public streets, or attending unauthorized meetings. Several hundreds of them have received sentences ranging from six months to five years in prison. More severe sentences were handed down to those found guilty of the May 1991 assault on an office of the governing party, the Democratic Constitutional Rally, in which two guards were doused with gasoline and burned alive. Five were sentenced to death and three have been executed.

The Islamist witch-hunt, which has lasted for than a year, has led to the arrest of 1,000 to 3,000 people, as sources vary. Has that sufficed to dismantle the An Nahda organization inside Tunisia? Official quarters claim that it has, stating that the movement's uncaught members and its sympathizers "have abandoned any future militant action and want nothing more than to fade from view." It is true that calm and security reign in Tunisia. But it must be common knowledge that the Islamists have endured several crack-downs since the 1970s only to reorganize and abruptly reassert themselves, more determined than before.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Dubayy Seaports Experience Major Upswing

92AE0450A *Dubayy Al-BAYAN* in Arabic

24 May 92 p 3

[Article by 'Ali Shahdud: "Major Upswing in Maritime Transport Traffic Through Dubayy; High Offloading Rates at Rashid, Jabal 'Ali Ports; High Year-End Transport Rates Expected"]

[Text] The ports of Rashid and Jabal 'Ali in Dubayy took first place in terms of their share of total cargo offloaded [in the Emirate] during the years from 1988 to 1990. Port Rashid offloaded about 52.4 percent in 1988, 40.4

percent in 1989, and 36.4 percent in 1990. The port's share of oil tankers was 9.4 percent in 1988, about 7 percent in 1989, and about 9.2 percent in 1990. The port has 36 piers, 158,400 square meters of covered warehousing, about 490,000 square meters of exposed storage, and a container area capacity of 20,000 containers.

The volume of goods and cargo offloaded at Port Rashid was reported at 3,909,000 tons in 1988, rising to 4,477,707 tons in 1989, then dropping to 4,123,898 tons in 1990. Meanwhile, oil tankers offloaded about 702,689 tons at the port in 1988, rising to 778,584 tons in 1989, and again in 1990 to 1,038,221 tons, the highest rate reported for those three years, and a positive indicator of increased petroleum transport traffic through the port during the 1988-1990 period.

Port Jabal 'Ali took second place among Dubayy's ports in terms of its share of offloaded cargo, with 14.4 percent in 1988, about 17.3 percent in 1989, and about 21.8 percent in 1990, while having higher rates and percentages for petroleum cargoes. The port came in first place in petroleum, offloading about 16.6 percent in 1988, rising to 30.4 percent in 1989, and then dropping by comparison to the year just reported, reaching 27.1 percent, having recorded a higher increase in 1988 in this category.

The port has approximately 67 piers, a covered warehousing area of 70,000 square meters, about 750,000 square meters of exposed storage, a 4,000 square meter area for cold storage, and a container area capacity of 12,000 containers.

Statistics from the 1991 Dubayy Statistical File report that Port Jabal 'Ali achieved a major upswing in the volume of offloaded cargo in terms of oil tankers received and amounts offloaded there [as published]. In 1988, about 1,072,151 tons were offloaded, rising to 1,918,060 tons in 1989, and growing once again in 1990 to 2,463,651 tons.

Oil tanker cargoes offloaded at Port Rashid in 1988 were about 1,240,587 tons, reaching 3,384,216 tons in 1989, before dropping in 1990 to 3,069,261 tons.

Port al-Hamriyah came in third place in terms of share of offloaded cargo with a total of 423,151 tons (about 5.7 percent) in 1988, 428,197 tons (about 3.9 percent) in 1989, and a total of 465,635 tons (about 4.1 percent) in 1990.

Dubayy Airport took fourth place among Dubayy's ports in share of offloaded cargo with about 80,805 tons (1.1 percent) in 1988, which increased in 1989 to 84,557 tons (0.7 percent), and rose to 191,163 tons in 1990 (0.8 percent).

Port al-Khur came in fifth place with 1988 cargoes of about 3,731 tons [as published] (0.4 percent), about 43,961 tons in 1989 (0.4 percent), and about 66,811 tons in 1990 (0.6 percent). During the years reported, the

overall rate of offloaded cargoes and petroleum tankers at Dubayy's ports witnessed continual growth to 7,459,493 tons in 1988, increasing to 11,115,282 tons in 1989, and recording a new increase in 1990 to 11,318,640 tons, as conditions in the region were stable, and commercial traffic there increased.

The number of vessels arriving, departing, and mooring at Dubayy's ports during the years reported are as follows. Port Rashid had about 4,786 in 1988, increasing to 5,586 in 1989, and then dropping in 1990 to 5753 vessels.

In 1988, 778 ships arrived at Port Jabal 'Ali, rising to 1064 in 1989, and rising to the largest number, 3,097 ships, in 1990.

At Port al-Hamriyah, the number of ships arriving, departing, and mooring in 1988, including small boats, was 17,878. This grew to 19,949 in 1989, and to its largest number, 26,290, in 1990.

In 1988, Dubayy's Port Khur had 13,485 ships, increasing in 1989 to 18,217, and rising once again in 1990 to 18,437.

WESTERN SAHARA

Special Report Reviews Socioeconomic Situation

92AF0879A London *AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT* in Arabic
29, 30, 31 May, 1 Jun 92

[Article on the Western Sahara in three installments by Talhah Jabril]

[29 May p 5]

[Text] Aioun—On 5 September last year, an American jumbo jet from Andrews Air Force Base near Washington landed at Aioun (largest city in [Western] Sahara).

The plane was carrying the first wave of MINURSO [United Nations Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in Western Sahara] observers pursuant to Security Council Resolution 690 providing for a referendum in the Western Sahara and for monitoring of the cease fire that went into effect on 6 September.

MINURSO members subsequently continued to arrive, and those who were soldiers were sent to monitoring posts in the region.

MINURSO was headed at that time by Johannes Mans [phonetic] of Switzerland, who later resigned and is currently succeeded by Ya'qub Khan.

Although the referendum was scheduled to be organized for early this year, disagreements between the disputing parties over the number [of people] eligible to vote prevented its being held.

UN Secretary General Butrus Ghali recently declared his organization's determination to give a fresh impetus to steps toward peace in the region.

When I arrived in Aioun, I had to look into the situation regarding relations between MINURSO and local Moroccan officials, particularly in view of certain reports alleging disagreements between the two sides over the international mission's task.

I began by meeting with Salih Zamrak, prefect (governor) of Aioun province, who has held this position throughout the difficult years endured by the region (since 1979). Although Zamrak originally came from Central Morocco (the Beni Mellal region), he is thoroughly familiar with the [Western] Sahara, and his memory is filled with many details.

Before meeting with Zamrak, I had heard from certain sources that MINURSO members—perhaps due to their insufficient knowledge of the nature of the problem—had behaved in a manner that offended sensitivities on the Moroccan side. This included their (especially the Swiss medical mission that came with MINURSO) having distributed some clothing and blankets to the inhabitants, in the belief that like other tension spots, the region was living in poverty and need. The inhabitants, however, refused those "donations," which put matters back on course, although this is not to deny the existence of some points of misunderstanding.

The headquarters of Aioun province (governorate) is located inside a building constructed during the Spanish era, to which Moroccan authorities have made basic modifications. I met with Salih Zamrak in his second-floor office. He began his interview by pointing out that with respect to Moroccan authorities, MINURSO has a well-known, specific mission, and that its members enjoy full diplomatic immunity.

Zamrak indicates that present relations with MINURSO are good and cordial, but he does not deny the existence of some problems. In this connection, he says, "Some individuals from MINURSO, especially the Westerners, behaved in an unfriendly and illegal manner, indeed beyond the bounds of their responsibility. They were perhaps unaware of their presence among a people possessing history and a civilization, but when they realized their mistake, they retreated and apologized."

The authorities are currently providing housing and food to MINURSO members. The Moroccans consider this to be their contribution to facilitating the task of the international mission as a member of the UN and the Security Council.

As individuals of the mission began to arrive, Moroccan authorities even provided means of transportation. Here Zamrak observes that MINURSO accused Morocco of breaking the cease fire, when Moroccan reconnaissance aircraft began overflying the region separating the defensive wall where Moroccan forces are stationed from the Mauritanian border. Zamrak responds to this, saying,

"MINURSO says that Polisario [Popular (Front) for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro] fighters had been located in this area before the cease fire resolution went into effect. Since it was Moroccan authorities who were responsible for transporting the international military observers into the region, it makes no sense that they would have taken them to an area lying under Polisario control. I believe this is a clear contradiction."

One problem that occurred between the two sides concerns treatment of the press and journalists. There was a widespread belief that Moroccan authorities were preventing journalists from meeting with MINURSO personnel. Accompanied by my photographer colleague, I, in fact, personally entered the Parador and al-Masirah hotels where MINURSO personnel are staying, without anyone challenging us. Likewise, we stayed at the Nikjir [phonetic] Hotel where some MINURSO members are also residing, and we felt no reservations or objections to performing our assignment.

When I asked Zamrak about this point, he indicated that Moroccan authorities had never prevented a journalist from contacting MINURSO members, asking, "How are we preventing journalists from contacting members of the UN mission? True, there are Moroccan police inside the hotels. This is natural because the area is under Moroccan administrative control. At the same time, no one, even in an official capacity, can enter MINURSO headquarters in Aioun without permission from UN mission leadership."

Zamrak adds, "Journalists came here, and we were not even informed of their actual identity. Indeed, we were told that they were relatives of MINURSO members. Nonetheless, we did not object to their presence in the area."

It now seems that the two sides have overcome these problems, as MINURSO's administrator emphasized to us.

If this is so, however, why was the referendum not organized?

I asked this question of Salih Zamrak, despite its political nature and the fact that the answer may lie in Rabat, not in Aioun. He responded, "The obstacles came from Polisario, because it objected to [Western] Saharans who were living outside the region, because they had been forced to migrate due to harassment by colonialist authorities. Thousands of them have now returned to the region and are living in special tent camps, waiting to take part in the referendum."

Zamrak continues with exasperation, "If Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Aziz (president of the Saharan Republic) himself came and entered one of these camps, he would be unable to say to them 'You are not from this area,' because he knows their real identity."

The distinction in this issue is that if a decision was made to prevent them from voting, a large number of Polisario leaders would likewise not be entitled to vote, because they come from areas not in dispute.

It is enough to point out that the founder of the Polisario Front, Wali Mustafa al-Sayyid (killed in an attack on Nouakchott in 1976), originally came from the town of Tan-Tan, which lies in an undisputed area.

[30 May p 5]

Migration in Western Sahara is in one direction, from the camps to [Western] Sahara, but the number of those who have escaped can not compare to the number actually wanting to return... People are convinced [the referendum's result] will be the exception proving the rule. Whereas most referenda conducted under UN supervision have led to independence, the [Western] Sahara referendum will legitimize merger with Morocco.

In recent years, the city of Aioun has enlarged and expanded. It is no longer just a rendezvous point for bedouin nomads. It has become an urban area, where the vital facilities needed in modern cities are available.

Local officials say that for 16 years they have had to spend generously on the district to compensate for what it missed. Yet, officials will admit that unemployment and housing problems do exist.

Aioun now lives the political atmosphere of Morocco, to the point that the populace has nearly forgotten about the referendum. Talk at gatherings in Aioun revolves around the forthcoming elections. In this regard, it will be noted that the opposition has recently intensified its activity in Aioun, and is working hard to attract activist elements.

You really only sense the subject of the referendum in the "Unity Tent Camps," which consists of a huge number of tents erected on one of the city commons, where residents of Saharan origin [who were] living in northern Morocco are staying. They had left the area in the fifties and sixties due to harassment by Spanish colonial authorities. Morocco is demanding that these Saharans be allowed to participate in voting, since they originally came from the region.

When we visited these camps, we were met by throngs of demonstrators carrying Moroccan flags and calling for the Moroccanization of [Western] Sahara.

Old and young, women and men, wearing Saharan garb: a flowing blue djellaba and a wound black headscarf, clapping and waving the flags and pictures of King Hassan II. You sense they have unparalleled determination and enthusiasm. The number we found in the camps ranged between 25,000 and 30,000 persons.

Officials say the number is greater than that, because many are living with their relatives in Aioun and come to the camps from time to time.

Officials responsible for the camps asked us to listen to some of the tribal shaykhs to familiarize ourselves with their viewpoints on the prospective referendum. Following are some of the things they had to say.

Al-Talibi Muhammad 'Ali says, "The [Western] Sahara has been Moroccan since ancient times. We will not accept the referendum unless all Saharan tribes participate, because the census conducted by Spanish authorities in 1974 did not include all Saharans."

Al-Layli Muhammad al-Hasan explained to us how he and his family moved into undisputed territory, indicating that they migrated barefoot and nearly naked from [Western] Sahara because of colonial authorities. Excitedly, he continues, "We came here to participate in the referendum. The whole world could not evict us from this territory."

One of the women spoke, saying, "We accepted the referendum because it is a confirmatory referendum. We demand that all Saharan women participate in it. We have heard statements from the others that revolved around the same topic."

Everyone stressed that they will not leave the territory until they participate in the referendum. Later, one of the area's poets stood up to recite a poem in the Hassaniyah dialect (the regional dialect), wherein he reviewed the stages of [Western] Sahara's struggle against Spanish colonialism and its people's contribution to struggles of the Moroccan Liberation Army.

The commission determining voter identity is reported to have agreed to register some of them on the electorate rosters, but the issue is not yet resolved, since commission activities are currently halted.

It is important to note that the Security Council resolution on organizing a referendum in [Western] Sahara relies on the census conducted by Spain in 1974, which puts the number of inhabitants of the area at about 70,000 people. However, the resolution also referred to the possibility of refining the electorate rosters if those presenting appeals prove they belong to the territory.

If the request of Unity Tent Camp residents, or even part of them, to participate in voting is accepted, the Moroccans will feel more assured about the referendum's results.

As we were about to leave the camp, the shouting and singing rose. Everyone was dancing to the beat of the drums, chanting Saharan songs.

During a meeting with Aioun notables at the home of Shaykh Larbas Ma'-al-'Aynayn, the conversation was also about the referendum. The prevailing conviction was that voting would go in favor of Moroccanizing the [Western] Sahara by a big majority.

Some who were there said that if Polisario wanted to know the true stance of those living in the Tanduf camps,

it could do so without even conducting a referendum by allowing them freedom of movement and travel to Saharan cities.

Here, one tribal leader says, "We are able to travel to Polisario camps because we have Moroccan passports, and there are no restrictions on our movements. But is the Polisario leadership able to give those present in the camps equal treatment?" Continuing, he says, "Certainly, no one but the relatives and families of the leaders would stay in the camps, if the others were given the freedom to move about...Many former Polisario members returned, leaving their wives and children in the camps. Why are they not allowed to return? If the Polisario leadership is confident of their stance on the forthcoming referendum, why does it prevent them from joining their families here in [Western] Sahara?"

People here do not talk about the referendum's result. As one put it, it will be the case of the exception proving the rule. Whereas most referenda conducted under UN supervision have led to independence, the [Western] Sahara referendum will give legitimacy to the situation that currently exists, i.e., merger with Morocco.

But what of the future? Will new political and tribal sensitivities arise after the referendum?

Many respond by saying such assumed sensitivities will not occur because most families and clans want to reunite.

One person summarizes it this way: "Had you been absent from your people for over 17 years, how would you feel? You would certainly be extremely anxious to see them, right? So, where do the sensitivities come from? Polisario members are our sons who chose the wrong path. When they realize that, there has to be tolerance."

When Saharans turn to the subject of the referendum, the subject of family dispersal noticeably dominates all other subjects. This is why one clearly pained former Polisario member says, "Personally, I left my wife and children behind when I decided to return...The Polisario leadership does not allow anyone from the camps to leave on any official mission, whether inside or outside Algeria, unless he leaves his family behind. This falls within the framework of an obvious plan aimed at forcing many to remain in the camps, even when they decide to give up Polisario. Sacrificing one's wife and children, and returning without them, explains the situation there for you."

Recently, following the return of many from Polisario, travel measures, even within the camps, have become subject to harsh restrictions. Movement between one camp and another can only be accomplished by official written permission.

At the conclusion of the meeting with city notables, I posed a question to them regarding their interpretation of some individuals having recently joined Polisario, in

spite of the circumstances mentioned earlier. I learned that it was an individual case in which a citizen from Aioun went over to Polisario ranks, but then returned to Morocco a few weeks later.

There was another case related to a young man accused of being a Polisario sympathizer.

He was forced to leave Morocco and join Polisario ranks, but some of his friends recently received from him something indicating he wants to return to Morocco. The strict surveillance has prevented this from happening, however.

Thus, it is clear that migration is in one direction, from the camps to [Western] Sahara, but the number of those who have escaped does not compare to the number of those actually wanting to return.

There are confirmed stories that many died on the road due to difficult environmental conditions and the rough desert tracks, or they were arrested and executed by Polisario.

There are many stories which tell these sad events.

[31 May p 6]

A former Polisario member arrived while I was in Aioun. His relatives and family rushed to the airport to meet him, but local authorities were forced to ask that he return to Rabat, fearing that such an outpouring of people could lead to a security breakdown.

This scene summarizes the situation of many families yearning to see their relatives living in Polisario camps.

The matter of families scattered here and there worries many, and has taken on a dramatic humanitarian character. The dimensions of this problem are illustrated in the stories I heard during a lengthy interview session with seven former Polisario members.

Al-'Azami Salih Muhammad, a young man who went to the Polisario camps at the age of eight, says that his family went over to Polisario ranks forcibly in 1975 when Polisario fighters fired over their heads near the town of Kalmim [phonetic] and forced his family to accompany them to the Tanduf camps. He was subsequently transferred to Libya, where he received his elementary, preparatory, and secondary education. He then pursued legal studies at the University of Algeria, and upon graduation, he was appointed responsible for information and culture at the Awsan [phonetic] camp. At the beginning of this year, he fled to Nouadhibou in Mauritania. Later, he returned to Aioun, leaving his mother and siblings behind in the camps.

Idris Sa'id, a former policeman who worked with the Spanish authorities, transferred to the Polisario camps of his own accord in 1975, but in recent years he no longer believed in Polisario's tenets. Thus, he considered returning, and when the opportunity arose last year, he

returned to Aioun via Mauritania. He left his wife, children, siblings, and father in the camps.

Muhammad Bu-Sayf joined Polisario at 14 and trained in air defense. He spent two years in Cuba, during which he received intensive training. From 1987 on he participated in several battles, until he decided to return last year. He also left his family in the camps.

Al-Aruri Muhammad Khuna was attracted by the campaigns Polisario carried out among Saharan youth regarding study abroad and the provision of higher education for all, especially in Eastern European countries and Cuba. He joined the Polisario in 198 [number illegible]. He quickly found himself imprisoned, however, after charges of organizing a pro-Moroccan sabotage ring were leveled at him. He stayed in prison until 1987. During these years, a number of those imprisoned with him died under torture. Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Aziz, president of what is called the Saharan Republic, has admitted that many died in prison as a result of "unintentional mistakes." He considers them to be martyrs.

Muhammad al-Amin Ibrahim joined Polisario during the seventies, while he was studying in France, under the influence of the revolutionary slogans of that time. As he puts it, "Klashnikov revolutions" were then the fad. At the beginning of the eighties, he participated in a military battle, was injured, and was transported to Yugoslavia for treatment. Upon his return, he was assigned to teach at the school for the injured. Muhammad al-Amin says, "Once the fervor for slogans disappeared, we began to realize the facts around us. I fell out with Polisario leadership, was imprisoned several times, and was subjected to torture. Both Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Aziz and al-Bashir Mustafa al-Sayyid (the number two man in Polisario) would be present at my interrogation. Last January I was given the chance to escape, so I returned to Aioun, but I left my wife and children behind...."

Al-Husayn is a student who was studying in Aioun, and then transferred to Barcelona, from where he joined the ranks of Polisario. He rose through several positions until he became the office director of a Polisario leader. He nonetheless decided to leave the front and return to Morocco. When the opportunity arose, he returned to Aioun, also leaving his family behind.

The last person to speak was 'Abd-al-Rahman Kharbush, who joined Polisario not long ago [as published] in Seville. Discussing this, he indicates that he went on vacation to Spain in 1986, where he met some Saharan youth who told him about the study opportunities and university missions enjoyed by young people who have joined Polisario. They showed him a video film that was purely Polisario recruitment propaganda. He actually traveled to Algeria, and from there to the Tanduf camps, but he was imprisoned immediately upon arrival on the charge of working for Moroccan intelligence. He spent five years in prison, during which he was subjected to torture until his jaw was broken. After his release, he received a training course in nursing and was appointed

a nurse...His dreams of university study or benefitting from a study mission in a Western country were shattered. He stayed there until the chance arose to escape via Algeria and return once again to Morocco.

A number of common factors can be deduced from the stories of these returnees from Polisario ranks:

- The matter of separated families keeps many sleepless. Everyone is anxious for the referendum to put an end to this boundless human tragedy.
- It can be said in all objectivity and integrity that most of those now present in Polisario camps will vote on Morocco's side.
- Despite all the attempts by Polisario's leadership, tribal struggles have had an obvious impact on destabilizing the Front from within, particularly in the wake of the events of October 1988, when most of those originally from Western Sahara rebelled against clansmen of the eastern Ruqaybat tribes (of Algerian origin), who control Polisario leadership.

In this connection, the returnees say that Polisario leadership has raised the slogan "Popular Front leadership...sincere and revolutionary" with the purpose of blunting tribal resentment against it. What is meant by the Popular Front is the Polisario Front, since Polisario's full name originally was "the Popular Front for the Liberation of Sagia el Hamra and Rio de Oro." They also point out that the first founders of Polisario never considered establishing a state in the Sahara. Their basic objective was to liberate the region from Spanish colonialism. I heard other similar stories on this matter, especially from those who had known up close al-Wali Mustafa al-Sayyid, Polisario's founder who was killed in an attack on Nouakchott in 1976. It was the stance of former Algerian President Houari Boumeddiene, however, that pushed events in the direction of declaring a "Saharan Republic" in exile.

When matters began to move in this direction, the first to realize that the eastern Ruqaybat [tribes] were seeking to control Polisario leadership was the tribal confederation known as the Taknah [phonetic] Confederation, which includes the Ait Lahsan, Ait Musa and 'Ali, the Zarqiyun, and the Ait Awsa. Most members of these tribes have withdrawn from Polisario since 1977.

From 1982 onwards, especially when battles between Moroccan forces and Polisario intensified, the Front's leadership believed that the tribal struggle would dissipate in the wake of the battlefield victories realized at that time. Matters exploded six years later, however, to the point that most Polisario members who have returned to Morocco call the events of 1988 within the tent camps the "October Uprising."

Following those events, most tribesmen of the coastal Ruqaybat (of Moroccan origin) were driven out, as were the tribes of Awlad Dalim, Ait Tadariyin, the 'Arusiyun, the Ma'-al-'Aynayn, and other affected locations. Their leaders were also imprisoned, including 'Umar al-Hadrami, one of the three founders of Polisario

(returned to Morocco two years ago). He originally belongs to a branch of the coastal Ruqaybat tribes called the Buwayhat.

According to information provided by reliable sources, the imprisoning continues inside the tent camps. One of the most recent leaders to be imprisoned is the former Polisario representative in London, whose nom de guerre is Kamal Lakhya. His real name, however, is Muhammad al-Aghdab Ibn-al-'Abadilah. He has totally disappeared from sight, and his fate is unknown as of now.

In view of these circumstances, the slogan now being raised by many in the Polisario camps goes to the effect of "Let us return to our families, then we will vote as we want."

[1 Jun p 6]

When Morocco first began to enter the [Western] Sahara, the city of Aioun was like a free zone. Goods beyond number were being imported by the city's merchants from the nearby islands of Las Palmas [as published] (20 minutes away by air), attracting many to work in the commercial sector.

The city currently continues to preserve its commercial reputation, but goods no longer come from Las Palmas as was the case in the past. Since the residents are accustomed to such merchandise, the merchants have turned to bringing Spanish goods from the Tetouan and al-Funaydiq region in the far north of Morocco, an area adjacent to the Spanish-occupied town of Ceuta.

Although commerce is the main sector in which Aioun's residents work, it is not the only one. Many have gone to work in the phosphate mines and the new port constructed by the Moroccan government, where ambitious plans have been laid for expansion and raising its capacity.

In reality, the Spanish paid little attention to the port of Aioun...indeed, no attention at all, despite the tremendous fishery resources of the region. The explanation for this, according to specialists, is that the Spanish did not want to build a port that would compete with Canary Islands ports near (Las Palmas) [parentheses as published].

The phosphate mines and processing plants were hurriedly erected by the Spanish in the early seventies, in the belief that the region would remain under their control forever, to the extent that they considered having representatives elected from there to the Spanish Cortes.

To be precise, operations to exploit the phosphate mines at Bu Craa got underway in 1974.

Although these mines have lost [money] continually, Moroccan authorities have not moved to close them due to political and social considerations, since 2700 families live off income from the "Phos Bu Craa" company. Appendices to the Madrid Agreement, under which

Spanish Sahara was ceded to Morocco, contained a provision referring to the need for continued Spanish participation in this company. As a result, the Spanish company "Ina" [phonetic] continues to own 35 percent of "Phos Bu Craa," while Morocco's al-Sharif Phosphate Bureau [SPB] owns 65 percent. When I asked local officials about the length of this company's term [of incorporation], they had no response. They referred me to the institution's headquarters in Casablanca. It should be pointed out here that the Spanish are a "silent partner," as economists say, since they are not entitled to run the institution.

Under the agreement, 15 Spanish employees still work at Aioun's phosphate export harbor and at the main mine at Bu Craa about 100 kilometers away. The Moroccans say they have no need for those technicians, because as the world's largest phosphate exporter, Morocco has over 70 years experience in mining this substance. It is commitment under the agreement, however, that determines that this number of Spanish remain. The number has declined greatly because the Spanish corporation participating in "Phos Bu Craa" has begun reabsorbing its workers from there into jobs in Spain. Perhaps only those for whom work could not be provided are left, because those 15 Spanish experts include one who works as a waiter, serving tea and coffee to visitors to the processing station near the Aioun harbor.

Based on present production capacity, 1.17 million tons of phosphate are exported, whereas 3 million tons are needed for export, if "Phos Bu Craa" corporation is to strike a balance between income and expenditure. Two years ago, the Moroccans drafted an ambitious plan to achieve this balance and profits that involves building three water desalination units for the purpose of producing a new type of phosphate.

The distinction is that most Saharan phosphate exports go to Western countries that still do not recognize Moroccan sovereignty in [Western] Sahara. There is a clear explanation for this, since Westerners generally draw a sharp line between economic interests and political problems. Thus, the United States imports 48 percent of Saharan phosphate, Spain 12 percent, Belgium 9 percent, Norway 9 percent, Germany 9 percent, Japan 6 percent, Italy 3 percent, Yugoslavia 2 percent, and Australia 1 percent (official 1991 statistics).

Two types of phosphate are exported. The first, and more costly, is washed with sweet water (sea water that has been refined), while the second type is washed with sea water.

SPB is currently working to renovate its phosphate purification and mining equipment. Local officials say the Spanish used technologies usually employed to mine bituminous coal, not phosphate. They paid no attention to environmental conditions and the scarcity of water in the region because of their lack of experience in phosphate extraction.

The problem Morocco faced after it entered [Western] Sahara is that the phosphate mines, as well as the export harbor, were financed by loans, which Morocco became obligated to repay.

Moreover, the Spanish used an excessively expensive technology to transport the phosphate from the mines to the processing unit and the export harbor, building a 100-kilometer-long conveyer belt, the longest conveyer belt in the world. Here again, no attention was paid to environmental conditions (extreme heat, winds, moving sands), which continually led to conveyor belt breakdown. The Moroccans normally use the railroads to transport phosphate from production sites to processing and export areas.

During the initial period of the Saharan dispute, the conveyor was subjected to attacks by Polisario fighters because it was so hard to watch. Matters stabilized later, however, after Moroccan forces constructed defensive walls around [Western] Sahara.

The Moroccans developed a plan to merge the phosphate harbor with the port of Aioun, and a budget of 1.5 billion Moroccan dirhams was allocated to do so.

Despite the modernity of the port built by the Moroccans, it has begun to attract the fishing boats that crowd the area, either to repair their damages or for refueling and resupplying with essentials. The most important exports through this port are fish...and sand! The exclamation point here is intentional, since the movement of tides at sea carries sand from the shores of Las Palmas to the shores of Aioun. This sand is then reexported to the Spanish Canary Islands for use in construction.

When we visited the port, we found a small ship at anchor being loaded with camels. The harbor master informed us that the camels were not being exported for food—unlike Sahara's residents, the Spanish do not eat camel meat—but for tourism purposes. The phosphate mines in [Western] Sahara at this point constitute a service sector relied upon to ensure a source of income for about 2700 families, despite the losses they are incurring. One of the most important sectors in which Morocco has invested is education. Although it is the sector that has expanded the most in the region, it is also the sector most subject to criticism. This is natural because all of the families are directly or indirectly related to this sector.

Local officials say that prior to Morocco's entrance into [Western] Sahara, the education sector failed to meet the needs of the population. Only a few institutions existed for the benefit of children of the Spanish community and a few fortunate residents. There were no more than 1774 pupils in [Western] Sahara, 920 of whom were in Aioun province. Most of those were males, because girls were banned from entering modern schools. The rest of the children wandered in the desert where they received an Arab education under tents from some religious scholars.

According to official statistics, there were 2,910 male and female pupils at the primary level in 1976. The number now stands at 16,781.

In 1976, not a single pupil was at the preparatory level, but the number has now reached 5,563. There was no secondary school in Aioun in 1976, but now there are 2,163 male and female secondary students.

Foreign Minister: Morocco's Referendum Condemned

LD2506075292 *Algiers Radio Algiers Network in Arabic*
2200 GMT 24 Jun 92

[Text] In an exclusive statement to APS in Dakar, on the sidelines of the OAU ministerial council, Saharan Foreign Minister Mr. Mohamed Salem Ould Saleck said that if Morocco persists in impeding the referendum in Western Sahara, the Saharan Democratic Republic will ask to join the United Nations unilaterally.

The Saharan foreign minister also affirmed that the OAU secretary general has submitted a report on the peace process in Western Sahara. Most OAU members have expressed sympathy with the Western Sahara issue, and African states have a real will to solve the Saharan problem.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Gun Control Law Not Curbing Assassinations

92AE0456A *London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic*
16 Jun 92 pp 29-32

[Article by Hasan Abu-Talib: "Weapons in Yemen: Force of State Versus Force of Custom; Weapons Still Available in al-Talh, 'Imran, and al-'Abbarah Markets"]

[Text] The ink on the decree regulating gun possession, acquisition, and sale had barely dried when another crime shook Yemen, adding to the list of assassination attempts that have hit Yemen like an earthquake. An armed clash took place in the town of al-Hazm, al-Jawf Governorate, between the town inhabitants and some army troops and claimed the lives of a soldier and two civilians. The tension was not alleviated until the Yemeni deputy chief of staff intervened and tried to achieve reconciliation through the area chieftains to whom he offered some weapon pieces as a gift.

Amidst the growing demand that the government shoulder its duties and confront the sweeping state of lawlessness in the country, in the middle of a clamorous political debate, and after several stormy sessions, the Yemeni Chamber of Deputies passed the law regulating the possession, acquisition, and sale of weapons, thus taking an important step on the path of uniform legislation for all of Yemen. It is the opinion of numerous Yemeni forces that this step has come much too late and that it should have been one of the first steps with which the united state started its procession in life two years

ago. Meanwhile, it can be said that the law could not have been passed successfully and ratified by the parliament if it had not been for the state of ebullience and mobilization which the Yemeni political scene experienced recently as a consequence of the numerous assassination attempts that have claimed the lives of members and leaders of the two ruling parties themselves. These attempts have demonstrated the extent of the inability of the government and of its agencies to pursue this phenomenon that poses a threat to the citizens' security and to the stability of the United Yemeni State and that forewarns of an all-out explosion.

In fact, if it hadn't been for the abovementioned political and propaganda mobilization, it would have been very difficult to pass this law which deals with and touches directly on one of the Yemeni people's most dangerous and sensitive customs, namely the weapon-bearing custom. A common phrase among Yemenis, be they officials, intellectuals, people with a small degree of education, or people denied all education, is that the "Yemeni people are armed" and that "no home is void of weapons." If this is the condition in homes in the capital and the major cities, then one imagines that weapons are more abundant and that this condition is more widespread among tribesmen and in rural areas remote from the capital's control and authority. When a Yemeni says a "weapon," what is intended is a variety of personal weapons, including automatic handguns and rifles, both western and eastern. In areas remote from the capital and the major cities and in the rural areas generally, especially in the northernmost and northeasternmost parts, the variety is greater and includes mortar guns, heavy guns with a range of up to 10 km, antiaircraft guns of various calibers, and some [military] field vehicles.

The weapon-possession custom and the widespread demand for weapons have, on the other hand, led to the presence of famous historical gun markets, such as al-Talh market in Sa'dah area in the northeastern part of the country, and in al-'Abbarah, a small border village near Qa'tabah, located on the crossing point between the two parts of Yemen. There is also the market in 'Imran, a village located nearly 45 km from Sana', the capital.

The gun markets and the force of custom have contributed to another widespread phenomenon, namely smuggling guns into the country. It has been announced that numerous attempts to smuggle a variety of handguns, rifles, and ammunition have been undertaken in the past two years, the latest of which was in the first week of this May when it was announced that more than 7,000 handguns and silencers smuggled from Djibouti Port to Aden Port were discovered. Some Yemeni officials believe that the uncovered gun smuggling attempts constitute but a small part of the volume of weapons that actually enter the country and go to the country's small tribal armies. Circulated reports say that some heavy weapons and some small weapons belonging to Ethiopian Army forces were smuggled into Yemeni ports last May after ex-President Mengistu had been toppled and

that these weapons have ended up in the hands of numerous tribes in return for safety, food, and a little money [for those smuggling them]. The extended Yemeni naval borders and the inadequacy of the available resources to effectively control them have played a major role in the success of numerous attempts to smuggle guns into the country.

Oddities Reflecting a Tragedy

The issue is not void of oddities, but they are oddities that reflect a major problem, even a tragedy. At times, some tribes possessed sophisticated weapons that weren't available to the state's official army! In the early 1980s, for example, certain Yemeni tribes in the former North Yemen possessed Soviet-made missile launchers known as the Grad-B. The land version of these launchers has a range of 17 km. The Yemeni Army couldn't get this weapon until later. Another, and no less interesting, oddity is that in 1975, i.e. during the administration of Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim al-Han.di who was known for his policy of spreading government authority over the tribal areas, the Ministry of Interior tried to establish control over a northern area where weapons were sold as extensively and as openly as any other ordinary commodity. The endeavor was led by a prominent security official who, upon reaching the area, discovered that the arms market offered weapons that surpassed in their capability and variety the weapons available to his team that was assigned to establish control over the site. All this official could do was to return empty-handed.

In 1987, the U.S. Hunt Company, an oil production company, threatened to halt its activities in all parts of Yemen because a group of armed tribesmen seized one of its food and equipment-transporting caravans on the road between a work site and al-Hudaydah Port on the Red Sea. The company demanded that the shipment, with all its components, be returned and that its kidnapped engineers and workers be released immediately; else it would close its oil file in Yemen. The government had to exert major efforts with influential tribal leaders and chieftains in the region to end this critical problem.

Oddities and anecdotes of this sort are numerous in Yemen. We will not mention here the individual acts of revenge that assume a general tribal character because this is in the nature of things in Yemen.

Customs and Modes of Conduct

Many first-time visitors to Sana' have been fascinated by two sights: The first is the "dagger" with which Yemenis don't part day or night. It is carried at the waist with an ornamented belt from which shows an ivory handle and a sharp blade. The other sight is that of blue-colored strong iron gates that have many locks and that cover all shops and entrances to all residences and homes, with no exception. This gives many people the feeling of a sad sight which one needs several days to overcome. When a stranger asks about the reasons for such precautions, the

widespread presence of weapons and the anticipation of confrontations that could develop for one reason or another are brought up automatically.

What is important is that the law regulating the bearing and possession of weapons has been approved. But what is more important is to find a way to apply the law soundly and comprehensively. If approval of the law has been faced with numerous challenges, then its implementation will be faced with greater and greater challenges. The issue will assume a political and an ethical character simultaneously. Politically, the law will mean confronting the Yemeni society's organized and deep-rooted political and party forces that defend arms possession and that even exert efforts to make this possession a general rule in society. The ethical aspect is attributable to the worth and the values that the ordinary Yemeni citizen attaches to weapons. The dimensions of neither aspect could be understood correctly unless we wade into the tribe's relations with the government on the one hand and with the individual on the other.

Confronting Government

It is well known in Yemen's history that the expansion or decline of its central authority is tied to how strong or how weak are the tribes. Because central authority has meant to the tribal man some sort of domination and intervention in tribal affairs, this authority has always been met with rebellion and insurgency. Of course, the force of arms has been the decisive element in this regard. The Yemeni tribe is well known for its self-reliance and extreme independence. This is why it has been eager to secure the elements of intrinsic strength in anticipation of any possible confrontation with the central government or with any other tribal force, ordinarily a rival force.

This general line in the relations of the Yemeni tribe, be it big or small, with the central government, be it domestic or foreign, has represented politically and ethically the historical basis for the idea of letting weapons be the umpire, of seeking to acquire them, and of being eager to possess them and use them well. There is no difference in this regard between man and woman, at least theoretically. Despite the modernization processes to which the Yemeni society has been subjected throughout the past three decades, the dissemination of education, and the diffusion of elements of the middle class, the social-prestige value of bearing and possessing arms has remained unchanged. Perhaps this explains why some tribal forces resorted to opposing the law before it was approved recently. This has happened several times since unity was established and before then.

Balanced Viewpoint

Finally, tribal forces were eager to declare their opposition to this governmental tendency. This opposition was crystallized when a group of tribal chieftains, as well as a number of merchants, ulema, intellectuals, and notables

from various circles, totaling 34 altogether, met at the home of Shaykh 'Abdallah Ibn Husayn al-Ahmar, the paramount chief of the Hashid tribes, on Thursday, 7 May 1992. After deliberation, they issued a statement expressing their viewpoint on the way in which the government has dealt with the assassinations issue and on the gun control bill. The statement criticized the bill and considered it a bill that "hasn't been studied carefully and hasn't taken the Yemeni people's characteristics into account." The statement also said that the government hadn't taken into account the dangers and difficulties which it will encounter interfering in the people's possession of arms. The statement contained eight main points which called for regulating arms possession in the capital and the major cities, underlining the vigilance and responsibility of the security agencies, the need not to undermine the citizen's right to possess arms outside the major cities because "this will be tantamount to belittling the Yemeni citizen's dignity and to flouting his values, customs, and traditions." The statement warned the government against banning the possession of arms, expressing the belief that it "will lead to a sedition whose consequences and ramifications only God knows." The statement also expressed the opinion that the credit goes to weapon possession for the absence of crime in 90 percent of the republic's territories because the presence of arms is what has "made criminals think a thousand times [before committing their crime]." Concluding, the statement noted the need "not to separate the security situation from the administrative, political, and living problems and from the widespread corruption in the country when tackling issues."

Contents of the statement can be considered to be the viewpoint of the tribal forces generally and of those who believe that the Yemeni tribe is the basis of the state's social and political organization and that, therefore, its opinions and values must be taken into account.

Premeditated Confusion

Even though the statement tried to present the issue in a balanced manner, the tribal forces' call surpasses at times those visions that are characterized as balanced and reasonable and seeks to confuse the issues in an interesting manner. I recall in this regard an article published by AL-SAHWAH, which is closely tied to the Yemeni Reform Grouping and which some people consider to be this grouping's organ. This article, entitled: "To Arm or Disarm," was published in the "Pricks of Remorse" corner of the paper on 9 August 1990, i.e. shortly after unity was established. Its author said: "There are those who suggest that the government must take away arms; however, I urge that weapon possession be more widespread, not just in rural areas but also in cities. Rather, the need for arms in the city is more compelling." To underline the importance of this call, the writer recounts that he once encountered a driver addressing wounding words to two veiled women walking in the street, which caused "blood to boil in my veins." He goes on to say: "Does any man who has a sister, a mother, or a daughter dare let them out of their

home if such stray dogs are allowed to roam the streets? Now that you have learned what has happened, do you blame me for calling for the possession of weapons in the city if such people are not curbed? We expect the officials to study this problem. Let everybody defend his honor. And what is the opinion of those who urge day and night that women come out of the home? Is it for such harassment that they should come out? I expect women's associations to devote attention to this serious matter. This is the issue on which they must focus most of their attention."

This example reflects to a large degree the traditionalists' way of thinking which confuses some individual excesses with the call for permitting individuals to adjudge situations, determine the right punishment, and mete it out without referring to the government, as if it doesn't exist, in a manner that promises all-out social chaos.

What is interesting in the abovementioned example is the forced linkage between women's position in the Yemeni society and the call by some people for fighting women's participation in public life on the one hand and the call for weapon possession on the other hand. This linkage is made in a way that leads to a general conviction that weapon possession and protecting women are the absolute good and two sides of the same coin. What is dangerous here is dealing with the serious issue of weapon possession from the perspective of arousing human instincts, not of controlling them, and of the premeditated exclusion of the government role, and not of boosting this role and of assisting the government in this cultural modernization task.

Government Is Responsible

In fact, the call for arms possession isn't due just to widespread tribal values or to some sort of fallacies. With its political and military conduct, the government has helped at times adherence to this custom and the further spread of the custom. What we mean here specifically is the way the North Yemen authorities behaved in the early 1980s when they helped the tribes greatly in creating their private forces and when those authorities enlisted the assistance of these tribes to counter the opposition National Front that was positioned in areas adjacent to the borders with the ex-South Yemen. What is more, the government itself supplied those tribal forces with weapons and munitions which were supposed to belong to the armed forces and which were subject to strict control. People in the know say that the government turned a blind eye to weapon imports by influential tribes in an attempt to please them and gain their loyalty and in return for seasonal attacks made by those forces against the opposition National Front elements. Those attacks played a major role in besieging the front and paralyzing its ability. Perhaps it is because of this role that the tribalists believe that the government in the ex-North Yemen owes them a favor. Perhaps they believe that if it hadn't been for their role, the North's stability and regime would have been subjected to severe tremors.

Examples of Success

The difficulties facing the gun-control and gun-regulation policy don't mean that there are no examples of success in this regard. Historical facts say that during the defunct imamate, it was extremely difficult for weapon use to spread openly, unless sanctioned by the imam himself and only for certain parties. The imam's regent had the authority and the power to ban weapon possession within his jurisdiction. The British occupation was able, in turn, to disarm numerous tribes, especially al-'Awaliq region tribes in the south. When the south gained independence in November 1967, the ruling National Front and the political organizations and governments emanating from it later were able to regulate possession of the weapons that were abundantly available to citizens as a consequence of years of armed struggle. The front engaged in a large-scale confrontation of this custom and curbed it. This was tied to the government's standing and to its ability to settle matters. Before unity, nobody was allowed to carry arms in the South, whether in cities or in the countryside. Violators were punished severely. After unity, conditions changed completely as a result of the lack of uniform legislation in this regard. As a consequence, some people in the South have revived this social custom that had largely disappeared.

The government in the North itself had a successful experiment in this regard in wake of the 70-day war between the national republican forces and the royal forces between the end of 1967 and the beginning of 1968. During the war, weapons became abundantly available to all people with their various political and intellectual tendencies. As soon as Lieutenant General al-'Ayni's government gained control of the situation, it launched a large-scale war to disarm all those who belonged to the national democratic forces and popular pan-Arabist forces generally so that no weapons would be in the hands of people beyond the control of the government and of the forces loyal to it. The government succeeded in its endeavor despite the difficulties it faced.

This demonstrates that if the government and the ruling authority resolve to achieve the objective of an arms ban, and not just of regulating the possession and acquisition of arms, they can accomplish it.

Requirements for Success

So the important thing is political will and the ability to provide a role model and an example. In this regard, it can be said that success in applying the recently issued law regulating arms possession is tied to various conditions, including a positive response from the influential tribes to the government efforts and a provision that the law is applied gradually and comprehensively to everybody so that no force will be exempted from submission to the law and to its controls. An information and political campaign should also be launched on a sound scientific basis to address all Yemeni citizens with their various tendencies and to highlight the major benefits of regulation of arms possession to ensure security and stability in the country and to embody the state's standing and control over all its people and territories. A comprehensive security policy that makes no distinction between city and countryside should also be adopted, provided that it is tied to reviving the judiciary's role and to organizing this role on a modern basis.

Because the issue is comprehensive and multi-dimensional, the Yemeni parties should also perform their role which is not less important than the government's role. In such general issues that concern the future of the entire country, the parties are required to abandon the policies of incitement and of absolute opposition to gain the passing support of voters at the expense of the country and its future. The parties shouldn't confuse the issues and should contribute to developing a public opinion that flows into the course of state authority, social discipline, and renunciation of negative customs.

It is, no doubt, a major battle between the old on the one hand and the new on the other, between custom and state authority, between lawlessness and the diffusion and application of justice to all.

List of Assassinations in Yemen in the Past Few Months

Number	Name	Profession	Cause of Death
1	'Abd-al-Qawi Muthanna Hadi	housing minister, from Socialist Party	sudden paralysis at Sana' Airport in June 1991
2	Sa'id Salih Salim	Aden governor, from Socialist Party	fabricated car accident in suburb of Aden in mid-1991
3	Nasr 'Ali Nasir	member of standing committee of People's General Congress	fabricated car accident on Sana'-Aden Highway in August 1991
4	Husayn Salim Bawazir	standing committee member	medical negligence on part of state in October 1991
5	Faysal Murshid	colonel, engineers corps commander	fabricated car accident
6	Sa'id Basallum	colonel, militia	drank bottle of Canada Dry in qat session
7	Nu'man Qasim Hasan	colonel, secretary of Socialist Party organization in Ibb	assassinated for political reasons on 9 September 1991
8	Hasan 'Alya al-Huraybi	Yemeni Unionist Grouping member, Sana' officer	mysterious car accident

List of Assassinations in Yemen in the Past Few Months (Continued)

Number	Name	Profession	Cause of Death
9	Dr. Amin Nashir	Health Ministry undersecretary	fabricated car accident in Aden in December 1991
10	'Ali Zayn	attorney	medical negligence on part of state in November 1991
11	'Abdallah Ahmad Muhyayriz	director of Yemeni Cultural Research Center	medical negligence on part of state, December 1991
12	Idris Hanbalah	poet and educator	premeditated assassination
13	'Ali Ahmad 'Awad al-Shard	Foreign Ministry	assassinated by naval colonel on 12 December 1991
14	Salah Salim Fadl al-Zanbil	Aden municipality	political assassination
15	'Abd-al-Wasi' Talib Abu-al-Nasr	Socialist Party secretary in Hays	medical negligence on part of state
16	Muhammad Sa'id Umsabi	Martyrs' Families Welfare Department	mysterious death
17	Qa'id Muthanna 'Abdallah	Socialist Party secretary in Ta'izz	premeditated assassination on 17 November 1991
18	two individuals assassinated in Sana'		traffic accident on 6 November 1991
19	Khalid Hasan al-Shaynah	Ministry of Commerce employee	political assassination, 19 November 1991
20	Muhsin Salih Muhsin	Martyrs' Families Department	political assassination, 3 November 1991
21	two persons assassinated in al-Nawahi	ports authority	assassinated by army colonel on 5 December 1991
22	'Abduh 'Ali Sharaf	traffic officer	due to spread of weapons, 5 November 1991
23	man kills his six-year old son in al-Mu'alla		9 December 1991
24	student opens fire on two colleagues in al-Mu'alla	students	13 November 1991
25	seven persons killed in Hadramaut by man called Basuhayb	employees	avenge his brother's death, 12 November 1991
26	Major Ahmad 'Ushn assassinated	major	mysterious incident, 28 October 1991
27	Russian expert assassinated	at thermo-electric plant	29 October 1991
28	flour mill guard assassinated	guard	by army colonel
29	deputy cadre director Assassinated	land transport	premeditated murder, 11 November 1991
30	David Milay ssassinated	oil expert	11 November 1991
31	Muhammad 'Ali al-Murayqi	colonel	mysterious death, 9 April 1991
32	Hashim Mahmud	deputy director of 14 UKTUBAR Printing Press	Mysterious Death, 9 April 1991
33	nine individuals from Lahij Governorate killed	employees	mysterious accident, 6 April 1991
34	Hana' 'Abbas 'Abdallah	six-year old girl	killed by Zubayd police chief, 7 January 1991
35	'Ali 'Abd-al-Razzaq Badhib	Central Committee and Chamber of Deputies member	premeditated negligence on part of state, 6 January 1991
36	Muhammad Sa'id Jaradah	poet, minister plenipotentiary	premeditated negligence on part of state, 30 January 1991
37	twelve people killed in Warraf hamlet, Haylah subdistrict, Ibb Province, including Lieutenant Colonel Dirham al-Qadiri and his son		13 May 1991
38	three persons assassinated in Yahar, Yafi' district, Lahij		25 April 1991
39	Sa'id Nusayb 'Awad	employee	mysterious accident, 27 March 1991

List of Assassinations in Yemen in the Past Few Months (Continued)

Number	Name	Profession	Cause of Death
40	Rashad Ahmad Yusuf		mysterious circumstances, 26 March 1991
41	five persons killed in 'Asr area, Sana'		political assassination, 6 May 1991
42	Ahmad al-Ru'ayni	head of Liberation Front's Crater Center	mysterious circumstances, 19 March 1991
43	Ahmad Kadish	Socialist Party member	mysterious accident, 16 May 1991
44	Ja'far 'Ali 'Awad	department head at Aden University	premeditated negligence on part of State, 7 June 1991
45	Zayn al-Saqqaq	lieutenant colonel at Ministry of Interior and Security	fabricated incident, 2 November 1991
46	Muhsin Ahmad al-Haydari	lieutenant colonel at Ministry of Interior and Security	eliminated at 'Anasir Hawsh Hospital in November
47	three persons assassinated in al-Subayhah, Lahij Governorate		political feuds, 7 April 1991
48	'Abduh Sa'id Sayf	employee	mysterious accident, 4 July 1991
49	Thabit Qayid al-Zawqari	lieutenant colonel	fabricated car accident, 6 December 1991
50	'Abdallah 'Ali Salim al-Wali	colonel	mysterious death in December 1991
51	Al-Hawfi	Socialist Party member, Sa'dah branch	political assassination, 5 December 1991
52	Lina Mustafa 'Abd-al-Khaliq	student	political assassination, 26 January 1992
53	Shaykh Faraj Abu-Bakr	Abyan Governorate bureau	mysterious death, 8 October 1991
54	Naji 'Ali al-Ashwal	Chamber of Deputies member	mysterious death, 14 January 1991
55	'Abdallah 'Abduh Sayf	oil company	mysterious death, 2 December 1991
56	Husayn al-'Arashah	Progressive Popular Organization member	mysterious death, 18 June 1991
57	Husayn Ahmad Muhammad	Mawdamah housing official	fabricated incident
58	'Abdallah Husayn Mansur	Socialist Party member	political feuds, 5 June 1991
59	'Arafah al-Hatabani	Yemeni Socialist Arab Ba'th Party member	political assassination, 12 May 1991
60	Fahmi Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid	police academy	political assassination, 30 September 1991
61	three persons killed in al-Wa'trah village, Lahij Governorate		Al 'Azabiyah tribes, 27 September 1991
62	Ahmad 'Ali Hammadi	merchant	negligence, 21 September 1991
63	Nasir Ahmad al-Jarmil	student	assassinated by unidentified persons, 3 November 1991
64	Muhammad 'Amir Zayd	Yemeni Socialist Party leader in Hawshi	political assassination, 2 February 1991
65	'Abdallah Ahmad 'Abdrabbuh	Yemeni Socialist Party	political assassination, 2 February 1991
66	Ahmad Yasin Sayfallah	Yemeni Socialist Party	political assassination, 2 February 1992
67	Shaykh Naji Bajjash al-Shayif	Yemeni Grouping member and prominent tribal leader	political assassination, April 1992
68	'Awad Salih al-Namis	founder of South Yemen's People's Militias	murder
69	Muslih Salih al-Shahwani	Socialist Party Organization committee member in Sa'dah	murder, March 1992
70	'Abdallah Muhammad Lutf	Socialist Party member in Ta'izz	assassination, April 1992

NEPAL

Government Urged To Support 'Democracy' in Bhutan

92AS1209C Kathmandu *THE RISING NEPAL*
in English 22 Jun 92 p 4

[Editorial: "Bhutanese Refugees"]

[Text] Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala told the press upon his return from the Rio Earth Summit Saturday that he had received assurances from Indian Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao that India would do what it could do to resolve the problem of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal. Since the last years, Bhutanese nationals of Nepalese origin have been fleeing their native land in their tens of thousands, accusing the Bhutanese government of unleashing a campaign of discrimination against the people of the southern part of Bhutan. The latest estimate of such refugees in eastern Nepal puts their number at 65,000. In absolute terms, this number might not appear very serious, especially in view of the displacements of people in many parts of the world, including South Asia. In proportionate terms—bearing in mind Nepal's population and the number of refugees entering the country—our problem is almost as serious as the influx of Bangladesh refugees into India in 1971 or the recent flow of Burmese refugees into Bangladesh. That our situation has not succeeded in generating similar international media mileage and humanitarian support is an altogether different matter, and a highly discouraging one at that.

The Bhutanese refugees deserve all the support of the Nepalese government and people during their present hour of despair and distress. However, there is a clear limit to what this country can extend by way of such support, especially in view of its own poor resources amid pressing needs and weak infrastructural base. A lasting solution to the refugees' plight cannot be found in anything other than their return to their homeland in dignity. While the exact ways and means of mitigating the present hardships of the refugees and facilitating their eventual return home will have to be worked out in earnest by the parties involved, the message of support that the Indian Prime Minister has expressed is heartening. In the immediate period, there is an urgent need to ensure proper food, clothing and shelter to the refugees who have been placed along the banks of Kankai River in Jhapa, a task that will require the good will and encouragement of all national and international quarters. With the onset of the monsoon rains, the possibility of disease wreaking havoc in the camps will have to be taken into serious concern by the authorities. Timely efforts need to be made to ensure that this additional peril does not threaten the already over-burdened refugees. An ideal solution would be the establishment of truly representative liberal democracy in Bhutan which will not only ensure the return home of the refugees in full confidence but also fulfill the long suppressed aspirations of the Bhutanese people for freedom. Bhutan is

reported to have told Nepal that not all those claiming to be Bhutanese refugees are Bhutanese. If so, Bhutan need not have shied away from Nepal's proposal for an impartial count. An immediate solution to the problem is not only in Nepal's interest but in the interest of the whole region and the world.

Political Alignments Seen Opportunistic

92AS1209B Kathmandu *THE RISING NEPAL*
in English 23 Jun 92 p 4

[Article by Mukti Raj: "Local Elections: New Political Alignments"; quotation marks; italicized words as published]

[Text] All political interests and stakes are hovering around the elections to the districts development committees. The Nepali Congress [NC], which took a convincing majority of seats of the nearly four thousand village development committees and thirty-six municipalities, has found many of the district development committees up for grabs.

Nodal Position

The second in race for the local elections—the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) [CPN-UML]—has vied for retaining its influence in the district development committees where it has bagged a considerable number of seats.

The local elections have placed the other parties in a nodal position as a result of which the ruling and the mainline opposition party are compelled to seek their support to form the district development committees where none of the parties have obtained the clear majority.

The parties that are being wooed for support in forming the district development committees have been the National Democratic Party [NDP], Nepal Sadbhavana Party and the Samyukta Jana Morcha in particular. The National Democratic Party seems set to forge an alliance with the ruling Nepali Congress, whereas the Samyukta Jana Morcha and 'Masal' have entered into a pact with their "natural ally"—the CPN (UML).

However, there does not appear to be any clear-cut strategy evolved by any political parties as to identifying foes and allies for the electoral alliance. The Nepali Congress seems guided by the tactics of expediency. It is committed to form as many district committees as possible by striking deals with any parties come what may.

The Nepali Congress Party was even prepared to ally with its rival CPN (UML), as pronounced by its party president Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, to push the radical Mashal out in Pyuthan district. But the CPN (UML) turned down the Congress offer and decided to go together with its fraternal ally.

Similarly, the CPN (UML) that possessed clout next to the ruling Nepali Congress to maintain control of the district development committee has also not evolved any definite policy.

Its politbureau, the highest decision-making body, is reported to have decided not to enter in any alliances with the ruling Nepali Congress. However, in Sindhupalchowk and Tehrathum it has forged an explicit understanding with the ruling party.

In the Sindhupalchowk district the ruling party has been offered the presidency of the district development committee while CPN (UML) is to keep the presidency in the Tehrathum district. In many districts, where combined opposition candidates can derail the Nepali Congress, the CPN (UML) has extended its cooperation to the national Democratic Party and Nepal Sadbhavana Party, but there has not emerged any semblance of alignment of political forces in many cases as the Nepali Congress itself is effortful to bring non-communist political forces in its favour.

For capturing the Ilam district development committee, the Nepali Congress and the National Democratic Party have made a seat sharing arrangement while Nepal Sadbhavana Party is being wooed by the ruling party in order to quell the combined opposition showdown in many Terai districts. The politics of alliances and counter-alliances which is being crystallised in the districts appears to be most confusing and hard to explain on the basis of any ideological yardstick.

The National Democratic Party, till few days back, had been treated as a 'political outcast' and degenerate by both the Nepali Congress and the leftists. The major plank of the leftist campaign for the local polls had been to expose the alleged 'NC-revivalist collusion'.

Similarly, the NC did not spare the NDP and breathed fire against it. Now, when it came to occupying the seat of power in local government, the one time political foe and adversary has turned a partner.

The NC-NDP alliance can be thought of as natural when their ideological tenor does not differ markedly from one another. They, no matter how estranged they seem outwardly, represent the same class compositions and tendencies.

But the alliance between the CPN (UML) and the NDP that is being reported in the press is hard to vindicate in any ideological cloak.

Similarly, the alliance of the CPN (UML) with Nepal Sadbhavana Party in connection to the Bhadrapur municipality has been questioned as the political platforms of both the parties stand in two opposite extremes.

The CPN (UML) has one justification as explained by its politbureau member Jhal Nath Khanal recently, that is, to forge an understanding among the opposition groups against the bullying tendencies of ruling party.

Should a party of left ideology come forth to sacrifice all its established political constituency in order to oppose the ruling party? This is a question posed from all quarters. It is a decision of sheer political expediency and opportunism dictated by an urge to savour the taste of power.

The CPN (UML) through its policy of striking an understanding with all political forces irrespective of ideology might garner some short-term gains but it shall have to suffer negative political consequences in the long run.

There shall be confusion among the people regarding the ideological distinctions and platforms of the political parties if the alliances are forged with no consideration to the political values and normative planks.

Inferences can easily be drawn in respect to the unpredictable course being followed by the political party consequent to which the people's faith shall be eroded.

Power at Any Cost?

The *Realpolitik* approach to grab power at any cost through adjustment and compromise on the ideological stances breeds ominous tendencies with politicians tempted to make unholy alliances at the cost of popular interests and expectations.

Analysts View Alliances in Aftermath of Local Elections

92AS1209A Kathmandu *THE RISING NEPAL*
in English 24 Jun 92 p 4

[Article by Saubyagya Shah: "The Alliance Game"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] With the completion of the local elections for 3,995 village development committees and the 36 municipalities of the kingdom, political interest is now focused on the upcoming 75 district development committee polls slated for this month. With the growing importance being given to local bodies as the vehicles of local development under the decentralization concept, it is no wonder that various political parties have entered a new phase of polarisation and alignments.

The District Boards

Unlike the VDC [Village Development Committee] elections which were directly formed on the basis of adult franchise and secret ballot, the district boards will be elected by the members of the VDC and municipal bodies. In that sense, the outcome in those districts where one or the other party commands more than 51 per cent of the eligible voters to the DDC [District Development Committee] is quite straight forward. Accordingly, the party with the over 51 per cent of the voter strength will be able to elect the president, vice president and most of the Ilaka (sub-division of the DDC representatives single handedly.

But the complications arise in those districts where no single party enjoys the support of a clear majority of the electorate college. In this situation, the major parties will definitely try to curry favour with the smaller organisations in order to achieve a working majority in the DDC elections. Similarly, the lesser parties, no doubt, will try to extract the maximum political mileage out of their position as the deciding minority. All this is part and parcel of the multi-party system where groups and lobbies form alliances and understandings to further one's electoral and larger political fortunes.

In Nepal's context, the interesting point is that since it is the first local unit election under multi-party arrangements, it holds sort of a novelty value as to how and among whom seat arrangements and alliances will be formed to decide the fate of the DDC elections in those districts where no party holds an absolute majority. The second factor contributing to the significance of the elections is that as many of the major parties hold mutually exclusive ideologies and outlooks, how will they, in actual practice, balance the canons of ideological purity and the mundane wheeling and dealing of the political expediency. The actual form and content of the inter-party interactions and arrangements during the forthcoming elections will no doubt have a formative influence on the evolution of party politics in Nepal.

According to the latest VDC and municipalities poll results, the Nepali Congress (NC) is set to dominate the DDC bodies in 42 districts on the numerical strength of its own eligible voters. Indeed, its candidates have already been elected unopposed to the post of president and vice-president of Dandheldhura and Manang districts. Similarly, the next largest party, the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) [CPN-UML] has enough eligible voters to dominate DDC bodies in two districts, Dhankuta and Bhojpur, on its own. Thus in these 44 districts where one of the major parties holds more than 51 per cent of the voters, the eventual outcome is a foregone conclusion because even if all other parties cooperate, they would still fall short of the 51 per cent mark.

Therefore, the real tussle will be in the other 31 districts where no single party has more than 51 per cent of the eligible voters thus necessitating some sort of electoral coalition amongst parties to decide the outcome. In these crucial 31 districts, the smaller parties will play the decisive role, depending upon which way they choose to throw their weight.

Amongst the smaller players, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) composed entirely of the erstwhile panchas has emerged as a force to be reckoned with after the local elections by capturing nearly 10 per cent of the local seats nationwide. It now appears to be capable of deciding the outcome of DDC elections in at least 21

districts by joining forces with one or the other major parties, viz NC and CPN (UML) and has emerged as the second largest party in six districts. Although shunned in the past by others as a regressive and reactionary force, the RPP seems to be finding grudging acceptance by major parties in their drive to form winning combinations.

Especially in the Terai, Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP) too has made some gains and can decide the outcome of the polls in five districts where there is a tie between the big players. It itself has emerged as the second largest party in Sarlahi and Rupendehi districts. Similarly, the radical Samyukta Jana Morcha (UPF) and Mashal have emerged as the largest parties in Rolpa and Pyuthan districts respectively and can easily control the DDC there if cooperation from other left factions is forthcoming. Moreover, the UPF is poised to play a decisive role in the poll outcome in four other districts.

With this power equation prevailing regarding the DDC elections, it is rather surprising that the various contestants have not yet categorically made their position clear to the public as to how and with whom they will form alliances or coalitions. Even though the various parties have not formally announced their groupings, hectic behind the scene "horse trading" is underway between parties so as to grab the DDC pie. As the election date nears, it's more and more looking like a no-holds-barred slug feast where every party will try to get the most out of the bargain regardless of ideological or other considerations. The only criterion will be electoral success.

Apart from the candid admission of NC president K.P. Bhattarai that his party was ready to forge alliances with any party as necessitated by the situation, others haven't been so forthcoming on this issue. Even though the CPN (UML) has gone on the record by saying that it won't form coalitions with either NC or RPP, its under-the-table arrangements made with NSP during the Bhadrapur municipal elections betrays the fact that it too is just as ready to cast aside its mantle of high ideological purity when it suits its purpose. As they say, politics makes strange bed-fellows.

The RPP and NSP, the main tiebreakers where there are no clear winners, are being feverishly courted by the major parties. It is interesting to note that only recently these organisations were political outcasts and pariahs, the former for being reactionary and the later for its communal and regional platforms.

Since the overall DDC poll scene is still in a flux and the pregnant silence from the contending parties not helping in clearing up the suspense either, a bizarre situation may arise in which party 'A' may collude with party 'B' in one district yet join forces with a third party to defeat party 'B' in another district. If that be the case, then

specific issues and programmes will be given the back burner while election process is turned into a marriage of convenience.

This sort of naked opportunism can not be ruled out as the minor parties also have not defined their election programmes and the RPP is even reported to have issued circulars to its district units instructing them to make arrangements for coalition on the basis of the local situation.

Purity Vs Pollution

Whatever the exact outcome of the DDC elections, it can be fairly predicted that NC will emerge the victor in at least 55 districts and the hitherto professed considerations of purity and pollution among different political parties will be appreciably diluted as occasioned by the expediency of vote-politics. In the process, the public will be forced to relearn the dictum that "politics is the art of the possible and convenience."

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